Rumors about Ak Bars Bank. Which banks will close soon. "Ak Bars Bank" is not closed

Tatarstan bank "Ak Bars" on the verge of license revocation?

Against the backdrop of the sinking Tatfondbank, residents of the Republic of Tatarstan began to look at other banks, in particular, Ak Bars. One gets the feeling that serious financial problems overtook the second bank of the republican government. Which is not surprising - after all, both Tatfondbank and Ak Bars were ruled for a long time by the same person suspected of withdrawing assets - Robert Musin.

On weekends, queues were observed at the ATMs of the Ak Bars Bank of Tatarstan, as eyewitnesses say. According to the bank's clients, many left with nothing, it was not possible to withdraw money from the card.

In the offices of "Ak Bars" there was too strong an influx of customers even by the standards of New Year's Eve - the majority came to collect their deposits. Until it's too late.

AT last years The Russian banking market experienced the "death" of several large banks and hundreds of smaller banks. What is characteristic - for most of them it all started with "minor problems" and a well-played "good mine" towards clients - they say, there is nothing to worry about. And then - "hanging" and missing from the bank's capital money, "burnt" deposits, and so on.

Experts began to suspect that Ak Bars had begun those same “not big problems”, to which the bank's customers reacted. Perhaps only those who decide to play it safe and take the money now will be able to save their own savings.

Earlier, the materials of the inspection by the Central Bank of Ak Bars Bank got into the press.

From these documents it follows that the regulator imposed a fine of 3.5 and 1.5 million rubles on the financial institution.

Thus, during the audit, “facts of underestimation by the bank of risks related to credit operations and transactions with securities. That is, Ak Bars is pursuing a high-risk policy - if you look at the website of the Central Bank, you can see that this phrase often accompanies the news of the revocation of a license from another bank.

In addition, the Tatarstan bank "Ak Bars" seemed to be distributing problem loans and, as it turned out, the leadership financial organization resisted creating provisions for problem loans.

Moreover, Bank of Russia analysts suspected the bank, whose main shareholder is the government of Tatarstan, of "hidden" lending to a number of companies at suspiciously low rates. In addition, Ak Bars, according to the materials of the Central Bank’s audit, was convicted of committing senseless from an economic point of view financial transactions with other contractors.

Recall that in the summer of this year, the authoritative rating agency Fitch has downgraded Ak Bars' Viability Rating to 'CCC' from 'B-', stating that there is a 'significant standalone risk'. This means that without the support of shareholders - in this case, the authorities of Tatarstan, the bank's viability hangs in the balance. The long-term rating on the possible default of the bank at the same time remained "with a negative outlook".

Analysts also counted 141 billion rubles of problem loans in the bank - the same ones that the Central Bank was worried about.

The current year "Ak Bars", most likely, would have ended with a loss, if not for the next budget injections. So, in August of this year, the State Housing Fund of Tatarstan, which owns 25.7% of the bank's shares, actually "filled" 9.8 billion rubles into Ak Bars at the expense of taxpayers' money. And if the Tatarstan bank completed three quarters of the year before last with a loss of 7.49 billion rubles, then the results of three quarters of this year allowed the bank to get into a small plus - only 476 million rubles.

That is, without budget injections, the loss of Ak Bars this year would have become even greater. In addition, investors should be concerned about the fact that the republic simply does not have the funds for new “infusions” into Ak Bars. Absence free funds manifested itself already at the stage when the republican authorities were offered to participate financially in Tatfondbank, which otherwise would face the revocation of its license. But the government of Rustam Minnikhanov has only one answer - there is no extra money. And without budgetary support, Ak Bars, experts say, will “die” in the near future.

However, it is curious to think - where did all these budget billions, which have already been pumped into Akbars, and which "magically" did not improve the bank's affairs, go?

Musin's trail

Those familiar with the situation claim that the panic among Ak Bars customers did not rise out of nowhere. Recall that in 2002 - 2013, Robert Musin was listed as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Ak Bars Bank. This is exactly the same Musin, who on December 15 was removed from the post of chairman of the board of the sinking Tatfondbank.

Participants in the banking sector believe that it was Musin who brought the TFB, which is threatened with either a license revocation or, at best, reorganization, to the state of a “dummy”. In Ak Bars, rumors about a possible merger with the TFB, as a possible way to save Tatfondbank, were categorically denied. Is it because Musin, who spent 11 years at the head of Ak Bars, managed to do things in a financial organization?

The banker, we recall, was called the author of schemes for withdrawing money not only from Tatfondbank itself, but also from the Sovetsky bank, which he was reorganizing. The bank being rehabilitated actually lost 15 billion rubles, despite the fact that the court refused to satisfy the appeal of the TFB management against the court's decision - all 15 billion rubles, as well as the interest for using the loan, Tatfondbank owes Sovetsky. There is a solution, but where exactly are these billions now? It is possible that those in whose interests the withdrawal of money from Sovetsky was started only needed to wait for the “death” of the TFB - and there the general confusion will help to “lose” all 15 billion so that they will not return to Sovetsky ...

More importantly, it seems that at the end of last year - the beginning of this year, Robert Musin got rid of Ak Bars shares.

So, in early January 2016, it became known about the change in the composition of shareholders the largest bank Tatarstan. The owners of almost a tenth of the bank's shares have changed.

According to rumors, it was Robert Musin who could get rid of Ak Bars shares at that time. And in the summer of 2015, the banks “exchanged” the rights to claim loans. It is noteworthy: at that time, Musin was still a shareholder of both banks, and held the chair of the chairman of the board at Tatfondbank.

More specifically, Ak Bars bought from Tatfondbank the rights to claim loans for almost 2.5 billion rubles. In return, TFB received from Ak Bars the right to claim the debts of Smart Electronics for a total of 856 million rubles. It is noteworthy that the debtor office was part of the DOMO group, control over which was “held” by Musin. That is, Musin really “ran away” from Ak Bars, taking his debts to another bank?

Recall that Mr. Musin knows how to leave in English and not pay off his debts like no one else. Recall the story of a year ago with the bankruptcy of the White Wind Digital retail chain. The company began to show losses, and its owners decided to file for their own bankruptcy. They owed at that time 10 billion rubles. something could have fallen to creditors - the assets of the trading network were then estimated at almost 3 billion rubles. but just before the bankruptcy, a couple of re-registrations were carried out, and now - bailiffs there was nothing to arrest. The BVC did not have any property or money left.

And the owners of this wonderful company, apparently, are the beautiful representative of the Musin family - his wife Aida Ilyasova.

And a man like Musin managed Ak Bars for 11 years. The hasty “escape” of Robert Musin from the bank and the statements of clients about the impossibility of withdrawing money from cards and taking their deposits casts serious suspicions that Ak Bars will soon repeat the history of Tatfondbank.

Rumors about ABB's problems arose after the transition of employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to service in VTB

Chairman of the Board of Directors of Ak Bars Bank and General Director of Svyazinvestneftekhim Valery Sorokin today held an emergency press conference on behalf of the President of Tatarstan. The reason for the meeting was yesterday's information attacks with a call to withdraw money from accounts and messages about the bank's problems. The management of "Ak Bars" Bank denied the information, telling who is behind it and how the bank really is doing. Read more in the material of Realnoe Vremya.

Fake authors are the police?

At a meeting with journalists, Valery Sorokin immediately tried to explain where the rumors about the problems of Ak Bars Bank came from. This morning, the head of Svyazinvestneftekhim was convinced of the fact that fake information about the creditor is circulating in the city with might and main.

As soon as I got into the car, my driver asked me: “Is it true that Ak Bars is closing?” I realized that since the situation reached the driver, it means that the matter is already serious. I ask him how he knows. No, he did not receive a text message. He was told by a familiar traffic cop. Any decent driver has a familiar traffic cop, otherwise it is difficult for him to live. I even know this traffic cop, but I won't talk, - says Valery Sorokin.

According to him, in fact, the source of information is much wider. The fact is that throughout the country, the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is switching to service in VTB, which acts as a sponsor of the Dynamo sports society. The lender comprehensively services the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and only in Tatarstan, in the person of Ak Bars, "they resisted this to the last."

According to Sorokin, the fact is that throughout the country the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is switching to service in VTB. Photo uralweb.ru

Ak Bars Bank issued 1.5 million plastic cards, 600 thousand of which are salaries. 6,600 police officers of Tatarstan also received money on them. Assuming that half of them are married, there are about 10,000 primary media who were told that they would receive their salary through another bank, Sorokin explains. Considering the general background in banking since the end of last year, it's not hard to guess what people will conclude.

Naturally, a reasonable person, or, as one of the critics used to say, an "astute reader", immediately understands: this is not a pure matter. Our man is a collectivist, he must warn his friends. Then I tell you as a mathematician: 10 thousand carriers of primary information that something is not right, we take 3 people we know from each. At the 4th step there will be all the able-bodied population of Kazan, at the 5th step - more than half of the population of Tatarstan through a simple progression, - the chairman of the Board of Directors of Ak Bars describes the scheme for disseminating erroneously perceived information.

Against the backdrop of the situation with Tatfondbank and a number of other credit institutions, rumors agitated the clients of Ak Bars Bank. Sorokin called two more cases with an announcement in a pharmacy about the refusal to serve on the Ak Bars card and make a payment from another bank, allegedly due to the “low rating of Ak Bars”, the intrigues of competitors. There was a case with a call in social networks that the Russians should not carry money to national banks.

And then, according to the scenario of Malakhov’s program “Let them talk,” it started. They opened their mouths wider and forward - they don’t listen to anyone. Even now, I think more than half of the comments on my speech will come down to the fact that the bank is lying. Because our Soviet people are used to reading newspapers between the lines,” Sorokin complained.

For his part, the head of Svyazinvestneftekhim advised Ak Bars' clients to "be friends with their heads" and analyze the bank's performance. The lender does not intend to file a complaint about information attacks with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, considering the authors of fakes not specific people, but “a multi-headed hydra.”

Over the past three days, no more than 900 deposits have been closed, almost 3,000 new ones have been opened, and about 14 million rubles of unpaid interest on early withdrawn deposits remained in the bank, Sorokin said. Photo by Daria Turtseva

Ak Bars won and lost from the TFB crisis

It's all about how to measure winnings, explains Sorokin. Since December last year, Ak Bars has had a steady influx of deposits from individuals.

What is called success? If this is a success, then this situation is probably developing successfully. Although we already talked about this in December, we assumed a certain rebound from the situation and prepared for this - what I called - to charge ATMs to capacity. Which, in fact, is happening now, - says the chairman of the board of directors of Ak Bars.

At the same time, there are clients who nevertheless succumbed to panic and took their deposits ahead of schedule. Nevertheless, the influx of new depositors significantly exceeds the outflow. So, over the past three days, no more than 900 deposits were closed, almost 3,000 new ones were opened, and about 14 million rubles of unpaid interest on early withdrawn deposits remained in the bank.

One client comes and says: “And they told me that the bank had 2 days left. In 2 days, if you don’t have time to remove it, then it will be - you yourself know how. Well, how to convince him? Only without paying him a percentage, - Valery Sorokin gives an example.

At the same time, according to him, as of December 1 last year total amount on deposits of individuals in the bank amounted to 104.165 million rubles, and as of February 1 this - 112.395 million rubles.

Valery Sorokin himself, as an experiment, became a client of 5 banks in order to study how colleagues work. In this peculiar rating, in his opinion, Ak Bars took a solid middle ground.

Valery Sorokin called the situation with the TFB and a number of other Tatarstan banks typical for the entire banking system in Russia and cited as an example the words of the head of the Central Bank of Russia that Russia would need a few more years to “clear the banks”. Photo by Maxim Platonov

"There is no such tap - to drink dry rivers"

Valery Sorokin called the situation with the TFB and a number of other Tatarstan banks typical for the entire banking system in Russia and cited as an example the words of the head of the Central Bank of Russia that Russia would need a few more years to “clear the banks”. When asked how to restore trust in regional banks in Tatarstan, the leadership of Ak Bars answered unequivocally: "To work."

I don't see any unique opportunities from the local banking community. There is no separate tap with money - to drink dry rivers. The market is competitive, you have to compete with heavyweights. Everyone has to look for some kind of niche, explains Sorokin.

Question: did the National Bank do everything to stop the problem, the interlocutor left unanswered. As well as a request to tell what the government of Tatarstan is doing to reorganize Tatfondbank.

I don't have the mandate to comment on the government's position, don't get me wrong. The only thing I can ask you is to rewind and see from what moment the propaganda began that Tatfondbank is government? - Valery Sorokin answered a question with a question.

In the memory of journalists, such information appeared in the fall. But the head of Svyazinvestneftekhim urged to take into account that the bank had existed for a long time even before that. The propaganda was deliberate, Sorokin hinted:

Obviously, in the mass consciousness of the same depositors, a bank with state participation is more trustworthy than a bank with private participation.

To attract more contributors? the press asked.

I can only speculate, I can't comment on it, - summed up Valery Sorokin.

Vasily Shirshov

Under the reliability of the bank we will understand the totality of factors under which the bank is able to fulfill its obligations, have an adequate margin of safety when crisis situations, do not violate the standards and laws established by the Bank of Russia.

It should be borne in mind that only on the basis of reporting it is impossible to accurately determine the degree of reliability of the bank, so the study below is indicative.

Bank stability is the ability to withstand any external influences. Dynamics over a certain period may show stability (either improvement or deterioration) of various indicators, which may also indicate the stability of the bank.

Joint Stock commercial Bank"AK BARS" (public joint-stock company) is largest Russian bank and among them it ranks 18th in terms of net assets.

On the reporting date(January 01, 2020) the net assets of AK BARS Bank amounted to 616.20 billion rubles In a year assets increased by 12.15%. Growth of net assets positively affected the return on assets ROI: over the year, the net return on assets increased from 0.59% to 1.20% .

In terms of services rendered, the bank mainly attracts client money.

AK BARS - state-owned bank .

Bank AK BARS - has the right to work with the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation and can attract its funds in trust management, in deposits and savings for housing military personnel; has the right to work with non-state pension funds implementing the mandatory pension insurance , and can attract pension savings and savings for housing for military personnel; has the right to open accounts and deposits in accordance with the law 213-FZ of July 21, 2014. , i.e. organizations of strategic importance for the military-industrial complex and security of the Russian Federation; in credit organization appointed authorized representatives of the Bank of Russia.

Liquidity and reliability

The bank's liquid assets are those bank funds that can be quickly turned into cash in order to return them to depositor customers. To assess liquidity, consider a period of approximately 30 days during which the bank will be able (or not able) to fulfill part of its obligations. financial obligations(because no bank can return all obligations within 30 days). This "part" is called the "proposed outflow". Liquidity can be considered an important component of the concept of bank reliability.

Brief Structure highly liquid assets present in the form of a table:

From the table of liquid assets, we see that the amounts of cash on hand, interbank loans placed for up to 30 days, highly liquid securities of the Russian Federation, have slightly changed, the amounts of funds on accounts with the Bank of Russia, NOSTRO correspondent accounts in banks (net), highly liquid securities securities of banks and governments, while the volume of highly liquid assets, taking into account discounts and adjustments (based on Directive No. 3269-U dated May 31, 2014), increased over the year from 81.38 to 96.63 billion rubles

Structure current liabilities is shown in the following table:

During the period under review, what happened to the resource base was that the amounts of deposits of individuals with a period of more than a year, other deposits of individuals (including individual entrepreneurs) (for a period of up to 1 year), deposits and other funds of legal entities changed slightly ( up to 1 year), incl. current funds of legal entities (excluding individual entrepreneurs), interest payment obligations, delinquencies, accounts payable and other debts, the amounts of correspondent accounts of LORO banks, own securities have greatly increased, the amounts of interbank loans received for up to 30 days have greatly decreased, while the expected outflow cash decreased over the year from 84.77 to 63.98 billion rubles

At the moment under consideration, the ratio of highly liquid assets (funds that are easily available to the bank over the next month) and the estimated outflow of current liabilities gives us the value 151.04% what says good margin of safety to overcome a possible outflow of funds from bank customers.

In correlation with this, the standards of instant (H2) and current (H3) liquidity are important for consideration, the minimum values ​​of which are set at 15% and 50%, respectively. Here we see that the H2 and H3 standards are now at sufficient level.

Now let's track the dynamics of change liquidity indicators during a year:

According to the median method (discarding sharp peaks): the sum of the norm of instant liquidity H2 during of the year unstable and tends to significant growth, but for the last half a year tends to increase, the amount of the standard current liquidity H3 during of the year unstable and tends to decrease slightly, but over the last half a year tends to decrease, and the expert reliability of the bank during of the year unstable and tends to increase, but over the past half a year tends to significant growth.

Other coefficients for assessing the liquidity of the bank PJSC "AK BARS" BANK can be seen at this link.

Structure and dynamics of the balance sheet

The volume of assets generating income for the bank is 84.80% in total assets, and the volume of interest-bearing liabilities is 78.12% in total liabilities. The volume of earning assets is approximately in line with the average for the largest Russian banks (87%).

Structure earning assets at the moment and a year ago:

We see that the amounts of Loans to legal entities, Loans to individuals, Promissory notes have slightly changed, the amounts of Investments in leasing operations and acquired rights of claim, Investments in securities have increased, the amounts of Interbank loans have decreased, and the total amount of earning assets increased by 10.6% from 472.56 to 522.55 billion rubles

Ratio of other securities bank AK BARS to sources of own funds is 207.46% . Such a high proportion may indicate the possible presence of problem assets.

Analytics by degree of security issued loans, as well as their structure:

An analysis of the table suggests that the bank is focusing on diversified lending, the form of security of which is guarantees and guarantees. The overall level of loan collateral is quite high and possible loan defaults are likely to be offset by the amount of collateral.

Brief structure interest liabilities(i.e. for which the bank usually pays interest to the client):

We see that the amounts of deposits of individuals have changed slightly. persons, the amount has increased Funds legal. persons, the amounts of funds of banks (interbank loans and correspondent accounts) decreased significantly, and the total amount of interest-bearing liabilities increased by 14.0% from 422.14 to 481.37 billion rubles

The structure of assets and liabilities of PJSC "AK BARS" BANK can be considered in more detail.

Profitability

Profitability of sources of own funds (calculated according to balance sheet data) increased over the year from 4.21% to 8.48%. At the same time, the return on equity ROE (calculated on forms 102 and 134) increased over the year from 3.61% to 8.84%(here and below, data are given in percent per annum for the nearest quarterly date).

Net interest margin decreased over the year from 2.28% to 1.91%. Profitability of lending operations decreased over the year from 11.90% to 9.63%. The cost of borrowed funds decreased over the year from 5.68% to 5.37%. The cost of household funds (individuals) decreased over the year With

The Central Bank found the courage to do what it should have done a long time ago - it revoked the license from Tatfondbank. For this bold, perhaps even courageous step, one can only applaud the head of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Elvira Nabiullina.

After all, she comes from the same republic as the bank. But, not afraid. Well done.

For a long time, the Republic of Tatarstan considered a role model. In the previous crisis of 2008-2009, not a single Tatarstan bank suffered. And during this crisis, the republic's banking system held out for a long time. But in 2016, the dam burst. Banks began to die like flies, one after another. The first sign was the Kama Horizon bank, which lost its license on November 11, 2016. And in December 2016, problems in the banking system of the republic began to grow like a snowball.

"Tatfondbank" became the trigger for the systemic banking crisis in the republic. First, the Central Bank was forced to declare a moratorium on satisfying the requirements of creditors, and introduce a temporary administration in Tatfondbank (December 15, 2016). After his actual clinical death, several more banks (associated, or even not associated with him) limited or even completely stopped their work. "Intechbank", "Radiotechbank", "Timer Bank" and "Tatagroprombank" staggered. As a result, the Central Bank was forced to announce a moratorium on satisfying the requirements of creditors, and introduce temporary administration at Intekhbank (December 23, 2016). Bulgar Bank lost its license on January 16, 2017. In February, Anchor Bank staggered. In early March, Ankor Bank, Intekhbank and Tatfondbank lost their licenses.

Intuition tells me that this is not the end. The complete destruction of the banking system of the Republic of Tatarstan is still very, very far away. In this region, there are still very tasty morsels for the redistribution of property. After all, this has long become a classic - push the falling one. Especially when the pie is clearly shrinking, and there is not enough of it for everyone. At such moments, everyone is for himself, and with pleasure he will take someone else's piece of a pie melting before his eyes.

But first, let's finish with Tatfondbank. The Central Bank called a press conference for a narrow circle of limited people, at which he told a lot of interesting facts. The Central Bank could have expanded the list of journalists invited to the press conference through video conferencing (after all, Tatfondbank worked not only in Kazan and Moscow, and there could well have been interested journalists in other regions of its presence), but did not do this. As they say, God be his judge. About the facts.

On the night before the revocation of the license from Tatfondbank, a real brainstorming session took place in Moscow and Kazan. A last attempt was made to save this bank. She was unsuccessful. And the blame for this, in my purely subjective opinion, is exclusively the shareholders and creditors of Tatfondbank. The Tatars, it seems, wanted to limit themselves to a minimum of their own funds when saving this bank. The lion's share, according to their ideas, was to be paid by Moscow. Alas and ah, the freebie did not work. Indirectly, this version was confirmed by Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Dmitry Tulin, who said: "Shareholders offered very limited support, which was not enough to restore the bank's financial position."

At a press conference, it turned out that the Central Bank already in the spring of 2016 knew that Tatfondbank "is in a difficult financial situation", that "capital is lost", that "loss of liquidity can occur at any moment." All this time there was a tug-of-war on the topic - who will pay for the continuation of the banquet? The numbers of "holes" in the bank's balance sheet, as is usually the case in such cases, were constantly growing. Before the introduction of the provisional administration, it was about 43 billion rubles, on February 1 this amount increased to 97 billion rubles, now the Central Bank is already talking about 120 billion rubles. 220-230 billion rubles would have to be allocated to save the bank, which, given the volume of insurance payments in the amount of 54 billion rubles, looks economically inexpedient.

The authorities of Tatarstan, as the main shareholder of Tatfondbank, verbally constantly demonstrated their desire to save the bank. I will confine myself to quotes from the President of the Republic of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov. They will be sufficient. On December 13, 2016, he told reporters that the authorities of Tatarstan would support the bank: "To the best of our ability, we are always ready to help." While emphasizing that mergers with largest bank Republic "Ak Barsom" will not be. On January 12, 2017, he said: "Of course, we are ready to provide all possible assistance if a sanatorium is identified. We have some kind of support, and we understand that this is a very important project for us." On January 14, 2017, at the XXVI conference of the Tatarstan regional branch of the All-Russian political party "United Russia", he stated: "Today, the authorities are conducting all necessary work, and there is confidence that we will cope with these problems." On January 18, 2017, on the sidelines of the forum in Davos, he told reporters: "There is a preliminary discussion (bail-in). But you need a sanator, you need to talk with him, with a sanator. Unfortunately, there is no [certainty with the candidacy of the sanatorium] yet, so we are waiting. We are ready to assist the sanatorium in any form... If a sanatorium comes, we will also look for resources, assets that will allow the sanatorium to solve this problem... We will not be outside observers, we will actively support."

However, in reality, the authorities of the republic were not very eager to save the sinking bank. So, back in December 2016, Vedomosti reported that the Central Bank invited bank representatives to a meeting with Rustam Minnikhanov, but most of those invited did not continue communication after the meeting. At the same time, a well-informed source from the Tatarstan publication "Business Online" said the following: "A decision was made to help and develop only one bank."

How, then, to explain the appearance, 3 days before the revocation of the license, of the message that the TAIF holding (which controls 96% of the chemical, petrochemical and oil and gas processing industries of Tatarstan) is allegedly ready to become a strategic investor in Tatfondbank? This is similar to an attempt by the authorities of Tatarstan to shift the responsibility for the death of their bank to the management of the Central Bank. Like, we did everything we could, we fought to the last to save the bank, but the evil central bank put sticks in our wheels all the time.

However, it is worth recalling that it was the authorities of Tatarstan that were the largest shareholder of Tatfondbank. It was in their power to prevent the bankruptcy of the bank. But they didn't. Either they couldn't or they didn't want to. As a result of the revocation of the license from the bank, the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan will suffer great reputational losses. If the authorities knew that the bank was actually being plundered, and did not stop it, then all the republican officials involved in this should be arrested and put in a cell next to the former chairman of the bank's board, Robert Musin, who was arrested the other day. And if the authorities did not know this, then they were either "shameful suckers" who were fooled by "Musin and Company", or absolutely illiterate non-professionals incapable of managing a bank. Or all combined. Who are these people? The chairman of the board of directors of the bank was the Prime Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan Ildar Shafkatovich Khalikov. The members of the board of directors of the bank were Deputy Minister of Finance of the Republic of Tatarstan Danil Vertolievich Volkov and Deputy Minister of Land and Property Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan Farit Shagitovich Musin. The other members of the board of directors of the bank, by the way, turned out to be no better than those listed. All, or empty zeros, or in a fraction.

Well, now let's deal with the largest bank in Tatarstan - Ak Bars. Why not the second bank of the republic - "Zenith"? Strange, but there are no rumors about him, unlike the first. Perhaps because Tatneft is the key shareholder of Zenit Bank. Firstly, her reputation did not suffer from the bankruptcy of Tatfondbank. She was not a shareholder there, unlike the authorities of Tatarstan, who are shareholders of Ak Bars. Secondly, Tatneft has much more free resources to support its bank than the authorities of Tatarstan have to support their bank.

Let's compare the figures of Ak Bars and Tatfondbank in the nine months of 2016, and see what happens in the end.

According to the interim condensed consolidated financial information in accordance with international standards financial reporting(IFRS) for the nine months of 2016, securities in the assets of Ak Bars accounted for 15.9% (63.316 billion rubles). For reference, according to the same IFRS, Tatfondbank had 17.3% (38.147 billion rubles) on the same date. Both in this section have a negative. Ak Bars has acquired shares in its securities portfolio for 32.035 billion rubles Russian companies(?!). This is 8.1% of all bank assets. Yes, stocks can periodically pay dividends, but a fall in their price can eat up all the dividends in a few years. Tatfondbank has virtually no shares, but some of the securities worth 10.198 billion rubles are encumbered with collateral for repo transactions. This is 4.6% of all bank assets.

How many of the securities purchased by "Ak Bars" accounted for investments in the bonds of "Tatfondbank", unfortunately, is not said. It's a pity. There is only a total figure of investments in corporate bonds - 7.352 billion rubles. As for Tatfondbank itself, it issued debt securities worth 17.279 billion rubles, plus Eurobonds worth 0.986 billion rubles. Certainly, some part of these bonds was bought by banks. Including the Ak Bars bank. Unfortunately, it is still unknown who bought it, and how much.

Loans legal entities in the assets of Ak Bars amounted to 191.085 billion rubles (48.2% of assets), loans individuals- 37.428 billion rubles (9.4%), provision for depreciation of the loan portfolio - 35.781 billion rubles (9.0%). Ak Bars' reserves grew from 28.226 billion rubles to 35.781 billion rubles in nine months.

Loans to legal entities in the assets of Tatfondbank amounted to 127.866 billion rubles (57.9% of assets), loans to individuals - 28.926 billion rubles (13.1%), provision for impairment of the loan portfolio - 17.597 billion rubles (7.9%) . Tatfondbank's reserves fell (?!) from 18.295 billion rubles to 17.597 billion rubles in nine months.

Unfortunately, both banks do not have any information about overdue debts in their IFRS statements. But such information is in a file called "Explanatory information to the interim accounting (financial) statements for 9 months of 2016".

Bank "Ak bars" overdue debt amounted to 17.368 billion rubles (6.4% of the loan debt, amounting to 272.478 billion rubles), plus restructured debt in the amount of 19.786 billion rubles (7.3%). In total - 13.7% of the loan debt. Provisions for possible losses in the file "Explanatory Information" are indicated in the amount of 25.007 billion rubles.

Tatfondbank's overdue debt amounted to 5.378 billion rubles (3.7% of the loan debt, which amounted to 144.217 billion rubles), plus restructured debt in the amount of 4.106 billion rubles (2.8%). In total - 6.5% of the loan debt. Provisions for possible losses in the file "Explanatory Information" are indicated in the amount of 14.067 billion rubles.

If Ak Bars bank formed reserves for possible losses on loans according to the lower bar set by the Central Bank in accordance with regulation No. 254-P (bad loans - 100% of the debt amount, problem loans - 51%, doubtful loans - 21%, non-standard loans - 1%), then the reserves of the bank "Ak bars" should have amounted to 35.742 billion rubles (19.438 + 4.908 + 9.320 + 2.076). This figure follows from the data on the classification of the bank's assets by quality category, indicated on page 26. This is the lowest possible estimate. The bank itself indicates in the line of the settlement reserve for loan debt the figure of 40.967 billion rubles. This is commendable severity. However, it is not implemented in practice, since Ak Bars actually formed reserves in the amount of 28.641 billion rubles. The shortfall from the minimum is 7.101 billion rubles. The shortage of reserves of 7.101 billion rubles with equity capital of 63.363 billion rubles is not a very big problem for Ak Bars Bank. Capital adequacy ratio H1.0 was 11.64%.

If Tatfondbank formed reserves for possible losses on loans according to the lower bar set by the Central Bank in accordance with regulation No. 254-P (bad loans - 100% of the debt amount, problem loans - 51%, doubtful loans - 21%, non-standard loans - 1%), then the reserves of Tatfondbank should have amounted to 29.412 billion rubles (10.484 + 11.797 + 6.397 + 0.734). This figure follows from the data on the classification of the bank's assets by quality category, indicated on pages 37-38. This is the lowest possible score. The bank itself indicates in the line of the settlement reserve for loan debt the figure of 29.878 billion rubles. This is commendable severity. However, it is not implemented in practice, since Tatfondbank actually formed reserves in the amount of 16.114 billion rubles. The shortfall from the minimum is 13.298 billion rubles. The shortage of reserves of 13.298 billion rubles with equity capital of 29.488 billion rubles is a very big problem for Tatfondbank. The capital adequacy ratio H1.0 according to the reporting was 12.1%. However, it is not violated only because the bank has created insufficient reserves. If the reserves were created in full, the Central Bank would already have grounds for revoking the license on October 1, 2016

It turns out that Tatfondbank, even in open reporting, had very big problems. Ak Bars has no visible problems. This does not mean that they do not exist at all. Judging by the statements, Tatfondbank's own capital was positive, although in reality there was most likely no capital even then.

But it's not even about whether Ak Bars has problems or not. The point is, will the authorities of Tatarstan be able to help their second bank if problems come to light, or not? The experience with the first "Tatfondbank" has convincingly shown that the authorities of Tatarstan will not be able to help. Even if they want to. Because they themselves are in debt, like in silks. They don't have real money. A real estate injection and/or land plots at the moment when customers demand from the bank to return their cash, the bank will not help in any way. The same experience convincingly showed that the federal authorities would not save Ak Bars at their own expense. The stability of the banking system of Tatarstan has already suffered greatly due to the simultaneous destruction of a quarter of all the assets of the system. Confidence in her fell below the plinth. Trust in the authorities of Tatarstan is in the same place. Such an unstable situation may well be used by the players to redistribute the local market in their favor. Now quite a small push is enough for Ak Bars to stagger. And then a little more for him to fall. It is enough to create panic among the population, and they will "carry out" any bank.

What advice can be given to the Tatarstan authorities in the current situation? Since they have already demonstrated in all its glory their own illiteracy in the management of their banks, having brought one of them to bankruptcy, and have demonstrated their own illiteracy in crisis management in all its glory, then they should consider selling their stake in Ak Bars Bank "as long as you can get at least something for this share. Otherwise, if they lose their second bank, then they will lose their familiar warm places. Either the angry population will take them down, or the federal authorities.

Under the reliability of the bank, we mean a set of factors under which the bank is able to fulfill its obligations, have an adequate margin of safety in crisis situations, and not violate the standards and laws established by the Bank of Russia.

It should be borne in mind that only on the basis of reporting it is impossible to accurately determine the degree of reliability of the bank, so the study below is indicative.

Bank stability is the ability to withstand any external influences. Dynamics over a certain period may show stability (either improvement or deterioration) of various indicators, which may also indicate the stability of the bank.

Joint Stock Commercial Bank "AK BARS" (Public Joint Stock Company) is largest by a Russian bank and ranks 18th among them in terms of net assets.

As of the reporting date (January 01, 2020), the net assets of AK BARS Bank amounted to 616.20 billion rubles In a year assets increased by 12.15%. Growth of net assets positively affected the return on assets ROI: over the year, the net return on assets increased from 0.59% to 1.20% .

In terms of services rendered, the bank mainly attracts client money.

AK BARS - state-owned bank .

Bank AK BARS - has the right to work with the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation and may involve its funds in trust management, in deposits and savings for the housing provision of military personnel; has the right to work with non-state pension funds that provide mandatory pension insurance , and can attract pension savings and savings for housing for military personnel; has the right to open accounts and deposits in accordance with the law 213-FZ of July 21, 2014. , i.e. organizations of strategic importance for the military-industrial complex and security of the Russian Federation; to a credit institution appointed authorized representatives of the Bank of Russia.

Liquidity and reliability

The bank's liquid assets are those bank funds that can be quickly turned into cash in order to return them to depositor customers. To assess liquidity, consider a period of approximately 30 days, during which the bank will be able (or not able) to fulfill part of its financial obligations (because no bank can repay all obligations within 30 days). This "part" is called the "proposed outflow". Liquidity can be considered an important component of the concept of bank reliability.

Brief Structure highly liquid assets present in the form of a table:

From the table of liquid assets, we see that the amounts of cash on hand, interbank loans placed for up to 30 days, highly liquid securities of the Russian Federation, have slightly changed, the amounts of funds on accounts with the Bank of Russia, NOSTRO correspondent accounts in banks (net), highly liquid securities securities of banks and governments, while the volume of highly liquid assets, taking into account discounts and adjustments (based on Directive No. 3269-U dated May 31, 2014), increased over the year from 81.38 to 96.63 billion rubles

Structure current liabilities is shown in the following table:

During the period under review, what happened to the resource base was that the amounts of deposits of individuals with a period of more than a year, other deposits of individuals (including individual entrepreneurs) (for a period of up to 1 year), deposits and other funds of legal entities changed slightly ( up to 1 year), incl. current funds of legal entities (excluding individual entrepreneurs), interest payment obligations, delinquencies, accounts payable and other debts, the amounts of correspondent accounts of LORO banks, own securities have greatly increased, the amounts of interbank loans received for up to 30 days have greatly decreased, while the expected outflow cash decreased over the year from 84.77 to 63.98 billion rubles

At the moment under consideration, the ratio of highly liquid assets (funds that are easily available to the bank over the next month) and the estimated outflow of current liabilities gives us the value 151.04% what says good margin of safety to overcome a possible outflow of funds from bank customers.

In correlation with this, the standards of instant (H2) and current (H3) liquidity are important for consideration, the minimum values ​​of which are set at 15% and 50%, respectively. Here we see that the H2 and H3 standards are now at sufficient level.

Now let's track the dynamics of change liquidity indicators during a year:

According to the median method (discarding sharp peaks): the sum of the norm of instant liquidity H2 during of the year unstable and tends to significant growth, but for the last half a year tends to increase, the amount of the current liquidity ratio H3 during of the year unstable and tends to decrease slightly, but over the last half a year tends to decrease, and the expert reliability of the bank during of the year unstable and tends to increase, but over the past half a year tends to significant growth.

Other coefficients for assessing the liquidity of the bank PJSC "AK BARS" BANK can be seen at this link.

Structure and dynamics of the balance sheet

The volume of assets generating income for the bank is 84.80% in total assets, and the volume of interest-bearing liabilities is 78.12% in total liabilities. The volume of earning assets roughly corresponds to the average for the largest Russian banks (87%).

Structure earning assets at the moment and a year ago:

We see that the amounts of Loans to legal entities, Loans to individuals, Promissory notes have slightly changed, the amounts of Investments in leasing operations and acquired rights of claim, Investments in securities have increased, the amounts of Interbank loans have decreased, and the total amount of earning assets increased by 10.6% from 472.56 to 522.55 billion rubles

Ratio of other securities bank AK BARS to sources of own funds is 207.46% . Such a high proportion may indicate the possible presence of problem assets.

Analytics by degree of security issued loans, as well as their structure:

An analysis of the table suggests that the bank is focusing on diversified lending, the form of security of which is guarantees and guarantees. The overall level of loan collateral is quite high and possible loan defaults are likely to be offset by the amount of collateral.

Brief structure interest liabilities(i.e. for which the bank usually pays interest to the client):

We see that the amounts of deposits of individuals have changed slightly. persons, the amount has increased Funds legal. persons, the amounts of funds of banks (interbank loans and correspondent accounts) decreased significantly, and the total amount of interest-bearing liabilities increased by 14.0% from 422.14 to 481.37 billion rubles

The structure of assets and liabilities of PJSC "AK BARS" BANK can be considered in more detail.

Profitability

Profitability of sources of own funds (calculated according to balance sheet data) increased over the year from 4.21% to 8.48%. At the same time, the return on equity ROE (calculated on forms 102 and 134) increased over the year from 3.61% to 8.84%(here and below, data are given in percent per annum for the nearest quarterly date).

Net interest margin decreased over the year from 2.28% to 1.91%. Profitability of lending operations decreased over the year from 11.90% to 9.63%. The cost of borrowed funds decreased over the year from 5.68% to 5.37%. The cost of household funds (individuals) decreased over the year With