slide 1
Document No. 1, page 172 In February 1931, JV Stalin declared: “We must not slow down! On the contrary, they must be increased to the extent of one's strength and capabilities... To slow down the pace means to lag behind. And the retards are beaten. But we don't want to be beaten. The history of old Russia consisted, among other things, in the fact that she was constantly beaten for backwardness ... We lagged behind advanced countries for 50-100 years. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we will be crushed.” How did Stalin justify the need for accelerated industrial development? Assess the nature of his arguments. What considerations underlay them - economic or political expediency?slide 2
1925 - XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - the primary task of economic development was announced - industrialization.
slide 3
Hostile "capitalist environment". The economic backwardness of the USSR foreign countries. Causes of industrialization Features of industrialization in Western countries: Started with light industry Carried out over a long period of time Used external sources: Robbery of the colonies Equitable trade with other countries Military indemnities Foreign loans
slide 4
Industrialization Goals Overcoming technical and economic backwardness. Strengthening the international position. Development of basic industries. Achievement of technical and economic independence Creation of a powerful defense industry
slide 5
Features of Stalin's industrialization: 1. Short deadlines. 2. High rates. 3. Development of heavy industry to the detriment of light industry. 4. Implementation of industrialization at the expense of internal sources of accumulation: High taxes from the population. government loans from the public. Collectivization. State monopoly on foreign trade. Income from light industry. Free labor of Gulag prisoners. Selfless labor of the Soviet people (Stakhanov movement).
slide 6
Socialism provided for the planning of the economy. The five-year plan is a five-year plan for the socio-economic and political development of the USSR, approved by the congresses of Soviets, later by congresses of the party. First Five-Year Plan - 1928-1932 Second Five-Year Plan - 1933-1937 The USSR has become a powerful industrial power.
Slide 7
1928-1932 – First Five-Year Plan See document No. 1, p. 172 Tasks: To increase industrial production by 180%, agricultural production by 55%. Heavy industry was to develop at a faster pace - 230% in 5 years. 3. Stalin put forward the idea of the "Great Leap Forward" - in 5-10 years to catch up with the West, which had gone ahead in its industrial development for 50 - 100 years.
Slide 8
Results of the first five-year plan: The five-year plans were not fulfilled, BUT the following were built: Dneproges, Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, coal mines in Donbass and Kuzbass, Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor plants, Moscow Automobile Plant, GAZ; Traffic was opened along the Turkestan-Siberian railway; New industries have been created: auto-tractor, aircraft building, chemical.
slide 9
V. Denis, N. Dolgorukov. First Five Year Plan. Dam Dneproges. I. Romas. Morning of the First Five-Year Plan.
slide 10
Social problems of the first five-year plan: Problems: Lack of labor force. Lack of engineering and technical personnel. High taxes from the population. Rising prices for goods Inflation Impoverishment of the people How they decided: The elimination of unemployment, the closure of labor exchanges (1930) The growth in the number of higher and secondary technical educational institutions. The use of prisoner labor (1930 - the creation of the Gulag) See document No. 2 p. 172
slide 11
1930 - the creation of the Gulag (Main Directorate of Camps) Political repressions of the 1920-1930s. Dekulakization Fight against sabotage Political repressions and repressions in the army Deportation of peoples
slide 12
Shakhty business. The Shakhty case is an open trial that took place in 1928 in the Donbass. 53 engineers and managers were charged with deliberate wrecking and the creation of an underground wrecking organization. 11 people were sentenced to death. The case of the Industrial Party. In 1930, an open trial took place in the Industrial Party case, at which prosecutor Krylenko was appointed public prosecutor (he was shot in 1937). The defendants were mainly representatives of the so-called "bourgeois intelligentsia", who were charged with sabotaging the industrialization of the USSR, cooperating with foreign intelligence services, and preparing foreign military intervention in the USSR. Case of the Labor Peasant Party. The case of the so-called "counter-revolutionary SR-kulak group of Chayanov-Kondratiev" also took place in 1930. The defendants were charged with sabotage in the field of agriculture and industrialization. The case of the Union Bureau. open process over the former Mensheviks took place in March 1931. The defendants were charged with sabotage in the field of planning economic activity, communication with foreign intelligence services. The beginning of mass repression
slide 13
The plans were more balanced. The Stakhanovite movement emerged. 3. The encouragement of mass enthusiasm was combined with the tightening of administrative measures: coercion to government loans, the introduction of the passport system in 1932, the introduction of work books in 1938, severe penalties for absenteeism and lateness. 3. Kramatorsk heavy engineering plant, metallurgical plants "Azovstal", "Zaporozhstal", aviation plants in Moscow, Kharkov, Kuibyshev were built. The Ural Heavy Engineering Plant (Uralmash), Uralvagonzavod (Nizhny Tagil), and others were completed. 4. The USSR has become a powerful industrial power. 1933-1937 - Second five-year plan
slide 14
Stakhanov movement A. Stakhanov. in the Stakhanovites mine: M. Mazai, N. Izotov, P. Krivonos, A. Busygin, P. Angelina, E. Vinogradova. See Document No. 3 page 173
ON THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES
Speech at the First All-Union Conference of Socialist Industry Workers
Comrades! The work of your conference is coming to an end. Now you will make resolutions. I have no doubt that they will be adopted unanimously. In these resolutions - I don't know much about them - you approve industry's control figures for 1931 and commit yourself to fulfill them.
The Bolshevik's word is a serious word. The Bolsheviks are accustomed to keep the promises they make. But what does the obligation to fulfill the control figures for 1931 mean? This means ensuring a general increase in industrial output by 45%. And this is a very big task. Little of. Such a commitment means that you not only promise to fulfill our five-year plan in 4 years—this matter has already been settled, and no more resolutions are needed here—it means that you promise to fulfill it in 3 years in the main, decisive branches of industry.
It is good that the conference promises to fulfill the plan for 1931, to fulfill the five-year plan in three years. But we are taught by "bitter experience". We know that promises are not always kept. At the beginning of 1930, such a promise was also made to fulfill the annual plan. Then it was necessary to increase the output of our industry by 31-32%. However, the promise was not fully fulfilled. In fact, the increase in industrial output in 1930 amounted to 25%. We must ask the question: will the same thing happen again this year? The leaders and workers of our industry are now promising to increase industrial output by 45% in 1931. But what is the guarantee that the promise will be kept?
What is required in order to meet the target figures, to give a 45% increase in output, to achieve the fulfillment of the five-year plan not in 4, but in the main and decisive branches in 3 years?
This requires two basic conditions.
First, to have real or, as we say, "objective" opportunities for this.
Secondly, to have the desire and ability to manage our enterprises in such a way that these opportunities are put into practice.
Did we have "objective" opportunities last year to fully implement the plan? Yes they were. Indisputable facts testify to this. These facts are that in March and April of last year the industry gave a 31% increase in production in comparison with the previous year. Why, one wonders, did we not fulfill the plan for the whole year? What got in the way? What was missing? Lacked the ability to use the available opportunities. They lacked the ability to properly manage plants, factories, and mines.
We had the first condition: "objective" possibilities for carrying out the plan. But we did not have a sufficient degree of the second condition: the ability to manage production. And precisely because the ability to manage enterprises was not enough - precisely because the plan turned out to be unfulfilled. Instead of 31-32% growth, we gave only 25%.
Of course, 25% gain is a big deal. Not a single capitalist country had an increase in production in 1930 and does not have it now. In all capitalist countries, without exception, there is a sharp drop in production. In such conditions, a 25% increase is a big step forward. But we could give more. We had all the necessary "objective" conditions for this.
So, what is the guarantee that the incident of last year will not be repeated this year, that the plan will be fully implemented, that we will use the available opportunities in the way they should be used, that your promise will not remain in a certain part on paper?
In the history of states, in the history of countries, in the history of armies, there were cases when there were all the opportunities for success, for victory, but they, these opportunities, remained in vain, because the leaders did not notice these opportunities, did not know how to use them, and the armies were defeated .
Do we have all the facilities necessary to meet the target figures for 1931?
Yes, we have such opportunities.
What do these possibilities consist of, what is required for these possibilities to exist in reality?
First of all, sufficient natural resources are required in the country: iron ore, coal, oil, grain, cotton. Do we have them? There is. There are more than in any other country. Take, for example, the Urals, which represents such a combination of wealth that cannot be found in any country. Ore, coal, oil, bread - what is there in the Urals! We have everything in the country, except maybe rubber. But in a year or two we will have rubber at our disposal. From this side, from the side of natural resources, we are fully provided. We have more than we need.
What else is required?
It requires the presence of such a power that would have the desire and strength to move the use of these vast natural resources for the benefit of the people. Do we have such power? There is. True, our work on the use of natural resources is not always without friction between our own workers. For example, last year the Soviet government had to wage some struggle over the formation of a second coal and metallurgical base, without which we cannot develop further. But we have already overcome these obstacles. And we will soon have this base.
What else is required?
It is also required that this power should enjoy the support of the vast masses of workers and peasants. Does our government enjoy such support? Yes, he does. You will not find any other government in the whole world that enjoys such support from the workers and peasants as the Soviet government enjoys. I will not refer to the facts of the growth of socialist competition, to the facts of the growth of shock work, to the campaign of struggle for a counter industrial financial plan. All these facts, in which the support of the Soviet power on the part of the vast masses is clearly visible, are well known.
What else is needed to meet and exceed the control figures for 1931?
What is also needed is the existence of a system that would be free from the incurable diseases of capitalism and that would give serious advantages over capitalism. Crisis, unemployment, wastefulness, poverty of the broad masses - these are the incurable diseases of capitalism. Our system does not suffer from these diseases, because power is in our hands, in the hands of the working class, because we are conducting a planned economy, we are systematically accumulating resources and correctly distributing them among the branches of the national economy. We are free from the incurable diseases of capitalism. This is our difference, this is our decisive advantage over capitalism.
See how the capitalists want to get out economic crisis. They reduce the maximum wages workers. They lower the price of raw materials. But they do not want to reduce the prices of industrial and consumer foodstuffs in any serious way. This means that they want to get out of the crisis at the expense of the main consumers of goods, at the expense of the workers, at the expense of the peasants, at the expense of the working people. The capitalists cut off the branch on which they sit. And instead of getting out of the crisis, it gets aggravated, it turns out the accumulation of new prerequisites leading to a new, even more severe crisis.
Our advantage lies in the fact that we do not know crises of overproduction, we do not have and will not have millions of unemployed, we do not have anarchy in production, because we are conducting a planned economy. But that's not all. We are the country of the most concentrated industry. This means that we can build our industry on the basis of the best technology and, through this, ensure unprecedented labor productivity, an unprecedented rate of accumulation. Our weakness in the past was that this industry was based on scattered and small-scale peasant farming. But it was. Now this is no more. Tomorrow, maybe in a year, we will become the country with the largest agriculture in the world. State farms and collective farms - and they are forms of large-scale farming - already this year have produced half of our marketable grain. And this means that our system, the Soviet system, gives us such opportunities for rapid advancement that no bourgeois country can dream of.
What else is required in order to move forward by leaps and bounds?
It requires a party sufficiently united and united to direct the efforts of all the best people of the working class at one point, and experienced enough not to drift in the face of difficulties and systematically implement a correct, revolutionary, Bolshevik policy. Do we have such a party? Yes there is. Is her policy correct? Yes, it is correct, because it gives serious success. This is now recognized not only by friends, but also by enemies of the working class. See how well-known "respectable" gentlemen howl and rage against our Party - Fish in America, Churchill in England, Poincaré in France. Why do they howl and rage? Because the policy of our Party is correct, because it brings success after success.
Here, comrades, are all those objective possibilities which make it easier for us to achieve the control figures of 1931, which help us to fulfill the five-year plan in 4, and in decisive branches even in 3 years.
Thus, the first condition for the execution of the plan is "objective" possibilities - we have
Do we have a second condition - the ability to use these opportunities?
In other words, do we have correct economic management of factories, mills, mines? Is everything going well here?
Unfortunately, not all is well here. And we, as Bolsheviks, must say this frankly and openly.
What does it mean to manage production? In our country, the question of the management of enterprises is not always viewed in a Bolshevik way. We often think that leading means signing papers, orders. It's sad, but it's a fact. Sometimes you involuntarily recall Shchedrin's pompadours. Remember how the pompadour taught the young pompadour: don’t puzzle over science, don’t delve into the matter, let others do it, it’s not your business, it’s your business to sign papers. We must admit, to our shame, that among us Bolsheviks there are quite a few who lead by signing papers. But in order to delve into the matter, master the technique, become the master of the business - on this score, no, no.
How could it happen that we, the Bolsheviks, who made three revolutions, emerged victorious from a cruel civil war, solved the largest task of creating modern industry who turned the peasantry onto the path of socialism—how could it happen that in the matter of directing production we give in to a piece of paper?
The reason for this is that signing a paper is easier than directing production. And so many business executives took this line of least resistance. There is also our wine, the wine of the center. About ten years ago, the slogan was issued: "Since the Communists do not yet properly understand the technique of production, since they still need to learn how to manage the economy, then let the old technicians and engineers, specialists conduct production, and you Communists, do not interfere in the technique of business, but, without interfering, study the technique, study the science of production management tirelessly, so that later, together with the specialists devoted to us, become real production managers, real masters of the business. That was the slogan. And what happened in reality? The second part of this formula was discarded, because it is more difficult to learn than to sign papers, and the first part of the formula was vulgarized, interpreting non-intervention as a refusal to study production technology. The result is nonsense, harmful and dangerous nonsense, from which the sooner we get rid of it, the better.
Life itself has repeatedly signaled to us about the trouble in this matter. The Shakhty case was the first serious signal. The Shakhty affair showed that the party organizations and trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our business executives are disgracefully backward in technical terms, that some of the old engineers and technicians, working without control, more easily slide into the path of sabotage, especially since they are constantly pestered with "suggestions" by enemies from abroad.
The second signal is the trial of the "Industrial Party".
Of course, class struggle is at the heart of sabotage. Of course, the class enemy is madly resisting the socialist offensive. But this alone is not enough to explain such a magnificent flourishing of sabotage.
How could it happen that sabotage has assumed such wide dimensions? Who is to blame for this? We are to blame for this. If we had put the matter of managing the economy differently, if we had gone over much earlier to the study of the technique of business, to mastering the technique, if we had intervened more often and sensibly in the management of the economy, the wreckers would not have succeeded in doing so much harm.
We must ourselves become specialists, masters of the business, we must turn our faces to technical knowledge - this is where life pushed us. But neither the first signal nor even the second signal provided the necessary turn. It's time, it's time to turn to technology. It is time to cast aside the old slogan, the obsolete slogan of non-intervention in technology, and become experts themselves, connoisseurs of the matter, become the full masters of economic affairs.
People often ask why we do not have unity of command? It is not and will not be until we master the technique. Until among us, among the Bolsheviks, there are a sufficient number of people who are well acquainted with questions of technology, economics, and finance, we will not have real one-man command. Write as many resolutions as you like, swear by whatever words you like, but if you do not master technology, economics, the finances of a plant, factory, mine, there will be no sense, there will be no unity of command.
The task, therefore, is for us to master technology ourselves, to become masters of the business ourselves. This is the only guarantee that our plans will be fully implemented, and that unity of command will be carried out.
Of course, this is not an easy task, but it is quite surmountable. Science, technical experience, knowledge - all this will come with time. Today they are not, but tomorrow they will be. The main thing here is to have a passionate Bolshevik desire to master technology, to master the science of production. With a passionate desire, everything can be achieved, everything can be overcome.
Sometimes people ask whether it is possible to slow down the pace a little, to hold the movement. No, you can't, comrades! You can't slow down! On the contrary, they should be increased as much as possible. This is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR require of us. This is what our obligations to the working class of the world require of us.
To slow down means to fall behind. And the retards are beaten. But we don't want to be beaten. No, we don't! The history of old Russia consisted, among other things, in the fact that she was constantly beaten for her backwardness. Beat the Mongol khans. Turkish beks beat. Beat the Swedish feudal lords. They beat the Polish-Lithuanian pans. The Anglo-French capitalists fought. Beat the Japanese barons. Everyone was beaten for backwardness. For military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for state backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. They beat me because it was profitable and got away with impunity. Remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: "You are poor, you are rich, you are powerful, you are powerless, Mother Russia." These gentlemen have memorized these words of the old poet well. They beat and said: "you are abundant" - therefore, you can profit at your expense. They beat and said: "You are miserable, powerless" - therefore, you can beat and rob you with impunity. Such is the law of the exploiters - to beat the backward and weak. Wolf law of capitalism. You are behind, you are weak - that means you are wrong, therefore, you can be beaten and enslaved. You are powerful, so you are right, therefore, you must beware.
That's why we can't fall further behind.
In the past, we did not and could not have a fatherland. But now that we have overthrown capitalism, and the power is with us, with the people, we have a fatherland and we will defend its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? But if this is not what you want, you must eliminate its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop real Bolshevik rates in building its socialist economy. There are no other ways. That is why Lenin said on the eve of October: "Either death, or overtake and overtake the advanced capitalist countries."
We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we will be crushed.
This is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR dictate to us.
But we have other, more serious and more important obligations. These are obligations to the world proletariat. They coincide with obligations of the first kind. But we put them higher. The working class of the USSR is part of the world working class. We won not only through the efforts of the working class of the USSR, but also thanks to the support of the world working class. Without such support, we would have been pecked long ago. It is said that our country is the shock brigade of the proletariat of all countries. This is well said. But this imposes on us the most serious obligations. Why does the international proletariat support us, why do we deserve such support? By being the first to rush into battle with capitalism, we were the first to establish workers' power, we were the first to begin building socialism. By the fact that we are doing a thing that, if successful, will turn the whole world upside down and liberate the entire working class. What is required for success? The elimination of our backwardness, the development of high, Bolshevik rates of construction. We must move forward so that the working class of the whole world, looking at us, could say: here it is, my vanguard, here it is, my shock brigade, here it is, my workers' power, here it is, my fatherland - they are doing their business, our cause is good, let us support them against the capitalists and fan the cause of the world revolution. Should we justify the hopes of the world working class, should we fulfill our obligations to it? Yes, we must, if we do not want to disgrace ourselves completely.
These are our obligations, domestic and international.
You see that they are dictating Bolshevik rates of development to us.
I won't say that we haven't done anything with regard to the management of the economy over the years. Done, and even a lot. We have doubled industrial output compared to pre-war levels. We have created the largest agricultural production in the world. But we could do even more if we tried during this time to truly master production, its technology, its financial and economic aspects.
In a maximum of ten years, we must cover the distance by which we have lagged behind the advanced countries of capitalism. We have all the "objective" possibilities for this. The only thing missing is the ability to really use these opportunities. And it depends on us. Only from us! It's time for us to learn how to use these opportunities. It's time to put an end to the rotten attitude of laissez-faire in production. It's time to learn another, new attitude, corresponding to the current period: to interfere in everything. If you are a plant manager - interfere in all matters, delve into everything, do not miss anything, study and study again. The Bolsheviks must master technology. It is time for the Bolsheviks to become specialists themselves. Technique during the reconstruction period decides everything. And a business executive who does not want to study technology, who does not want to master technology, is an anecdote, not a business executive.
It is said that it is difficult to master the technique. Wrong! There are no fortresses that the Bolsheviks could not take. We have solved some of the most difficult problems. We have overthrown capitalism. We took over. We have built the largest socialist industry. We turned the middle peasants onto the path of socialism. We have already done the most important thing in terms of construction. There is not much left for us: to study the technique, to master the science. And when we do this, we will have such a pace that we now do not even dare to dream of.
And we will do it if we really want it!
"Truth" № 35,
surname.
“The successes of Soviet power in the field of the collective-farm movement are spoken of
That's it. Even the enemies are forced to admit the presence of serious successes.
And these successes are really great.
It is a fact that on February 20 of this year. already collectivized 50% of the peasant
farms in the USSR. This means that we have exceeded the five-year plan
collectivization by February 20, 1930 more than doubled. ... You can't help but
admit that the collection of 220 million poods of seeds for the collective farm alone
lines - after the successful implementation of the grain procurement plan -
represents a huge achievement.
What does all this say?
The fact that the radical turn of the countryside towards socialism can already be considered
secure…”
1) I.V. Stalin
2) A.N. Kosygin
3) L.I. Brezhnev
4) M.S. Gorbachev
The creation of the government-controlled Writers' Union of the USSR refers to
1) 1920s
2) 1930s
3) 1940s
4) 1950s
Arrange the following events in chronological order. Specify
response in the form of a sequence of digits of the selected elements.
1) the proclamation of Russia as an empire
2) the issuance of a decree on the succession to the throne strictly through the male line
3) publication of the manifesto on the freedom of the nobility
4) the foundation of St. Petersburg
Establish a correspondence between foreign policy events and years:
for each element of the first column, select the corresponding element from
second column.
EVENTS YEARS
A) the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany
B) the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations
C) military conflict with Japan on the Khalkhin Gol River
1) 1918
2) 1923
3) 1934
4) 1939
England will suffer the most from this. "Imagine that it is now 1900, you are an English journalist and you need to write an article about German foreign policy. Write it using Disraeli's statement at the beginning or at the end of the work. 2) Continue the phrases. a ) In the last third of the 19th century in Great Britain, the Conservative Party was supported by _____________________________ b) The Liberal Party enjoyed the support of ____________________________ 3) after 1874, two working representatives first appeared in the House of Commons - T. Barth and A. Macdonald In 1879, Macdonald declared that the Conservative the government has done more for the working class in five years than the liberals have done in half a century. What do you think gave rise to such a statement? Support your point of view with facts. Write down your answer.
1. When did the government of Alexander II come to grips with the preparation of the peasant reform?A) 1861 B) 1857 B) 1855
2. Why were editorial commissions created under the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs?
A) to collect and summarize statistical data
B) to draft legislative acts on the liberation of the peasants
C) to compile the final report of the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs
3. Under what conditions did the reform of 1861 gave land to the peasants?
A) entirely at the expense of the state treasury
B) free
C) for a ransom with the assistance of the government
4. What did the peasants get in 1861?
A) freedom from government duties
B) personal freedom
C) the right to leave the peasant community
5. To carry out the redemption of land according to the law on February 19, 1861, the peasant had to pay 20-25% of the total redemption amount at a time. Who paid the landowners the rest?
A) state B) zemstvo C) nobles
6. The reform of 1861 reserved for the landowners:
A) ownership of the courtyard people who previously belonged to them
B) the right to own all the land they own
C) on ½ of the landowner's land
Explain the meaning of terms and concepts:
Serfdom
Redemption payments
Segments
Temporarily liable peasants
landowner
January 1929 - 1986
The period for which the central planning of the economy of the USSR was carried out.
FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1928/29 - 1932/33)
It entered into force on October 1, 1928. The main task of the five-year plan was to turn the country from an agrarian-industrial into an industrial one. But by that time, the five-year plan assignments had not yet been approved. At the suggestion of Krzhizhanovsky, two versions of the five-year plan were developed - "starting" (minimum) and "optimal". The development was carried out with the participation of prominent scientists (A.N. Bakh, I.G. Aleksandrov, A.V. Winter, D.N. Pryanishnikov). The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took as a basis the optimal version of the plan, which in May 1929 the Fifth All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted as a law.
The tasks of the optimal variant were about 20% higher than the starting one and could be completed only under a successful set of circumstances - a good harvest, the absence of international conflicts, ensuring the supply of equipment from Western countries, etc. However, historians and economists believe that this plan was a realistic program, taking into account the dependence of industrialization on the possibilities of peasant production. The plan provided for an increase in the five-year period of industrial output by 180%, the production of means of production - by 230%, agricultural products - by 55%; dramatically increase labor productivity. It was planned to build more than 1200 factories. Priority was given to heavy industry. The production of light industry and consumer goods was in a secondary position. The main slogan of the first five-year plan: "Technology decides everything!" It was about exceptionally rapid progress, which has no examples in world history.
The program of "socialist industrialization" was supplemented by a plan for the reconstruction of the national economy: a change in production techniques, the development of energy, the transfer of advanced American and European technology to the country's economy, rationalization, the scientific organization of labor, the transfer of production to sources of raw materials and energy, the specialization of regions in accordance with their natural and social needs. Through nationwide planning, it was supposed to realize the benefits of an economy free from the anarchy and competition of capitalism.
At the beginning of industrialization, much attention was paid to the re-equipment of old industrial enterprises. But at the same time, more than 500 new plants were laid, including the Saratov and Rostov plants of agricultural engineering, the Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk metallurgical plants, the construction of the Turkestan-Siberian railway(Turksib) and the Dnieper hydroelectric power station (Dneproges). Development and expansion industrial production was carried out largely at the expense of the resources of the enterprises themselves. However, purchases abroad of machinery, equipment, licenses increased. Foreign specialists were attracted to the country for big money. On the basis of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR, people's commissariats of heavy, light and forest industries were formed.
During the first years of the five-year plan, production came increasingly under centralized control from above. It seemed to many leaders that this situation was leading to the return of the "war communism" of the civil war period. Indeed, the banks were liquidated, joint-stock companies, exchanges, credit partnerships. Unity of command was introduced at the enterprises, the directors appointed there became responsible for the implementation of the plan.
In the summer of 1929, a revision began in the direction of increasing the already adopted plan targets for the five-year plan. This was demanded by members of the government, directors of factories, and the workers themselves. Against the backdrop of the economic crisis in Western countries, Soviet people sought by revolutionary methods to as soon as possible eliminate the backwardness of the Soviet state from developed countries to prove the advantages of the socialist system over the capitalist one. "Counter plans" were put forward and adopted, although sometimes there was no material support. In December 1929, he put forward the slogan: "Five-year plan - in four years!". The task was set to double capital investments annually, to produce twice as much as planned non-ferrous and ferrous metals, cars, agricultural machinery, cast iron, etc. The Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk plants were to become four times more powerful, by 1930 such great construction projects as Dneproges and Turksib were completed . A course is being taken for a "great leap" in the development of industry. The 16th Party Congress (1930) approved the actions of the supporters of acceleration. The slogan "Tempos decide everything!" was put forward. In February 1931, Stalin declared: “We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we will be crushed.” At the same time, it was decided to promote the achievements of the production drummers more widely.
Many historians today note that, despite the unprecedented pace of construction, there were failures in the fulfillment of the tasks of the first five-year plan. All this forced the country's leadership to announce at the beginning of 1933 its early implementation (4 years and 3 months). Further planning needed to be adjusted. At the January 1933 Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin declared that now there was no need to "whip up and urge the country on." However, the growth in the production of heavy industry equipment, electricity, raw materials extraction was very significant. Thousands of new facilities have been laid by the selfless labor of the Soviet people. The elimination of unemployment was considered a huge achievement.
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR warmly greet the workers and workers, engineers, technicians and the entire leadership of Dneprostroy.
Congratulations, comrades, on the completion of the construction and early launch of the electrification giant, which has no equal in the world.
If the Soviet government succeeded in solving this task of gigantic construction in a short time, at a time when a destructive crisis and unemployment are raging throughout the capitalist world, then this could only happen because the power of the Soviets is the only power in the world that has the selfless support of millions of workers and peasants. .
Long live the working class!
Long live the Leninist party!
Central Committee of the CPSU(b)
Council of People's Commissars of the USSR
SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1933-37).
Approved by the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b) at the beginning of 1934, proclaimed main task five-year plans - the construction of the material and technical base of socialism. The main slogan of the second five-year plan: "Cadres decide everything!" A struggle has unfolded in the country to increase labor productivity. ¬
In the second five-year plan, the average annual growth rate of industrial output fell to 16.5% (against 30% in the first five-year plan). Miscalculations in the development of light industry were taken into account, which now had to outstrip heavy industry in terms of production growth. In addition, it was planned to expand the output of consumer goods at heavy industry enterprises. All this was due to the need to solve pressing social issues, to somehow raise the living standards of the working people.
It was planned to create new industrial centers in the Urals, in Western and Eastern Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Transcaucasia. As before, the main attention of the CPSU(b) was concentrated on the decisive areas of technical reconstruction: energy and machine building, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the fuel industry, and transport.
Along with a slowdown in the growth rate of industrial output, the second five-year plan was also characterized by a certain expansion of the independence of enterprises, a revival of material incentives for workers and employees, and a strengthening of the ruble. Piecework-bonus payment for the performance and overfulfillment of tasks was introduced into the economy. Salary differentiation was introduced - depending on working conditions. During the years of the second five-year plan of the Supreme Economic Council, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, V.V. Kuibyshev was transferred to the leadership of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. Ordzhonikidze was more realistic than many other leaders in assessing the situation in industry and the possibilities of the economy as a whole.
Economic stimulation was supplemented by a call for broad socialist competition. A Stakhanovite movement developed in the country, named after the miner Alexei Stakhanov. On the night of August 30-31, 1935, he set an unprecedented record of coal production, exceeding the norm by 14 times in one shift. Stakhanov's successes were marked by government awards and received all-Union fame. The Party called for work in the Stakhanov way in all branches of production. Now Stakhanovites have appeared in almost every enterprise. Note that their excess work was paid an order of magnitude higher than other workers. In addition, they received fame, recognition, the opportunity to move up the career ladder.
Despite all the everyday difficulties, the idea of the country's industrial upsurge spread ever deeper among the working people. Ideology and propaganda were combined with a patriotic spirit. A significant part of the Soviet workers wanted to prove with their labor that they could build more and produce faster than at construction sites and factories in the USA, Germany or England. However, the desire to set records led in a number of cases to damage to new and expensive equipment.
In the second five-year plan, the construction of factories, factories, power plants (4.5 thousand industrial enterprises) continued. The Ural machine-building and Chelyabinsk tractor plants, dozens of blast furnaces, mines and power plants were put into operation. The first metro line was opened in Moscow. Huge capital investments went into the industry of the Union republics. In Ukraine - in engineering enterprises, in Uzbekistan - metal processing plants, etc. New industrial centers and new branches of industry arose in the country: chemical, aviation, tractor-building. Scientific and technical backwardness was overcome. The industrial base began to move to the East. Compared to the first five-year plan, labor productivity has doubled. The import of foreign equipment decreased by 10 times. Significant progress has been made in the development of transport. The White Sea-Baltic Canal and the Moscow-Volga Canal, the Turkestan-Siberian Road were laid. Air transport arose, which played a decisive role in the development of the North. The Northern Sea Route through the seas of the Arctic Ocean was opened for navigation. The country gained economic independence and self-sufficiency. New enterprises provided 4/5 of all industrial output. Coal production has doubled, oil production has increased by almost one and a half times, and rolled steel has tripled.
The bulk of the new workers came from the peasantry (2/3 of the 12 million in the first five-year plan). The economy was in dire need of qualified personnel. The slogan "Cadres decide everything!" assumed gigantic efforts in the training of specialists in their field. In 1933, factory apprenticeship schools (FZU) were reorganized into professional educational establishments. During the years of the second five-year plan, 1.4 million people received working specialties. Refresher courses were opened at factories and plants.
In the mid-1930s, the Soviet military-industrial complex (MIC) was formed. In 1936, the People's Commissariat for the Defense Industry was formed, which controlled a large number of industrial enterprises, as well as various research organizations and design bureaus.
Completion of the second five-year plan was announced ahead of schedule - again 4 years and 3 months. However, modern historians provide data that during this time the second five-year plan was completed only by 75-77% of the original tasks. Nevertheless, the overall results of the second five-year plan proved to be more successful than those of the first.
The main task of the five-year plan was to transfer our country, with its backward, sometimes medieval technology, to the rails of new, modern technology.
The main task of the five-year plan was to transform the USSR from an agrarian and weak country, dependent on the whims of the capitalist countries, into an industrial and powerful country, completely independent and independent of the whims of world capitalism.
The main task of the five-year plan was to, by transforming the USSR into an industrial country, completely oust capitalist elements, expand the front of socialist forms of economy and create an economic basis for the destruction of classes in the USSR, for building a socialist society.
The main task of the five-year plan was to create in our country an industry capable of re-equipping and reorganizing not only industry as a whole, but transport as well, but agriculture as well, on the basis of socialism.
The main task of the five-year plan was to transfer small-scale and fragmented agriculture to the rails of large-scale collective farming, thereby providing the economic basis for socialism in the countryside and thus eliminating the possibility of restoring capitalism in the USSR.
Finally, the task of the five-year plan was to create in the country all the necessary technical and economic prerequisites for the maximum increase in the country's defense capability, making it possible to organize a decisive rebuff to all and any attempts at military intervention from outside, to all and any attempts at military attack from outside.
The 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approves the program for completing the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy and increasing production in the second five-year period, presented by the State Planning Commission of the Union and adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
The Congress of the CPSU (b) decides:
Set the volume of output for all industry in 1937, that is, at the end of the second five-year plan, at 92.7 billion rubles. (in 1926/27 prices) against 43 billion rubles. at the end of the first five-year plan - in 1932, i.e., an average annual increase of 16.5% and an increase in the size of industrial output by 2.1 times, and in comparison with the pre-war level by about eight times. With regard to the production of consumer goods, to outline faster rates of development not only in comparison with the first five-year plan (an average annual growth rate of 18.5% versus 17% in the first five-year plan), but also in comparison with the rates of development of the production of means of production in the second five-year plan (average annual growth rate of 18.5% against an average annual growth rate of capital goods of 14.5%). (…)
The 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks establishes that the second five-year plan for the development of the national economy, presented by the State Planning Committee of the Union and adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, provides:
a) the liquidation of capitalist elements and classes in general, the final liquidation, on the basis of the complete completion of the collectivization of peasant farms and the co-operation of all handicraftsmen, private ownership of the means of production; the elimination of the multi-structural nature of the economy of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the socialist mode of production as the only mode of production, with the transformation of the entire working population of the country into active and conscious builders of a socialist society;
b) completion of the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy of the USSR on the basis created during the first five-year plan and following the path of further rapid growth of industry that produces the means of production (heavy industry);
c) a more rapid rise in the well-being of the workers and peasant masses and, at the same time, a decisive improvement in all housing and communal services in the USSR;
d) strengthening the economic and political positions of the proletarian dictatorship on the basis of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry for the final liquidation of capitalist elements and classes in general;
e) further strengthening of the country's defense capability.
The fulfillment of these tasks, leading to the ousting of the last remnants of the capitalist elements from all their old positions and dooming them to final destruction, cannot but cause an intensification of the class struggle, new attempts to undermine the collective farms on the part of the kulaks, and attempts at wrecking sabotage of our industrial enterprises by the anti-Soviet forces. On the other hand, the implementation of the tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan, the five-year plan for radically raising the living standards of the workers and peasant masses on the basis of completing the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy, cannot but arouse the enthusiasm of the working people, a surge of production activity and a growing desire to master new technology in the broadest masses of working people - builders. socialism.
Ruthlessly crushing the counter-revolutionary attacks of the class enemy and rallying the ranks of the shock workers of socialism for the victorious fulfillment of the Second Five-Year Plan, the working class, together with the masses of the collective farms, under the leadership of the Party, which is waging a relentless struggle against all kinds of opportunism, will overcome any and all difficulties on the path of building socialism.
DECISION OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR
The Central Executive Committee of the USSR, having considered the proposal of the Council of People's Commissars on awarding the most distinguished workers, engineers and leaders of Belomorstroy with orders of the USSR, decides:
To award the Orders of Lenin:
1. Yagoda Genrikh Grigorievich - deputy. Chairman of the OGPU of the USSR.
2. Kogan Lazar Iosifovich - head of Belomorstroy.
3. Matvey Davidovich Berman - Head of the Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps of the OPTU.
4. Firin Semyon Grigorievich - head of the White Sea-Baltic forced labor camp and deputy head of the Main Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps of the OGPU.
5. Rapoport Yakov Davidovich - Deputy Head of Belomorstroy and Deputy. Head of the Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps of the OGPU.
6. Zhuk Sergey Yakovlevich - deputy. chief engineer of Belomorstroy, one of the best and most conscientious engineers, who, with his exceptional knowledge of the matter and great ability to work, ensured the quality of the work.
7. Frenkel Naftaliy Aronovich - assistant head of Belomorstroy and head of work (who at one time committed a crime against the state and was amnestied by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in 1932 with the removal of a criminal record), from the moment the work began at Belomorstroy and to the end ensured the correct organization of work, high the quality of the construction and showed great knowledge of the matter.
8. Verzhbitsky Konstantin Andreevich - deputy. chief engineer of construction (he was convicted of sabotage under article 58-7 and released (early in 1932), one of the major engineers who most conscientiously treated the work entrusted to him.
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR
M. Kalinin
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR
A. Yenukidze
THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1938 - 1942)
By the end of the 1930s, tendencies towards centralization and the strengthening of planning mechanisms intensified in the Soviet economy. All factories and factories were in strict subordination of the respective people's commissariats represented by their chiefs. The plan was understood as both far-reaching programs and the preparation of current even small tasks. The enterprises' initiative was curtailed. The main reasons for these phenomena were the increased threat to the security of the USSR, the aggressive behavior of Nazi Germany and its allies, the need for strict control over production and labor discipline. There was also a lack of material resources that had to be distributed in accordance with the main priorities.
In March 1939, the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the third five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1938-1942. It set the following tasks: to almost double the volume of industrial output, to create large state reserves and mobilization stocks, primarily for fuel and defense products; to increase agricultural production by 1.5 times. The focus continued to be on heavy industry. The country's leadership put forward the slogan: in the near foreseeable future, "catch up and overtake economic terms most developed capitalist countries.
The third five-year plan was no easier than the previous ones. People overworked themselves with the hardest work in production and new construction sites. From 1938 to 1940, industrial output increased by 45%, however, a number of industries (railway transport, oil production, energy) still lagged behind in their development. In view of the war that began on September 1, 1939 in Europe, all the most advanced went to equip, first of all, the Red Army. Its numbers increased from 1939 to 1941. from 1.5 to 5 million people It was necessary to create mobilization reserves, to speed up the strengthening of the country's defense power. The share of spending on military needs increased from 13 to 25%. Particular attention was paid to the development of defense industries in the east of the USSR. The construction of understudy plants went on in the Volga region, in the Urals and in Siberia. This was a timely measure that made it possible in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War not only to preserve the military potential of the state, but also to evacuate machine tools from enterprises located in the west deep into the USSR. But serious mistakes were made in defense construction. In pursuit of the number of tanks, planes, rifles, they lost sight of the fact that the troops received already outdated weapons designs. New samples were also developed and put into operation - MiGG, LaGG aircraft, KV and T-34 tanks, PPD submachine guns - but so far they were not enough to equip a modern-type army. The repressions of 1936-1938 also had an effect, from which not only the military, but also highly qualified specialists, engineers, and directors of enterprises undeservedly suffered.
In the third five-year plan, disciplinary punishments at work were tightened. Under the threat of criminal liability, workers and employees did not have the right to move from one enterprise to another without the permission of the directorate. In June 1940, the working day was extended from 7 to 8 hours, and the working week became seven days. A worker could be tried and sent to forced labor in the Gulag system for being late for work three times in a month. The cheap labor of prisoners was used in the construction of canals, roads, mines, and factories in Siberia, the Far North, Kolyma, Kazakhstan, and other places. The construction of objects was carried out manually with high mortality among the convicts. However, the fact is that the standard of living of the population, especially in the cities, began to gradually rise. By the end of the 1930s, the life of ordinary Soviet people improved, and the production of essential goods increased.
Revolution and civil war shaped special type people who emerged from the turmoil and formed on the ruins Russian Empire new state of the Soviet Union. Many foreign specialists who came here in the 1930s had a hard time understanding how the majority of the country's population could live in de facto poverty by Western standards, but work hard almost for nothing for the ideals of a brighter future. However, getting closer to the spiritual qualities, skills and culture of the Soviet people, they understood that the USSR was at the stage of a gigantic reconstruction of its economy, which was supported by the vast majority of citizens. Indeed, the calls of the leadership to exert their strength day and night found a benevolent response among the workers.
They wanted to make their country prosperous, put an end to illiteracy, live with lofty thoughts, and save their children from constant need. Yesterday's peasant, who often did not see in his life a more complex mechanism than a clock with weights, in a few years became a class specialist: a driver, a machine operator, an engineer. Urban population by the end of the 1930s it exceeded 30%. And although it was considered the norm of life for a family to live in one room, the presence of a single suit and one pair of shoes, people believed that in the future they, or their children, would live much better. It was a breakthrough of a peasant country into a modern industrial society. There were both heroic and tragic pages in this breakthrough. But by the end of the 1930s, the selfless labor of millions of people put the USSR on a par with the leading industrial powers.
"ON THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW NUTRITIONS OF FOOD AND RETENTION FOR PRISONERS IN ITL AND ITK NKVD of the USSR"
Moscow city
Owls. secret
1. To put into effect from July 1, 1939, the norms of food and clothing allowance for prisoners in forced labor camps and colonies of the NKVD of the USSR in accordance with annexes No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 , 12, 13, 14, 15, 1b and the norms for replacing some products with others, according to Appendix No. 17.
2. For prisoners working in the Arctic Circle, as well as in underground work, the specified norms are increased by 25%, excluding the norms of bread, salt, bay leaves and pepper.
3. For prisoners in Norillag, Vorkutlag and the Abez Branch of the Sevzheldorlag, to maintain the food and clothing allowances approved by the plan for 1939/40.
4. Norms for meat, vegetable oil and sugar are introduced from the fourth quarter of 1939.
5. All previously established by the orders of the OGPU - the NKVD and the orders of the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR, the norms of food and clothing allowance for prisoners in forced labor camps and colonies of the NKVD of the USSR - cancel.
Application: norms.
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Divisional Commander CHERNYSHOV
Application No. 1
NORMA No. 1 allowances for prisoners in forced labor camps and colonies of the NKVD of the USSR, for those who do not work out production standards, household services, investigative and disabled people (per 1 person per day in grams)
Name of products / Quantity, gr.
Rye bread - 600
Wheat flour 85% - 10
Groats different - 100
Vegetable oil - 0
Surrogate tea - 2
Potatoes and vegetables - 500
Tomato puree - 10
Capsicum - 0.13
Bay leaf - 0.2
Note:
1. Prisoners engaged in basic production work and working out norms up to 60% receive food according to this norm.
2. Prisoners who work out production norms from 60% to 99% inclusive, receive in addition to the indicated ration of bread according to the following scale:
% by output
60-79% - 1st category - 100 gr.; 2nd category - 100 gr.; 3rd category and above - 200 gr.
80-99% - 1st category - 100 gr.; 2nd category - 200 gr.; 3rd category and above - 400 gr.
Early OOS GULAG" NKVD quartermaster of the 1st rank SILIN ...
1. Fur hats are issued for the Norillag.
2. Surrogate shoes are issued instead of leather shoes 1 pair for 4 months.
3. Paper footcloths are issued only to those who work outdoors, as well as in unheated premises.
4. A padded jacket is issued only to those working outdoors and in unheated premises. In the southern regions (Georgian, Azerbaijan, Armenian, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen SSR and Crimean ASSR), quilted jackets are not issued.
5. Wadded bloomers are issued only to those working in outdoor work and in unheated premises.
6. Short fur coats are issued at the rate of 7% of the composition of prisoners working in the open air and unheated premises.
7. Boots are issued only to those working outdoors. Felt boots can be replaced with shoe covers, cotton stockings with rubber boots.
8. Woolen mittens are issued in 2 pairs for outdoor workers and 1 pair for the rest.
9. Combined mittens are issued only to employees.
10. Youngsters are given the same material allowance, but of the appropriate size.
11. Those working by the Stakhanov methods are issued additionally in cash per person per year:
one). Undershirts - 1 pc.
2). Underpants - 1 pc.
3). T-shirt - 1 pc.
four). Panties - 1 pc.
5). Towels - 1 pc.
6). Summer footcloths - 1 pair
7). "-" paper - 1 pair
eight). Woolen mittens - 1 pair
9). Combined mittens. - 1 pair.
The above material allowance is issued no more than 3% of the total number of items released for the camp.
Early OOS GULAG NKVD Quartermaster 1st rank SILIN
What is the NEP and why was it replaced by industrialization
Today, the next difficult question is number 10. It is formulated in the QS as follows: "The reasons for the curtailment of the NEP, an assessment of the results of industrialization, collectivization and transformations in the field of culture." By itself, the wording of the question covers a long period of time and several entities at once. Therefore, we will not meet the scientific certification once. To begin with, let us dwell on how modern historical science interprets new economic policy Soviet power.
Accomplishments of the era of the first five-year plans: what you need to know about it
Having considered last time the NEP and the reasons for its curtailment, we now turn to the specific results of those processes that were designed to ensure the construction of socialism in the USSR (in other words, to ensure the country's sovereignty and global competitiveness) - industrialization and collectivization.
NEP and five-year plans: what is written about it in school textbooks
The existing textbooks, on the whole, satisfactorily interpret a voluminous and apparently very difficult question. Here we meet with a rather rare phenomenon, when the results of the work of historians, noticeable on these subjects over the past 25-30 years, have become the property of school education.
October 11, 1922 in Soviet Russia introduced a new monetary unit- chervonets. And on October 11, 1931, private trade was banned. Today, on the day of the accidental coincidence of two dates at once, it is worth talking about the fact that the state economic policy and private enterprise coexist in harmony in the concept of "economic sovereignty". And if suddenly they don’t get along, then, probably, something is wrong in economic policy, and sovereignty will take revenge on such a policy.
8 Comments
Kovalenko Nadezhda Vyacheslavovna/ Lecturer in archiving, GAUGN
1. Since there is no separate article on industrialization on Lenta, here one could briefly point out the different views in power regarding its pace and resources: disagreements between the Supreme Council of National Economy (Kuibyshev) and Gosplan (Krzhizhanovsky), positions of intra-party oppositions (for example, on Bukharin's "turtle step towards socialism"). It would also be possible to briefly point out the disputes of scientists about a possible alternative to the Stalinist version of industrialization, which had a great resonance in society.
2. "... historians and economists believe that this plan was a realistic program, taking into account the dependence of industrialization on the possibilities of peasant production." Still, it is not entirely clear what factors historians meant when they spoke of a realistic program, what phenomena are admissible when it is recognized as realistic. After all, dispossession took place here, and the famine of the early 30s, and local outbreaks of discontent in the countryside, at construction sites and factories, and the most difficult working conditions, and lowering prices in production, and “sabotage” processes, i.e. related to the discrepancy between the quality of the technical base and the workforce to the tasks set. All these phenomena should also have been somehow more clearly mentioned, especially since the article contains a link to the special summary of the OGPU, covering some of them. In this context, it should also be mentioned famous article Stalin "Dizziness from success".
3. The article quite rightly speaks of the labor feat of the people, of the enthusiasm of the Soviet people (moreover, as many as 3 times, in different places). But it also gives the impression that the increase in the pace of industrialization was solely the response of the authorities to the mood in society. (“In the summer of 1929, a revision began in the direction of increasing the already adopted five-year plan targets. This was demanded by members of the government, plant directors, and the workers themselves. Against the backdrop of economic crisis in Western countries, the Soviet people sought by revolutionary methods to eliminate the backwardness of the Soviet state from the developed countries as soon as possible, to prove the advantages of the socialist system over the capitalist. as is known, manifestations of dissatisfaction with the most difficult working conditions, for example, Stakhanovites, were often not favored by their labor collectives.
It should also be mentioned in more detail that, in addition to the labor feat of the people, certain initiatives of the authorities also played a decisive role. Thus, it was justly mentioned about the development of vocational education, that the development of the plan was carried out with the participation of prominent scientists, about the purchases of equipment abroad and the invitation of specialists. Here it should be added, for example, about the policy of the authorities regarding the development of science, including applied science (an issue that is extremely relevant now).
4. The article refers to the centralization of management in those years of the economy and industry (... banks, joint-stock companies, exchanges, credit partnerships were liquidated. One-man management was introduced at enterprises, directors appointed there became responsible for the implementation of the plan). The phenomena mentioned here fit under the concept of “winding down of NEP”, which has long and firmly established itself in science as well, and it probably should have been brought here in relation to these processes. The article provides documents related to the work of Gulag prisoners, links to them. Perhaps, on the contrary, it should have been mentioned in the text itself that some of the objects were built by prisoners, and references and documents should be given in the article “The Peak of Stalinist Repressions”, here links to scientific work and memoirs relating to the actual processes of industrialization (for example, Gimpelson E.G., Erenburg I.G.). Otherwise, readers may get the impression that it was the labor of prisoners that was the main "engine" of industrialization.
Gorbunova Marina/ honorary worker of education
1. I did not find in the explanatory material information about the transformations in the spiritual sphere during the first five-year plans (except for the creation of a system for the formation of workforce). Processes in the field of science, literature, fine arts, etc. remained undiscovered. Centralization, unification, increasing control by the political leadership, the assertion of the dominance of the principle of socialist realism - everything has become beyond the scope of what has been read.
2. There is no general picture of the social structure of society that took shape during this period, like a hierarchical ladder, each level of which was firmly fastened by complementary methods of material incentives and fear of repression, on the one hand, and on the other hand, by the assertion of the only and obligatory for all the dominant ideology, which, of course, contributed not only to the exaltation of the party elite, but also to the maintenance of mass labor and civic enthusiasm. The incredible complexity of an objective assessment of that period lies, it seems to me, in the contradictory nature of "then" reality, which makes it possible for both apologists and critics to use objective facts as an argument for their positions:
- real successes and achievements of socialist construction - BUT - merits and victories are attributed primarily to the wise party leadership and personally to Stalin;
- mass enthusiasm and solidarity of the working people, formed and maintained respect for working people - BUT - a feeling of a "besieged fortress" and a readiness to unanimously and without hesitation destroy anyone whom the authorities (!) call an external or internal enemy;
- confidence in a beautiful and inevitable future, the presence of a real upsurge, happiness and greatness among a part of the population - BUT - the impoverishment of the meaning of life, when the class struggle and work become its main content.
These oppositions can be continued further, but the main thing is that their presence does not allow reaching public consent so far, and modern realities exacerbate the split with twisted ideologemes that defame common sense and offend civic feelings.
Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm
It is well written how the 1st five-year plan was prepared, and how indistinctly it is written that this plan, adopted by the supreme authority of the USSR - the V All-Union Congress of Soviets, and having the force of law, was NOT IMPLEMENTED AT ALL! What Stalin did is Stalin's five-year plan. These two plans differ both in indicators and methods and results.
Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm
The plan was adopted in the spring of 1929 in an atmosphere of struggle against the "right deviation", because, of course, the plan was adopted in the best option. Well, the supporters of the starting plan were "stigmatized" with the appropriate wording. So, in May 1929, the plan was adopted with maximum tasks, and in July-August, and then in January 1930, Stalin approved new, even higher tasks. Stalin was guided, apparently, by the beautiful idea that "there are no such fortresses that the Bolsheviks could not take," and this one - "we need to run through .."
And what is the result? As a result of the implementation of the Stalinist 1st Five-Year Plan, not a single one! Stalin's increased task was not even close. For oil, they almost reached the task of the optimal plan, for the rest - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe tasks of the "surrender" starting plan, or even less. At the same time, we are talking only about the tasks of heavy industry, because the five-year tasks for agriculture, food and light industry were not only not fulfilled, but many went into the red. Wherein! much more money was invested in the national economy than according to plan. 1st five-year plan failed. True, the people were not told about this. It is good that Stalin knew how to learn from his mistakes and the second Stalinist five-year plan was quite sane.
Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm
About the first five years
The “optimum version” of the first five-year plan was in fact the maximum, and any attempt to further increase certain tasks could only lead to an overstrain of the country’s forces, to material and human losses, and ultimately to a disruption of the plan, as happened in reality. Already in the autumn of 1929, the Stalinist leadership gave the process of radical reconstruction of the national economy the scale and pace of an unrestrained race.
Excessive forcing of the complete collectivization of millions of peasant farms, going as far as attempts to carry it out in the grain regions of the country for a year and a half, and even "during the spring sowing campaign of 1930", meant the rejection of the Leninist cooperative plan and its basic principles. The widespread use of measures of administrative coercion, the dispossession of kulaks (in some places up to 15% of peasant farms) caused unjustified and incalculable damage. During 1929-1932, half of the livestock was exterminated. Agriculture has experienced a long decline. All this created enormous difficulties in the formation and development of collective farms as a socialist form of agricultural production, which, of course, had a negative effect on industrial development.
When it comes to the excesses and perversions committed during the years of the first five-year plan, we always confine ourselves to talking about the countryside. Meanwhile, they also took place in the city - in industry, especially in the policy and practice of industrialization. The task adopted in April 1929 to increase iron smelting to 10 million tons in a five-year period seemed insufficient to the Stalinist leadership. In January 1930, this task was increased to 17 million tons! Moreover, it was put forward before all party, trade union and public organizations as "the most important national economic task."
Stalin's "great leap" in metallurgy (as in a number of other branches of industry) led to the disorganization of industrial construction, to an extreme complication economic situation and waste of material and human resources. One of the results was the failure to fulfill the plan for metallurgy: in the last year of the five-year plan, the country did not receive not only 10 million tons of pig iron, but also 8 million. In 1932, 6.2 million tons of pig iron were smelted in the country. The voluntaristic task was not fulfilled even in 1940, when iron smelting in the country reached 14.9 million tons.
Note that when evaluating all these figures, there is no way to refer to the lack of experience in planning, to the right to make a mistake, to “unexplored ways”, etc. The issues of the limits of possible growth - both for the economy as a whole and for individual industries - were discussed in wide press and became sufficiently clear during the development of the first five-year plan. The need for coordinating, coordinating, balancing (or, as they put it then, equilibrium) of specific tasks, the meaning of "bottlenecks" were fully disclosed. Already in the plans for 1929, a “problem” was laid down, which consisted in the fact that it was planned to build factories “today” from brick and metal structures that would be made “tomorrow”. N. I. Bukharin's article "Notes of an Economist", published in Pravda on September 30, 1928, was devoted to these issues. "Notes" was not directed against high rates; they revealed the harm of voluntaristic inconsistencies, which inevitably reduced real growth rates and ultimately made senseless the extraordinary efforts undertaken by society. The vicious prorabotochnaya, and not only prorabotochnaya, campaign against the "limiters", "succumbing to difficulties" (in which the "right deviation" allegedly manifested itself), removed the discussion of these issues. They, of course, very soon arose again, but in a different capacity: not as planning issues, but as issues of eliminating the consequences. “Inconsistencies” and “bottlenecks” were already mentioned when explaining the reasons for the long non-fulfillment of production plans, poor product quality, high accident rate, etc.
Let us see, nevertheless, what an additional increase in the five-year plan target for the production of pig iron by 7 million tons in a maximum of three years meant. This was equivalent to a task to start anew, complete construction and put into operation seven (!) Kuznetsk or Zaporozhye metallurgical plants with a design capacity of 1 million tons of pig iron each or three Magnitogorsk plants with a design capacity of 2.65 million tons. The state and prospects are already Kuznetsk, Zaporozhye and Magnitogorsk plants under construction at the beginning of 1930, they said with all certainty that their launch would take much more time and effort than expected. To in last year five-year plan to receive 17 million tons of pig iron, all these real and hypothetical plants should have been fully commissioned in the previous, penultimate year! In fact, even the factories under construction were not and could not be put into operation either in 1932 or in 1933. In Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk in 1932, only the first heats were obtained at the first blast furnaces, from which years of work were required to "big cast iron". They reached their design capacity in 1934-1936. The symbol of the first five-year plan was not "big iron" (not at all finished products), but "pit". The Platonic image of that time was not an artistic fiction, but “only” a fixation of reality, its visible manifestation. The foregoing allows us to state with full confidence that the revision of the tasks of the first five-year plan, which in themselves were extremely intense, was purely voluntaristic in nature and led to the disruption of the plan.
Danilov V. The phenomenon of the first five-year plans.- Horizon. - 1988. - No. 5.- S. 33-35.
Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm
About the second five-year plan
The second five-year plan (1933-1937) gave an increase valuation industrial output by 2.2 times, which, of course, was another major step towards industrialization. At the same time, the growth of industry was uneven and was characterized by increased disproportions and difficulties. After the breakthrough of the first five-year plan with its almost 20% average annual increase in industrial output, a respite was required: 1933 gave an increase in its volume by only 5%. A new leap in 1934-1936 (an average annual rate of more than 20%) is replaced by a slowdown in industrial growth (in 1937, an increase in the number of products by 11%, in 1938 - by 12%) due to a sharp lag in the fuel and energy base. The mass repressions that fell upon the party, Soviet and economic cadres also had an effect. In 1936-1937, a wide range of managers of the largest factories, leading figures of industrial people's commissariats were destroyed. The deputies of the people's commissar of heavy industry disappeared one after another - G. I. Lomov, M. L. Rukhimovich, A. P. Serebrovsky, I. V. Kosior ... In February 37, he committed suicide (or was killed) and himself the legendary People's Commissar for Industrialization G. K. Ordzhonikidze. V. I. Mezhlauk, who replaced him, was soon also repressed. This fate was shared by the people's commissar of light industry I. E. Lyubimov, and the people's commissar of the forest industry S. S. Lobov, the director of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant K. I. Butenko, the Makeevka Metallurgical Plant G. V. Gvakharia, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant V. I. Mikhailov-Ivanov... The list of names of Soviet industry commanders who died as a result of Stalin's repressions can be continued for a very long time. But even this list could not be limited. The heaviest blow was dealt to the engineering and technical personnel. By the beginning of 1940, 2 (two!) Engineers and 31 technicians with diplomas remained at the Makeevsky Metallurgical Plant, and 270 engineering and technical positions were occupied by persons without the appropriate education, at the Magnitogorsk Combine - 8 engineers and 66 technicians with diplomas and 364 practitioners. At other metallurgical enterprises, the picture was similar. Is it any wonder that the smelting of, say, pig iron increased by only 0.6% in 1937, by 1.1% in 1938, and decreased by 0.1% in 1939. In other words, the production of ferrous metallurgy did not grow during these years.
Similar difficulties were noted in other industries. Everywhere they led to a huge turnover of personnel, organizational confusion, people's fear of taking business initiative and taking responsibility, to the disruption of planned targets and, ultimately, to a slowdown in the process of industrialization just when the objective prerequisites for its real acceleration were created. The Stalinist mechanism of leadership inevitably reaped destructive results in the second five-year plan.
Finally, we can appreciate the attempts to “write off” the “costs” of the Stalinist version of solving the problems that were then facing the Soviet country on the threat of war. The threat of war was real an important factor development of the country, requiring, above all, the acceleration of industrialization. But it also made the most stringent demands for the most economical (reasonable, careful) use of material and human forces, for their accumulation, and not destruction ... This, I think, needs no explanation. It is absolutely clear that not only the repressions of 1936, 1937 and 1938 against the military, engineering and technical and party and state personnel, but also dispossession in the Stalinist style, and the famine of 1932-1933, and the insane pace of industrial construction imposed on the country, and the trampling of the Soviet democracy - all this led to a waste of the country's forces and resources, to the disruption of very real plans, and thereby to a weakening of the country's efficiency.
Danilov V. The phenomenon of the first five-year plans.- Horizon. - 1988. - No. 5.- S. 36-37.
Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm
The "great turning point" that Stalin announced in November 1929
had nothing to do with the reality of the socio-economic
whom development - there was not supposedly a huge increase in production
the nature of labor in industry, nor the alleged mass
collective farm movement in the countryside. With regard to that time,
one can speak of a "great turning point" in only one sense: Stalin
for the first time had the opportunity to impose the parties, the country's own
views, assessments, methods, its own policy - the policy of a dictatorial
voluntarism, inevitably accompanied by huge
human and material losses. with the most damage and
direct disasters, Stalinist voluntarism manifested itself in the
review of the tasks of the first five-year plan of the national economic
construction of the USSR (1928/29-1932/33).
Danilov V.P. On the history of the formation of Stalinism
Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm
Here is a typical example. In order to find additional funds for the development of heavy industry, the Stalinist leadership agreed to place new large loans among the population, to sharply expand the sale of vodka. Quite recently, Stalin assured that alcohol, with the help of which Tsarist Russia had half a billion in income, would not be distributed in Soviet Russia. A little later, he changed his point of view: it is naive, they say, to think that socialism can be built with white gloves. And in September 1930, he wrote directly to Molotov: “It is necessary, in my opinion, to increase (as much as possible) the production of vodka. We need to cast aside false shame and directly, openly go for the maximum increase in the production of vodka ... ”And this was done.
Another source of funds was the issue of money. Moreover, growth money supply, not backed by goods, continued until the end of the first five-year plan, with all the ensuing inflationary consequences. Extraordinary measures ensured the export of grain. Even now, one can often hear that it was this export item that played a particularly important role in providing the state with currency for the purchase of equipment. The statistics, however, are not so categorical. The largest proceeds for the export of bread were obtained in 1930 - 883 million rubles. In the same year, the sale of oil products and timber yielded more than 1 billion 430 million rubles. Furs and flax added almost half a billion, and so on. In subsequent years, grain prices on the world market fell sharply. The export of a large amount of grain in 1932-1933, when the hungry sea mowed down the Soviet people, brought a total of only 389 million rubles, and the export of timber - almost 700 million, oil products - the same amount. Only the sale of furs in 1933 made it possible to raise more funds than for all the grain exported that year.
All this forces us to re-evaluate the methods that Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and others used in raising funds for the needs of industrialization. In 1926, Stalin convinced the party and the people that the mores of landowner-bourgeois Russia (“we ourselves are undernourished, but we will take it out”) are a thing of the past. Even later, he spoke regularly about the advantages of socialist industrialization, connected, in particular, with the steady growth in the well-being of the workers, of all working people. But how, then, to regard his actions in 1932-1933, when the proceeds for bread were too insignificant and, in fact, did not decide anything? Why was it necessary to export grain, which at that tragic hour would have saved the lives of many of our people? Obviously, the whole point is that grain was confiscated from the peasantry at a fabulously low price, and increasing the export of petroleum products and other types of profitable products required considerable effort.
V. Lelchuk, A. Ilyin, L. Kosheleva. Industrialization of the USSR: strategy and practice. In the collection "A lesson gives history / Under the general. ed. V. G. Afanasiev, G. L. Smirnova; Comp. A. A. Ilyin. - M .: Politizdat, 1989.
