Chronology
One of the main consequences was the transfer of state-political power, which was previously concentrated in the union center, to the republics and, first of all, to Russia. The Russian president, the government, the Supreme Soviet within a few days gained power, which they had been seeking for almost a year and a half. The problem of implementing radical reforms arose. While the radicals had a common ideology of reform, they did not have a clear and justified program of specific economic and political transformations. The plan for economic reforms was made public only at the end of October 1991. President B.N. Yeltsin. The plan included several specific areas economic policy Russia, which constituted the essence of the reform.
First major measure- one-time introduction of free prices from January 1992 - had to determine market value goods and eliminate the trade deficit. Second- - was supposed to speed up the turnover, create an infrastructure for the sale of domestic and imported products. Third- wide housing privatization, state enterprises— was supposed to turn the masses of the population into owners.
Privatization checkThe program of radical reforms was outlined by Yeltsin, but its authors were the leading ministers of the new Russian government: market economists E. Gaidar, A. Shokhin, A. Chubais. At its core, this program meant a quick transition to . The main theorist of Russian "shock therapy" Deputy Prime Minister for economic issues E.T. Gaidar
E.T. Gaidar
believed that the classical market model can be implemented in Russia without any serious consequences for the social sphere. However, the results were dramatic for the Russians. The release of prices in January 1992 led to their increase not by 3-4 times, but by 10-12 times, while wages and pensions increased by 70%. Savings deposits The government was unable to index the population. In fact, the bulk of the population of Russia was below the poverty line. The reform was popularly called "predatory", gave rise to an acute distrust of the government and generally negative attitude towards the course of reforms.
Radical reforms caused and broad opposition in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. This opposition was headed by the Chairman of the Supreme Council R.I. Khasbulatov. Resistance to radical reforms received broad support in society, primarily in the sectors of the military-industrial complex and public sector where the majority of the population was employed.
In October 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin unveiled a program for the transition to a market economy. The Russian economy was waiting for radical changes.
The main points of the program:
restructuring of industry, building a private-state economy;
privatization of most state-owned enterprises, unhindered development of private property;
land reform followed by permission to buy and sell land;
removal of restrictions on foreign trade operations, renunciation of the state monopoly on foreign trade;
liberalization of prices and trade;
introduction of Russian national currency- ruble.
Russia began to free itself from the economic legacy of the USSR and build new economy based on market relations.
At the same time, the Russian leadership decided not to drag out the transition to the market for several years and not to apply half-hearted measures. The transition to the market was swift and complete. Yeltsin's program began to be implemented in full in January 1992. Responsible for the implementation of the reform program was one of its developers, Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar.
Price liberalization. "Shock therapy". Fall in production. Hyperinflation (1992-1994).
The leadership of Russia did what the leaders of the USSR, who feared a social explosion, did not dare to do: they abandoned the state regulation of prices. From January 2, 1992, the country switched to the use of free market prices. Prices began to be determined not by the state, as it was in the USSR - they began to be determined solely by supply and demand. The state left under its control only the prices of bread, milk, public transport and other socially significant consumer goods and services (they accounted for 10% of the total mass of goods and services).
It was assumed that after the release of prices they will increase by 3 times. However, the reality turned out to be more dramatic: prices immediately increased by 10-12 times. The reason is an acute shortage of essential goods.
But the rise in prices did not end there: the country experienced hyperinflation. In 1992, prices rose by 2,600 percent. The savings of citizens accumulated during the Soviet period were depreciated. Hyperinflation continued in the next two years. The consequences of "shock therapy" turned out to be much more severe than the authorities and leading economists of the country expected.
The abrupt transition to the market had many pluses and minuses. Moreover, often an unconditional plus often became the cause of the appearance of a new minus - and vice versa.
High demand for household goods revived trade. Thanks to trade liberalization, it became possible to quickly fill the market with imports. Goods poured into the country from abroad. This made it possible to quickly cope with the deficit. But now another serious problem has arisen: Russian enterprises could not stand the competition, as their products were inferior to imported ones in terms of quality and assortment. As a result, a huge number of enterprises one after another became bankrupt and closed. For the first time in the last 70 years, unemployment appeared in the country, and it immediately became widespread.
The sharp decline in production also hit Russian budget. He lost important sources of income and became impoverished very quickly. The state turned out to be unable to finance socially significant budget items. Science, education, health care, and culture were particularly affected.
But in general, the rapid reforms, for all their drama, were important:
the trade deficit was quickly eliminated;
a new trading system has emerged, freed from state mediation and based on direct ties with domestic and foreign manufacturers and suppliers;
the country has avoided the rupture of economic ties and economic collapse;
created the foundations of market relations and market mechanisms for the future growth of the Russian economy.
In autumn 1992, privatization began. Thousands of state enterprises passed into private hands - to individuals and work teams.
An important task of the authorities was the formation of a class of owners, the creation of small, medium and large businesses, which would form the basis of the Russian economy. The announced privatization was also subordinated to the solution of this problem.
But the majority of the population did not have the funds to buy shares. And the authorities decided to issue a privatization check (voucher) to every citizen of Russia. It could be exchanged for shares total cost up to 10 thousand rubles. These and other state measures have led to the fact that privatization has gained active forms. During the first year of reforms, 24,000 enterprises, 160,000 farms, and 15 percent of trade enterprises were privatized. A layer of owners began to form in the country at a very rapid pace.
Voucher privatization did not improve financial situation the majority of the Russian population. It did not become an incentive for the development of production, did not meet the expectations of the authorities and the entire population, who were counting on an improvement in the economic situation in the country. This is an absolute minus of the economic policy of the authorities in 1992-1994. But within a short time, new economic relations based on private property and freedom developed in the country. entrepreneurial activity. And this is an equally unconditional plus of the past privatization.
The reform program did not bring the main expected result: the government failed to stabilize the country's economy. In December 1992, Yegor Gaidar, who acted as head of the government, was dismissed. The government was headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin. He made adjustments to the reform program: unlike Gaidar, he pursued a policy of strengthening the role of the state in the economy. A special stake was also placed on the fuel and energy and defense complexes.
However, these measures were not successful either. Production continued to fall, the treasury experienced a terrible deficit, inflation grew, and "capital flight" intensified: domestic entrepreneurs did not want to leave profits in unstable Russia. Foreign companies were also in no hurry to invest in Russian economy, fearing not only economic, but also political instability, as well as the lack of necessary legislative framework in the country.
Russia was in dire need of money to finance reforms. They were provided by the International Monetary Fund and The World Bank. In addition, the government began to issue state short-term bonds (GKOs), which brought considerable income. It was also possible to convince the population to keep money in banks. As a result, the necessary funds appeared in the budget. Thanks to this, the government managed to reduce inflation and stabilize the ruble.
However, by selling GKOs and taking loans from foreign financial institutions, the country got more and more into debt. It was necessary to pay interest on GKOs, but there were simply no such funds in the budget. At the same time, the proceeds were not always used effectively - and therefore did not bring the expected result. As a result, a new threat loomed over the country - the danger of a debt crisis.
In early 1998, Chernomyrdin was dismissed. Sergei Kiriyenko became the new prime minister. The renewed government tried to prevent the impending financial crisis or mitigate its consequences. However, nothing could be changed.
On August 17, 1998, the government announced the termination of payments on GKO, in fact, admitting its inability to pay its debts. An unprecedented financial crisis broke out. The ruble exchange rate collapsed in a matter of weeks, depreciating 4 times against the dollar. Cash deposits population for the second time in a decade depreciated. Confidence in banks was again undermined. Banking system was on the edge of the abyss. Imports decreased, and there was a threat of a new total deficit.
Lost the trust of citizens and the government. It, together with Prime Minister Kiriyenko, was dismissed.
Yevgeny Primakov was appointed the new head of the Cabinet of Ministers. He urged not to wait for outside help, but to rely on one's own strength. The default also had a positive moment: due to the strong appreciation of the dollar imported goods turned out to be too expensive for the majority of the population of the country. It was a chance for domestic production, which unexpectedly received serious competitive advantages: domestic goods turned out to be significantly cheaper than imported ones and began to be in serious demand. Production revived. A new economic growth has begun.
In May 1999, Sergei Stepashin became prime minister, and in August of the same year, Vladimir Putin headed the government. They continued their course towards the improvement of the Russian economy.
With the advent of Putin to the leadership of the government, the development of a fundamentally new economic strategy countries.
In the 1990s, Russia's lag behind the world's leading economies was constantly increasing. In terms of cumulative indicators economic development Russia has rolled back far, noticeably yielding to the leading countries of Europe and the United States. If in the middle of the 20th century Russia ranked second in the world in terms of industrial production, then in the 90s it dropped into the second ten. On the other hand, market relations have developed in the country, a new foundation has been built, on which the economy of the new, post-communist Russia was to be built. It was necessary to urgently get out of the protracted crisis, overcome the backlog and ensure sustainable economic growth. Not only the material well-being of the country depended on this. The future of Russia was being decided.
At the beginning of 2000 in Russia, instead of 47 thousand enterprises and organizations (at the end of the 1980s), there were 26 thousand large JSCs (including those with state participation of over 75%), 124.6 thousand privatized enterprises in industry and service sector (60% of the total), 270.2 thousand farms, 1.7 million private enterprises mainly in the field of market infrastructure (including 850 thousand small enterprises), about 27 thousand large agricultural enterprises, 110 thousand budget recipients, 1315 commercial banks, which allows us to speak about a certain degree of the formed market multi-subjectivity of the Russian economy.
In Russia, the decline in GDP production for 1991-96. amounted to 39%, including 6% in 1996. In 1997, the production of GDP amounted to 100.4%, in 1998 - 95%, in 1999 - 101.4%.
The depth of the decline in production in Russia is higher than the transformational one, which is due to a more deformed structure of the economy than in other post-socialist states, 75% of which accounted for the military-industrial complex and the production of capital goods, the inconsistency of market reforms and the massive withdrawal of production into the shadows (30-50% of GNP is not included in its officially taken into account dimensions).
The reduction in the rate of decline, but still continuing for 9 years, the decline in production and GDP causes a decrease in the living standards of the population through the confiscation of accumulated income, inflation, the growth of unemployment (or its suppressed character, due to the “pupation” of enterprises) and the deepening of the differentiation of the population in terms of the level of income received. income, as evidenced by both the growth of the K. Gini coefficient and the growth (until 1996) of the concavity of the M. Lorentz curve. the ratio increased from 1:1.8 in the 1980s to 1:16 in 1995 and 1:14.1 in 2000.
The fall in real incomes of the population of Russia in 1991–96. amounted to 30%, the consumption of material goods and services decreased by 10%. In 1997, per capita real incomes increased by 2.5%, in 1998 they fell by 18%, and in 1999 by 15%.
The “discovery” of suppressed inflation and price liberalization led to high inflation in the transition economies, the suppression of which is ensured the faster, the higher the sequence and pace of market transformations (the Baltic countries, on the one hand, and Ukraine, on the other).
In Russia, the CPI changed as follows:
1991 - 261%;
1992 - 2680%;
1993 - 1008%;
1994 - 324%;
1995 - 231%;
1996 - 123%;
1997 - 111%, 1st half of 1998 - 104.5%, 1998 - 184.4%, 1999 - 138%, 1st quarter of 2000 - 105.6%.
The transformational recession, overemployment in a centrally controlled economy objectively determine the growth of unemployment in the transition period. active population in accordance with the methodology of the International Labor Organization, and the number of officially registered unemployed is 1.2 million people, or 2.7% of the economically active population.
The agrarian crisis and the complete monopoly of state property on land complicate the formation of diversity economic entities the agrarian market and the solution of the agrarian question, which is aggravated in all post-socialist countries. These factors are also superimposed by the need for land restitution, if not to specific owners (the Baltic countries and of Eastern Europe), then the repressed segments of the population (Cossacks).
Due to the concentration of entrepreneurial qualities mainly in the nomenklatura, which always implemented them “in the shadows”, in criminogenic forms, the initial accumulation of capital could not fail to materialize in the forms of “nomenklatura” privatization of state property or resources and non-payments.
The crisis of statehood, combined with criminogenic forms of realization of entrepreneurial qualities, causes an increase in the criminogenic situation in the economy, a merger of state structures and shadow capital, which sets the task of strengthening economic security both internal and external. These processes are due to the fact that at critical moments for society, traditional ties are broken, and the value system is deformed. The dangerous tendency of the disintegration of society into atomic units and groups, leading the struggle of all against all in their narrowly selfish interests, is intensifying. There are rules of the game that are determined not so much by legal norms as by the real balance of power and influence of corporate groups that have seized control of the former state property. The primacy of force over law hinders the emergence of an effective owner. Instead, the figure of a temporary worker is characteristic, striving for the speedy enrichment and transfer of capital abroad.
Hence the origins of criminalization economic relations and public life in general. It is obvious that the exit economic crisis cannot be carried out only with the help of state structures, through reforms from above. The bureaucracy itself is largely subject to corruption. It is necessary to stimulate the processes of self-organization and self-development of society, which determines the energy of the system's development.
High deficit of state budgets, leading to high money and credit emission, generating inflation. The state budget deficit of Russia was:
1995 - 70 trillion. rub.;
1996 - 80.55 trillion. rub.;
1997 - 89 trillion. rub.;
1998 (plan) - 132.4 billion rubles, which was supposed to be covered by the issuance of government securities and external borrowings, in fact - 143.7 billion rubles. (5.3% of GDP), 1999 - 101.3 billion rubles. (2.5% of GDP), in fact - 58 billion rubles.
Overestimation of the emerging in the early 20th century. trends in the socialization and socialization of the economy has led to a high monopolization of all spheres of the economy of countries of real socialism, which necessitates demonopolization in the process of privatization and the further functioning of state (state) enterprises on the basis of downsizing and commercialization of their activities.
High tax pressure: taxes amount to 22.2% of GDP, and together with social contributions- 33%, government spending - 45% of GDP, which exceeds the optimal boundaries according to the A. Laffer curve.
Investment Crisis - 1991-96 investments decreased by 72.1%, in 1997 - by 5%, in 1998 - by 6.8%, in 1999 - an increase of 2.7%.
The strengthening of the crime situation in the economy, the merging of state structures and shadow capital, which sets the task of strengthening economic security, both internal and external.
Despite the economic, social, national, geopolitical and other features of each of the post-socialist countries, the reaction of their economies to market transformations is completely normal, which indicates the inherent nature of market self-regulation in modern economic civilization.
Differences in the implementation of general patterns are due to differences in the starting economic situation: the level of development, dependence on international trade, the degree of advancement of economic reforms, the level of imbalance in the economy. For example, agriculture in Poland consisted of many small (too small to be efficient) farms, the rest consisted of inefficient huge state farms and cooperatives, Hungary introduced a regulated market from 1968, and Czechoslovakia had a tightly managed state economy until 1989, but both had fewer macroeconomic imbalances than Russia and Poland. Thus, the established economic situation in each country influenced the features of the implementation of general patterns.
A set of reforms tested in different countries that enhance the market nature of the economy makes it possible to single out economic milestones transition period:
Creation of political and institutional prerequisites;
Economic liberalization;
Macroeconomic (financial) stabilization;
Privatization;
Structural adjustment.
The historical sequence of these stages in Russia was as follows:
1991–93 - the collapse of the administrative system, the formation of the foundations of a market economy;
1994–95 - stage of inflationist, protectionist policy;
1996–97 - achieving financial stabilization, restructuring of enterprises, stopping the decline in production;
1998–99 the financial crisis and its aftermath.
By its nature, the transitional economy is mixed, with the predominance of the public sector and collectivist forms of ownership. It contains the following sectors:
State (in 1995 it covered 50% of fixed assets and produced a third of GDP, occupied 40% of the labor force, in 1999 the production of GDP in the public sector decreased to 20%);
Private (individual and joint);
Corporate;
Small-scale (shuttle traders, street trade, peasant farms);
The presence in a market economy of many economic entities representing various forms of ownership and forms of management objectively determines the mixed nature of the transition economy, i.e. coexistence of both new and old sectors, reflecting the inertia of the economy.
Reforms of President Yeltsin
By the fall of 1991, the deficit had taken on terrifying proportions, and famine was expected in the country. President Yeltsin introduced great economic reforms in the early 1990s. 20th century He selected for this a team of young reformers - liberals, the main of which were Gaidar and Chubais. Prime Minister Gaidar introduced a market in Russia, and Chubais introduced private ownership of firms' property. Gaidar launched a price liberalization campaign on January 1, 1992. He abolished the state price setting procedure for all types of goods and resources and granted this right to the manufacturing enterprises themselves in order to lead the country out of the world of “planned absurdity” into the world of “market rationality”. The specialists expected some increase in prices, but no one expected such a big rise in prices. Prices during 1992 increased 26 times. Therefore, this economic policy was called "shock therapy". A similar policy was carried out in Poland, where there was also a giant jump in prices. People went to the store like a museum to look at products that they had not seen on the counter for many years, but they could not buy these products due to high level prices. Subsequently, the level of wages caught up with the level of prices and goods became available to the majority of the population. What is the reason for such a jump in prices in 1992? The fact that monopolist enterprises were able to raise prices in order to enrich themselves, for example, ferrous metallurgy enterprises raised prices 14 times at once. There was a debt crisis. All enterprises were still state-owned at that time, and they could not be made bankrupt for debts. Inflation set in, and the citizens' savings were completely burned up in the fire of this inflation.
In order to force enterprises to answer for their debts up to bankruptcy, in order to introduce economic control over the labor of employees at enterprises with the help of bonuses and fines, Chubais led a campaign to privatize enterprises. Insolvency (bankruptcy) of an enterprise is the inability to repay debts to creditors. The bankruptcy procedure usually ends with the transfer of the enterprise from the hands of the debtor to the hands of creditors or the sale of the enterprise at auction, when creditors receive debts from the amount of money received at the auction. On a personal level, the fate of a bankrupt is deplorable, because no one else wants to deal with him in business. Russian privatization developed at an unprecedented pace: only in 1993-1994. 64 thousand enterprises were privatized, and in total for 1992-2000. - 135 thousand enterprises. At the first stage, the sale of enterprises was carried out on privatization checks (vouchers). Voucher privatization was necessary to create an impression of social justice, and besides, at the time privatization began, there were simply no people in Russia who had enough money to privatize enterprises. In fact, those who were closer to power were appointed oligarchs, in this way Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, Abramovich and others became oligarchs. They obtained ownership of the factories through various frauds. Each citizen received one check, he had to choose one of the enterprises to be privatized and invest this check in the privatization of this enterprise. Chubais promised that the price of each voucher would be equal to the price of a car, in fact, its price was often equal to a bottle of vodka. Entrepreneurial businessmen appeared who bought them in huge quantities at such a ridiculous price from drunkards. Other people invested vouchers in unprofitable enterprises in which they themselves worked, subsequently these enterprises went bankrupt and the vouchers disappeared. Still others invested their vouchers in investment funds, for example, in the Permsky fund, which were headed by swindlers, subsequently these funds disappeared without a trace, and the vouchers disappeared. And only a fourth invested their vouchers in successful companies, such as Gazprom and RAO UES, but still they did not wait for dividends and after a few years sold their shares to larger shareholders of these companies. As a result of the privatization campaign, some of the richest oligarchs appeared in Russia, especially in the oil and raw materials industries. Having bought vouchers for next to nothing, some businessmen managed to buy state-owned enterprises with them. For example, Perm businessmen bought the Sport ski factory with vouchers, later the new owners took currency credit abroad, allegedly for the purchase of imported equipment secured by the property of this factory, but the money taken on credit disappeared without a trace along with the new owners, the factory was in debt. Still, the privatization campaign was necessary and useful. In the future, privatization was carried out for money, not for vouchers. As a result of the devaluation (depreciation) of the ruble in 1998, the price of domestic goods fell compared to imported goods, so domestic enterprises were able to squeeze out foreign competitors in the domestic market. In the conditions of the economic crisis, private enterprises tried to cut their costs and get rid of the housing stock, dormitories, rest houses, kindergartens, cultural centers and hospitals, which only brought them losses.
