2.2.7. The formational concept of progress by K. Marx The first integral "formational" concept of the progressive development of mankind was developed by K. Marx, who argued in his economic and philosophical works that

2.2.13. The concept of the dialogic nature of world culture Bakhtin, she found her detailed justification, first of all, in the studies of French historians of the Annales school (as well as Russian

Prattern's concept For example, Robert Prattern distinguishes 3 main types of transmedia based on the following criteria: - the number of narrative spaces (characters, locations, time); - the number of media platforms and the way they interact (sequential, parallel,

The concept of Jenkins The classification of one of the main theorists of transmedia, G. Jenkins, can also be considered a classic concept of a transmedia project. In 2009, Jenkins identified 7 main characteristics of transmedia.1) Fluidity - the ability of the public to

http://www.archipelag.ru/authors/wallerstein/?library=1084

http://www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/Polit/tork/01.php

Immanuel Wallerstein (b. 1930) is an American thinker, the founder of world-system analysis, one of the leaders of modern left-wing radical social science.

Born in New York on September 28, 1930. Studied sociology at Columbia University in New York (bachelor's degree - 1951, master's degree - 1954, doctoral degree - 1959). He worked at Columbia University (1958-1971), McGill University (1971-1976), Binghamton (1976-1999) and Yale (since 2000) universities. Since 1976 he has directed the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations (at Binghamton University), organized by him, whose members are actively involved in the development and promotion of the world-systems approach. From 1994-1998 he was President of the International Sociological Association.

Starting his scientific career as an African sociologist, Wallerstein began to study the general theory of social economic development. The world-system theory he developed is based on the principles of complex historical analysis proposed by the French historian Fernand Braudel. It synthesizes sociological, historical and economic approaches to social evolution.

I. Wallerstein is notable for his enormous scientific productivity: he has published over 20 books and over 300 articles.

The main work of I. Wallerstein is the multi-volume Modern World System: in the first volume (1974) the genesis of the European world economy in the 16th century is considered, in the second (1980) its development during the period of mercantilism, in the third volume (1989) he brought it history until the 1840s. In other writings, Wallerstein analyzes the evolution of the capitalist world-economy in the 19th and 20th centuries. and even makes predictions for the 21st century.

The originality of I. Wallerstein's approach lies in the fact that he offers a fundamentally new research perspective for the analysis of social, economic and political processes - a world-system perspective, in which the world acts as a certain systemic and structural whole, the laws of development of which determine the trajectories of movement of all individual national societies and states. The immediate appearance of the world-system theory dates back to the early 70s. This theoretical approach was a synthesis of several theoretical traditions at once:

Firstly , geohistoryF. Brodelai, more broadly, of the entire heritage of the Annales school,

Secondly, the "theory of dependence" in the version of A.G. Frank (which, in turn, goes back to the Marxist theories of imperialism),

Thirdly, non-classical economic theory(including concepts economic cycles), where the works of K. Polanyi, J. Schumpeter and N. Kondratiev should be highlighted.

In one of his theoretical works entitled "World-systems analysis", which was published for the first time at the dawn of modern globalization - in 1987, the author wrote: "Today we are faced with the question: are there any criteria that can be used to to state in a relatively clear and appropriate way the boundaries between the four supposed disciplines: anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology? World systems analysis answers this question with an unequivocal "no". All supposed criteria - level of analysis, subject matter, methods, theoretical assumptions - either no longer correspond to practice, or, if confirmed by it, are more barriers to further knowledge than incentives to create it. Or, on the other hand, the differences between acceptable topics, methods, theories or theorizing within any of the so-called disciplines are much stronger than the differences between them. This means in practice that the overlap is substantial and, in terms of the historical evolution of all these disciplines, is increasing all the time. It's time to break through this intellectual swamp by saying that these four disciplines are just one." Under the science that unites the four disciplines he listed, one can see nothing more than global studies. The merit of I. Wallerstein lies in the fact that he gave it not a narrow political science, but a cultural perspective. It cannot be otherwise, if by globalistics we understand the science that is part of political science, and the latter is included in cultural studies, since politics is one of the products of culture.

I. Wallerstein argues that world-system analysis is not a theory about social world or parts of it. It is a protest against the way in which social scientific research was structured for all of us at its inception in the mid-19th century. This research method has become a set of often indisputable a priori assumptions. World-systems analysis, on the other hand, argues that this method of scientific research, practiced throughout the world, has had the effect of closing rather than revealing many of the most important and most interesting questions. World-systems analysis was born as a moral and as a political, in its broadest sense, protest. However, it is precisely on the basis of scientific requirements, i.e. requirements related to the possibilities of systemic knowledge about social reality, world-systems analysis challenges the dominant method of research.

In the broadest sense, world-system analysis is a continuation and extension of the ideas of the “world revolution” of 1968 to the sphere of social knowledge, a reaction to the “ideologized positivism and false apolitism” of the social sciences of the 1950s and 1960s. In a narrower sense, world-systems analysis challenged the two dominant theories of the time - developmentalism (the theory of "development") and the concept of modernization. Although world-systems analysis was only one variant of this critique, it is now clear that it broke with nineteenth-century social science more deeply than other critics did.

I. Wallerstein's criticism is concentrated around the key, paradigm foundations of modern social knowledge, which he calls "the terrible legacy of the social science of the XIX century." According to I. Wallerstein, we need not just a rethinking, but a radical replacement of the social science of the XIX century, "for many of its premises (in my opinion, erroneous and limited) are still too ingrained in our thinking. These premises, once conducive to the liberation of the spirit, today act as the main intellectual barrier to a successful analysis of the social world.

First of all, it is the idea that social reality allegedly exists in three special and separate spheres: political, economic and sociocultural. In this case, economic phenomena are understood to mean that which relates to the functioning of the market, political - that which relates to the sphere of functioning of state institutions, and socio-cultural - that which is determined mainly by the state of our spirit. Each of these areas - economics, politics and culture - is an autonomous type of activity and has its own internal logic of development (therefore, contradictions and mutual conflicts can arise between them). However, according to I. Wallerstein, the separation of economics, politics and culture is rather a dogma of the dominant liberal ideology than a reflection of the real mechanisms of the functioning of the modern world. A variation of this myth is the idea that in pre-capitalist systems these spheres were indeed inseparable, and only capitalism (“modernization”, “transition from traditional to modern”) separates them.

In fact, according to I. Wallerstein, even within the capitalist system, these three areas work together and inseparably: at the personal level, there are no separate (economic, political, sociocultural) types of motivations, just as there are no objective institutions that acted exclusively in one area. . For example, functioning economic sphere cannot be properly understood on the basis of only what belongs to the realm of the "market": any production system is organized as a network social relations, which embodies a certain value system of ideas, which, in turn, imply and are realized through certain political processes. Even "economic" markets are rather socio-political formations, and, for example, the true level of prices depends on many socio-political circumstances. All political activity serves the purpose of providing economic advantages or needs, as well as the achievement of certain socio-cultural goals. The desire for political power, as I. Wallerstein points out, also cannot be separated from these moments. Finally, sociocultural activity is made possible and explicable through economic and political circumstances. Social (and/or cultural) activities cannot be imagined apart from these factors. “All institutions,” I. Wallerstein notes, “act simultaneously politically, economically, and socioculturally and cannot be effective otherwise.”

the trinity of politics, economics and culture has no intellectual value today. A fundamental reorganization of all cognitive activity in the social sciences on a global scale is needed, which implies going beyond the disciplinary division of social science that developed in the 19th century.

There are several innovative conceptual provisions that form the theoretical prerequisites for world-system analysis: firstly, this is a rethinking of the problems of historical temporality (from linear calendar time to a plurality of different types of “time-and-space”); secondly, it new unit analysis (historical systems, not individual societies and/or states); thirdly, it is a rethinking of the essence of social change (stochastic development instead of linear progress).

I. Wallerstein replaces the term "society" with the term "historical system". "Historical system" as a term emphasizes the unity of historical social science. Integrity is both systemic and historical. Historical systems have three defining characteristics. They are relatively autonomous, that is, the parameters of their functioning are determined by the action of internal processes. They have time limits, i.e. they have a beginning and an end. They have spatial boundaries, which, however, may change in the course of their historical existence.

I. Wallerstein wrote about the cyclical development of historical systems. It uses the concept of long waves N.D. Kondratiev. Quite important and complex, according to the researcher, is the problem of determining cyclical rhythms, secular trends and crises, which are transitional stages, and therefore breaks. Due to the fact that everything is always changing, the parameters of the cycle and the frequency are never exactly determined, at best very approximately. But change is not arbitrary. They are predictable in principle, within the framework of the rules by which the system operates - otherwise it would not be a system.

World-system analysis argues that the categories that inform our history were historically shaped (and in most cases only a century or so ago).

World-system analysis wants to take the idea of ​​progress out of the trajectory and expose it as an analytic variable. Historical systems can be better or worse. It doesn't have to be a linear trend - up, down, or straight ahead. Perhaps the trend line is oscillating; or possibly undefined. If this possibility were allowed, a whole new arena of intellectual analysis would immediately open up. If the world has many patterns, types, historical systems, and if all historical systems have beginnings and ends, then we want to know something about the process by which the succession (in time-space) of historical systems occurs.

I. Wallerstein divided all societies into three types - "mini-systems", "world empires" and "world economies". The first are small societies, which are characterized by the unity of culture. I. Wallerstein claims that today almost nothing is known about how mini-systems work. First, because they no longer exist. In addition, most of the phenomena that were described as mini-systems were in fact only local components of world-systems, since one of the prerequisites for their study was their inclusion in world-systems. And, finally, the life of mini-systems was short and now there are no methods for determining their life path. Therefore, we are faced with a problem similar to the one faced by physicists who tried to study extremely small particles, the existence of which eluded them. Probably, someday it will be possible to invent a way to comprehend these particles (mini-systems), which filled a significant part of the social history of mankind; but today it does not seem realistic. Therefore, further discussion will focus mainly on world-systems.

The second type of society is world empires, within which various cultures have been collected. Under the latter type of society, I. Wallerstein meant nothing more than capitalism (“the capitalist system”). Here is how I. Wallerstein himself defines them: “I assert that empirically there were three such models. "Mini-systems", so named because they are small in space and perhaps relatively short in time (lifespan of about six generations), are highly homogeneous in terms of cultural and control structures. Basic logic - the logic of "reciprocity" in exchange. "World empires" are vast political structures (at least at the top of the expansion and contraction process that seems to be their destiny) and embrace a wide variety of "cultural" patterns. The main logic of the system is the extraction of tribute from simultaneously locally self-governing direct producers (mainly rural), which is sent to the center and redistributed to a thin but important network of officials. The "world economies" are vast, uneven chains of production-involving structures cut across by numerous political structures. The underlying logic is that accumulated profits are distributed unequally in favor of those who are able to achieve various kinds of temporary monopolies in market networks. This is “capitalist” logic.

Table 1. Typology of historical systems by I. Wallerstein

In the pre-agricultural era, there were many mini-systems whose constant death could be more the result of environmental accidents plus the splitting of groups growing too profusely. Knowledge about this period, as noted earlier, is very limited. There was no written language, and information can only be obtained from archaeological reconstructions. Between 8000 B.C. and 1500 AD on the planet at the same time there were many historical systems of all three varieties. The world empire was the most powerful form of this era, as whenever it expanded, it destroyed and/or absorbed both mini-systems and world-economy, and when it contracted, it made it possible for mini-systems and world-economy to rebuild. Much of what we call the history of this period is the history of such world-empires, which is understandable as they raised cultural scribes to record what happened. The world economies were a weak form, individual, never lasting. This is because they either disintegrated, or were absorbed by the world empire, or transformed into it (through the internal expansion of a single political entity).

Around 1500, one such world economy managed to avoid this fate. For reasons that require explanation, the "modern world-system" was born out of the consolidation of the world economy. As a consequence, it had time to reach its full development as a capitalist system. By its internal logic, this capitalist world economy then expanded to cover the entire globe, absorbing in the process all existing world empires. As a result, by the end of the nineteenth century, for the first time ever, there was only one historical system on the globe. This has created an entirely new structural situation in which there are currently no coexisting historical systems external to the only surviving system called the capitalist world-economy.

The constant spatial expansion of the capitalist world-economy was a function of its main driving force, the continuous accumulation of capital. This driving force has acted and is acting in a threefold way. First of all, horizontal spatial expansion contributes to the restoration of the surplus value extraction coefficient whenever this coefficient decreases globally after the world economy exits the market recession (overcome by expanding global effective demand through the partial redistribution of this surplus value to relatively less profitable sectors) . The process of geographical expansion supports the incorporation into the world-economy of new low-wage direct producers, which restores to its former level the share of surplus value centralized in the hands of a small number of relatively large "accumulators" of capital.

Second, the capitalist world-economy includes structures that especially encourage technological development. Technological development was also encouraged in the world-empires, but there were also tangible obstacles (which significantly slowed down this process), since the centralized power constantly faced a serious political problem of controlling its axially dispersed governors, and technological development made such control more difficult (which could be called "a trend towards the democratization of the use of force"). Rapid technological progress, which fit very productively into the normal functioning of the capitalist world-economy, made this technically possible, since it provided a military opportunity to overcome the resistance of the world-empires to their inclusion in the world-economy.

Thirdly, the capitalist mode of production includes mechanisms that put at particular disadvantage those who are not sensitive to changing opportunities to maximize capital accumulation. The ones in control economic activity, and make no effort to maximize the accumulation of capital, eventually fail and are eliminated from the scene. On the contrary, there are no special mechanisms of power that could exist in the world-empire, aimed at persecuting irrational ways of consuming the world product. There is no way to systematically and persistently introduce anti-market values ​​into the decision-making process (as in world-empires). Consequently, there is no basis for effectively resisting geographical expansion, once it has shown itself to be beneficial to the interests of accumulation of capital.

The deepening of capitalist processes and the geographical expansion of the boundaries of the social division of labor were the result of the action of powerful forces that created and consolidated the world-economy itself. Their action is still unstoppable.

I. Wallerstein disputes the traditional formational and civilizational approaches to history, offering a new, third paradigm of social development.

It was traditionally believed that capitalism as a social system originally originated in some of the most developed countries, and only then did capitalist society begin to take shape. world economy. According to the concept of I. Wallerstein, on the contrary, capitalism initially developed as an integral system of world relations, the individual elements of which were national economies.

Capitalism was born, according to I. Wallerstein, in the 16th century, when, due to an accidental combination of circumstances in Western Europe world-empires gave way to a world-economy based on trade. The capitalist world-economy gave rise to the colonial expansion of the Western European countries, by the 19th century. it overwhelmed all other world-economy and world-empires, remaining the only modern world-system.

According to I. Wallerstein's theory, all countries of the capitalist world-economy live in the same rhythm dictated by "long waves". Kondratiev.

The capitalist world-economy is characterized by an "axial division of labor" - a division into a core (center) and a periphery. The countries of European civilization, which form the core of the world economy, play the role of the leading force in world economic development. Non-European countries (with some exceptions) form the periphery, i.e. are economically and politically dependent. The backwardness of the periphery countries is explained, according to I. Wallerstein, by the purposeful policy of the core countries - they impose on subordinate countries such economic specialization that retains the leadership of developed countries. Although the developed countries promote the ideology of "free trade", I. Wallerstein considers capitalism to be a deeply anti-market system, since the core countries monopolize their privileged position and defend it by force. However, in the 20th century the line between the core and the periphery began to partly blur due to the active attempts of previously backward countries (for example, Japan) to break into the circle of active participants in the world economy.

In addition to the antagonistic relationship between the core and the periphery, another core of the evolution of the capitalist world-economy is the struggle between the countries of the core. The evolution of the capitalist world-economy is an alternation of periods of rivalry and hegemony of core states for relative (as opposed to world-empires) control over the world-system. In general, the concept of hegemony can be defined as such relations of dominance of some states over others, which allows them to establish principles, procedures and rules of conduct that are common to (all other actors) and the whole international system generally. The fact is that the maximum and most efficient accumulation of capital in the capitalist world-economy occurs when it reaches a certain middle state between the world-empire (offering the direct military-political integration of the entire core) and the “open” rivalry of several approximately equal players. “The ideal situation from the point of view of capital accumulation within the system as a whole,” writes I. Wallerstein, “is the existence of a dominant power strong enough to determine the rules of the game and ensure that they are carried out to the end. When rivalry, as a systemic condition, is replaced by hegemony, this does not mean that the hegemonic power can do everything. But this means that it can prevent others from changing (violating) the rules.” That is, hegemony in the capitalist world-economy is determined by the presence of sufficiently strong actors who have the ability (economic, political, military or ideological) to force others to reproduce the established ( hegemon) regime of "distribution" of various forms of capital.

The desire for hegemony in the interstate system, according to I. Wallerstein, is similar to the desire for a monopoly in the global production system, and this desire is never fully achievable. The key, therefore, according to I. Wallerstein, is the search for an answer to the following questions regarding hegemony: 1) how does one or another state achieve superiority in relation to other strong states, i. such a position that we can call it "hegemony"? 2) what kind of world-structural policy are the hegemonic powers pursuing? 3) why do dominant powers lose their hegemony?

There were only three powers in history - hegemons: 1) the United Provinces (Holland) in the middle of the 17th century (1620-1672), Great Britain in the middle of the 19th century (1815-1873) and the USA - in the middle of the 20th (peak - 1945-1967 / 73 ). According to I. Wallerstein, the initial prerequisite for the emergence of hegemony is by no means military force, but the achievement of superiority in production efficiency in the world-economy: industrial, commercial and financial superiority. Each of the three hegemonic powers dominated only for a short period, namely when superiority was achieved simultaneously in all three areas.

At the same time, an important factor in achieving hegemony was that for a long time they did not make large investments in the creation of numerous armies, but each created a large merchant navy, which, in addition to its obvious economic function, supported the capabilities of these states in the maintenance of naval forces. “Perhaps,” writes I. Wallerstein, “this was indeed the key factor that these states were able to defeat their main rivals in the struggle for hegemony, namely the fact that they not invested in the creation of large armies.

However, the consistent achievement of industrial, commercial and financial superiority can only partly be explained by the achievement of victory in the corresponding form of free market competition in the world market, a common victory has always required state influence to create advantages of non-market origin, the gradual accumulation of which, sooner or later, was transformed into a common structural - a privileged position within the capitalist world-economy. The final stage of the struggle for hegemony (the qualitative transformation of non-market advantages into a structurally fixed privileged position) ultimately leads to a decisive military clash, which I. Wallerstein calls the “thirty-year war”, in which all opposing forces participate and the confrontation goes on all over the globe.

There were only three such global thirty-year wars in the history of the capitalist world-economy: 1) In the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) Dutch interests prevailed over the interests of the Habsburgs, 2) in the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) the British prevailed over the French, 3) in the thirty-year "American-German" wars of 1914-1945, the United States defeated Germany. They proceeded more sporadically than continuously (moreover, the states participating in them often changed sides and allies, changing their ideological convictions along the way), and ended in the end with the defeat of one of the warring parties. In all three cases, sea (/air) power overcame land power. And in each case, the forces committed to preserving the basic structure of the capitalist world-economy defeated those forces that sought to transform it into a world-empire. Thus, the Dutch hegemony, which led to the political institutionalization of the capitalist world-economy, acted as a historical alternative to the Habsburg world-empire, the British hegemony to Napoleon's world-empire, and the American one to Hitler's world-empire. At the same time, in a long period of decline in hegemony, two potential “candidates for the inheritance” always appeared: England and France after the decline of Dutch hegemony, the USA and Germany after the decline of British hegemony, and now Western Europe and Japan after the gradual decline of US hegemony.

The end of the "Thirty Years' War" was each time marked by a restructuring of the international system and the establishment of a new concept of world order that provides long-term political and economic advantages to the hegemonic power: this is the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, this is the system of the "European Concert" after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and this is the UN after 1945 . The dominant power can maintain its hegemony in periods of medium duration only as long as it is able to impose institutional restrictions on the degree of freedom and openness of the world market, which would then work exclusively for its benefit (because, by virtue of its greater efficiency, the producers of the power hegemons would win in the short term in the conditions of the most open and free world market, but in the medium term they would eventually become losers, as they faced new equally effective competitors). The immediate period of hegemony in each case is relatively brief, usually 25-30 years, after which the former hegemonic power again becomes a regular great power among others (even if it remains militarily the most powerful among them for some time. Decline of hegemony determined by a decrease in the total economic efficiency through the emergence of additional types of non-production costs determined by the “burden of leadership” (redistribution of monopoly income in favor of the middle and lower strata, large investments in the development of military infrastructure), the absence of which at one time served as the basis for the rise of the hegemonic state.

Thus, according to I. Wallerstein, cyclical ups and downs of hegemonic powers constantly occurred in history, which ensured the necessary degree of stable balance in interstate relations, as well as the processes of unhindered accumulation of capital. “A hegemony that lasted too long would turn the system into a world-empire. And a system in which a hegemonic power did not arise would not have the capacity to create the stable temporary orders necessary for maximum accumulation.”

An analysis of the "cycles of hegemony" shows a fairly accurate correlation with both secular trends and N. Kondratiev's cyclical rhythms. The slow growth of the hegemon takes place in the context of a long-term economic recovery in conditions of relatively free competition of many players, the consolidation of the dominant position of the most successful (i.e., effective) of them occurs through the victory in the global "Thirty Years' War" and the subsequent restructuring agreement. Consolidation of the monopoly position of the hegemon leads to a long-term relative decline in efficiency and a return to a state of rivalry among many powers.

Analyzing the historical processes of the past, I. Wallerstein thinks about what awaits us in the future. Most likely, in his opinion, it will be the "golden mean" - between heaven and earth, between the prosperous "golden billion" and the eternally impoverished periphery, between the center and the periphery.

In the article "Peace, stability, legitimacy. 1990-2025/2050" he wrote: "The period from 1990 to 2025/2050 will most likely lack peace, lack stability and lack legitimacy. This is partly due to the decline of the United States as the hegemon of the world-system, but even more to the crisis of the latter precisely as a world-system. The center of the world, in his opinion, will move in the next 50-75 years to maritime Japan. Japan will turn the US into its junior partner (as the UK did with the Netherlands, and the US, in turn, with the UK) and the joint Japanese-American condominium will sooner or later converge in a new large-scale "thirty-year" world war with the "continental" EU, the winner from which Japan will emerge. The remaining regions of the capitalist world economy will be distributed to varying degrees between these two alliances: North and South America, China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific region will be included in the Japanese-American zone, Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa and India - into the European zone. The most important problem of development and consolidation of these two zones in the period 2000-2025. will consist in the choice of optimal methods of integration, first of all, of the two giants - China and Russia. For successful integration, both Russia and China must achieve and maintain a certain level of internal stability and legitimacy that has yet to be fully achieved.

So, in the picture of the world predicted by I. Wallerstein, we see, firstly, the Japanese center and, secondly, two peripheries - “Japanese-American” and “European”. Under certain conditions, China will enter the first zone, and Russia will find itself in the same company, on the one hand, with Europe, and on the other, with Africa and India. In this picture, at least two neighborhoods look unexpected - China with America and Russia with Africa.

I. Wallerstein also has more specific scenarios for the future. There are three of them. Here they are: “The first scenario is the transition to neo-feudalism, which can reproduce the era of the new troubled times in a much more balanced form. The distinctive features of this system will be the parcelization of sovereignty, the development of local communities and local hierarchies, in general, the emergence of a “mosaic” of autarkic regions, interconnected only by threads of horizontal ties. Such a system may be sufficiently compatible with the world of high technology. The process of capital accumulation can no longer serve as a driving force for the development of such a system, but it will still be a kind of non-egalitarian system, the way of legitimizing which, perhaps, may be the revival of faith in natural hierarchies. The second scenario is connected with the establishment of something like democratic fascism, when the world will be divided into two castes: the upper layer of about 20% of the world population, within which enough high level egalitarian distribution, and the lower stratum, consisting of working "proles", i.e. from the proletariat deprived of political and socio-economic rights (the remaining 80% of the population). Hitler's project of the "new order" just assumed something close to this system, but it failed because of self-determination within the too narrow upper layer. A third scenario could be a transition to a radically more globally decentralized and highly egalitarian world order. This possibility seems the most utopian, but it should not be ruled out. Its implementation will require a significant reduction in consumer spending, but it cannot be just the socialization of poverty, because then this scenario becomes politically impossible.” Judging by the first two scenarios, it will not be better than now. As for the third, he is recognized as the most utopian by I. Wallerstein himself, but meanwhile he himself considers himself a person who recognizes the inevitability of progress in human history.

I. Wallerstein looks at the modern world as a "great worldwide disorder". That is why he imposes on the people of our time a colossal responsibility, without which it is impossible to move forward, which implies not only momentary survival, but also a long struggle against social inequality. In the article “Geoculture of development or transformation of our geoculture?” he wrote: “In this period of great worldwide disorder, the crisis of our modern world-system, historical capitalism we will only move forward if we are able to see the whole picture clearly. This will be a period of double struggle - the struggle for momentary survival and the struggle for the formation of the future historical system, which will eventually emerge from the current systemic chaos. Those who try to create a new structure by repeating the key feature of the existing system - hierarchical inequality - will do everything to focus our attention on the problem of momentary survival, so that we cannot put forward historical alternatives to their project of a fake transformation, a superficial transformation that leaves the su

a strategy of activity and cognition that models modern history 1) as a system of interactions between various social entities (regional unions, states, societies, cultures, ethnic and religious groups, between human individuals), 2) representing the human community as a historically changing system, 3) as a system connections that are formed in the process of shaping the modern social world.

In a broad sense, M.-s. p. is a set of historical, economic, socio-philosophical, globalist, world-holistic studies and practices focused on the problems of the formation of the modern social world as a system that unites the human community. Moreover, the focus of this association is both the problems that stimulate interactions and the problems associated with the formation of the structure of the human community.

Terminologically, M.-s. n. seems to inherit the system tradition, clearly expressed at the previous stage by system-structural and structural-functional concepts. In fact, he destroys the stereotypes that have developed at this stage. For M.-s. The structure is not a given that normalizes the interactions of social subjects and turns them into a system, but there is a problem that is solved in the very process of the formation of interactions between subjects.

The historicity of the human community system is fundamentally connected with the process of subjective (including, and above all, individual) interaction. M.-s. p. opposes both classical historicism and the concepts of the "end of history"; it significantly limits the notion of history as the past and linear ascending development, and at the same time concretizes the view of history as the formation, change, interaction of various social systems, reveals the problems and guidelines of this process.

In the narrow sense, M.-s. p. (world-system analysis) is a line of research currently associated with the work of I. Wallerstein and the Center named after him. F. Braudel (Binghamton, USA), The subject of these studies is the economic dynamics of the modern world-system, its contradictions and crises; prospects for the emergence of new forms of coexistence in human society. In its historical and methodological guidelines, this direction is based on the concept of social history developed by the Annales school (M. Blok, F. Braudel, L. Febvre), on the model of economic globalization of social history by F. Braudel, on the idea of ​​long economic "waves" and cycles of N. Kondratiev, on some motives of the philosophy of society of K. Marx (history as the activity of people; division of activity, interdependence and "asymmetry" of social positions; capitalist development and the commonality of world history).

Schematically, the historical logic of this version of M.-s. p. is drawn as follows. Conditionally human history can be divided into two stages: until the middle of the second millennium AD. e. and after 1500, when the world capitalist economy was formed. At the first stage, local societies and civilizations establish connections between themselves, but these connections do not affect the "organism" of their life; the world system is formed in the course of the formation of empires with identified centers and peripheries, with fairly clear contours and connections that determine the reproduction and movement of human resources.

Starting from the XVI century. the world-system is formed on the basis of the capitalist world-economy (CME). The forces and ties that unite the human community are increasingly economic in nature; the concentration of these forces in Western Europe determines its privileged position (in the early stages of the development of the KME) and the peripheral positions of the countries of the rest of Europe, the Americas, as well as Asia and Africa. In the 20th century, the center of the KME moved to the USA; important issue The KME becomes its confrontation and interaction with the socialist camp, which appears to be an oppositional and extra-systemic force in relation to the KME. However, this confrontation does not prevent the productive development of the LME from 1945 to 1990. However, already in the 80s. the prospect of a decline is determined, which manifested itself in energy crises, and at a deeper level, fixing the exhaustion of cheap labor resources, and therefore the need to restructure the LME. The collapse of the USSR and socialist system, initially interpreted as an opportunity to strengthen the CME and the United States, turned out to be one of the reasons for the decline in the development and weakening of the CME: it became clear that the Cold War was a deterrent for both sides. At the same time, it acted as a mechanism of dynamic balance between the two centers, which connected and fastened the peripheries located around them. In terms of representations M.-s. the collapse of the USSR and the socialist camp was one of critical factors crisis of the LME, i.e., an intra-systemic process expressing the general trends of changes in the modern social world, at the same time weakening and destroying the structures of interactions between segments of the world-system that has been taking shape over decades.

In the picture of the future, outlined by M.-s. etc., the world system based on the CME still has some resources for development, so that a situation of rise in the first quarter of the 21st century is possible. However, by the middle of the next century, the depletion of these resources and the growing contradictions between centers and peripheries will cause a crisis in the CME and the transition of the world-system to a new state. Already within the framework of the LME, a socio-political dilemma is outlined, which, apparently, will have to be resolved both within the framework of the coming crises of the LME and beyond the boundaries of the existence of this world-economy. Two trajectories of further social changes become probable: 1) the path of equalizing (relatively, of course) the opportunities for economic development between groups within the leading countries and in relations between the leading countries and countries representing the periphery, 2) the path of creating fairly rigid hierarchical social structures ("neo-fascist "order"), which makes it possible to maintain an "asymmetric" distribution of economic opportunities, funds and incomes between elites and other groups, between centers and peripheries.

Various social subjects, entering into increasingly dense interactions, form the connections of the world-system, thereby determining the vector of further social evolution. However, the possibility of choice does not guarantee its validity and consistency. "... The decline of the historical social system ... makes a collective choice possible, but ... the choice is hampered by the absence of a clearly defined alternative social force behind a reasonable choice" (I. Wallerstein. Social development or the development of the world system?//Questions of Sociology , 1992, vol. l, N l, p. 87). The reasonableness of the choice is largely determined by the attitudes and active capabilities of social actors. But in critical periods, the opposite is also true: the identification of positions and resources depends on the methodological and ideological clarification of world-systemic problems, on the appropriate justification of the direction and choice of means of the subjects' activities. However, such clarifications and justifications are hampered by the state of development of the modern worldview, philosophy and science, mainly by the pattern of relationships that developed back in the 18th - 19th centuries. The sectoral principle of formalizing human knowledge, which corresponds to the principles of organizing social production with a clear system of division of labor, still hinders the implementation of systemic strategies not in words but in deeds. The word "system", in relation to the human community, has been used for many decades. But this does not prevent even the global problems of mankind from being interpreted as sectoral problems - environmental, medical, technological - regardless of those subjects (and those interactions) for which (and in which) these problems are of decisive vital importance. The totality and structure of knowledge about society bears the hard imprint of those organizational schemes that have been worked out in the practice of society over the centuries of LME. Therefore, along with the crisis of these schemes, there is also a crisis of cognition, one way or another "embedded" in the practical mechanisms of the world-system. "... world system is in crisis ... the same applies to the analytical self-reflexive structures of this system, that is, the sciences "(I. Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 86). systemic development, it is dangerous to rely on existing scientific and everyday standards, because they not only block the perception of the future, but can also give rise to practices that are destructive in their consequences. analytical, dismembering, essentially extra-systemic methodologies that science has used over the past few centuries. Science could introduce certain restrictions on extra-systemic practices, show their threatening consequences, but it, declaratively recognizing systemicity, actually contributed to the implementation (ontologization) of partial, analytical, off-system models, since such This tactic was supported by sectoral principles of division and cooperation of activities. This dominant, which determined the work of science, actually sanctioned the narrowly pragmatic standards of production, economic and everyday activities of people, their attitude not only to natural resources but also the qualities of social life, to each other.

These standards operate not only in knowledge, but also in the practice of organizing social life, since it - this practice - is regulated by stereotypical ideas about the division of society into the economy, politics, culture, other spheres and subsystems. Such a segmentation of society, as a rule, is achieved by "crowding out" real social subjects from organizational and symbolic schemes, mainly human individuals themselves, reproducing the structures that integrate and divide society. In the activity and life of these subjects there is no division into economy, culture, politics, etc. No matter how the existing institutions of society alienate certain aspects of their life and activity from people, these aspects are synthesized into a system of life interdependencies only in the living sociality of their events and self-realization. If we accept characteristic of the sociology of the 60s. division of concepts into macro- and micro-level, then M.-s. p. should be attributed to macro-level concepts, since it interprets issues related to the prospects of the human community, with the formation of the structures of the world-system, with the development of interregional, interstate, intercultural relations. However, one of the important methodological features of M.-s. It lies precisely in the fact that, having focused attention on the formation of the forms of the world community, he cannot be distracted from the existence of real subjects, from the life and activities of human individuals, where emerging social ties acquire the qualities necessary to then be reproduced in the form of stable structures. M.-s. in this regard, it turns out to be not only a kind of combination of macro- and micro-approaches, it essentially reveals the limitations of macro-social concepts that are "untranslatable" into the language of describing being and the interaction of human individuals. The thesis that history takes place in the interactions of real subjects does not reject the idea of ​​universality and interdependence. social life, but he "plunges" this idea into the process of reproduction and generation of social forms, matches it with the scale of people's daily behavior. "For a historian closely tied to the concrete, global society can only be the sum of living realities, connected or not connected one with the other. It is in this sense that I made it a rule ... to speak of society as a set of sets (ensemble des ensembles), as the total sum of all the facts that we ... touch on in various areas of our research ... This means ... that everything is social, cannot but be social ... It's like saying today: "There is a social process an inseparable whole" or "History is only universal" (F. Braudel. Exchange games. M., 1988, p. 461). In the 70s. F. Braudel's words were perceived as an expression of one of the possible positions in the methodology of social science. In the 90s. these words sound like a clear fixation of changes in the integration scheme and disciplinary matrix of social science: they point to a paradigm shift in social and humanitarian knowledge, renewal of the forms of synthesis of philosophy and science, to theoretical and methodological shifts necessary to comprehend the development trends of the world-system.

M.-s. p., especially in its Braudel-Wallerstein version, is a scientific overcoming of philosophical-historical schemes. But it cannot be developed by summing up scientific knowledge obtained under the conditions of a disciplinary division of labor. Its consistency is formed not from a combination of various aspects of knowledge about society, but from an understanding of the problematic nature of human existence and the subjects that realize this existence. In this regard, M.-s. while maintaining a scientific orientation towards the study of the modern human community, it acts as a special kind of social philosophy. Its peculiarity is that it works in a "focus", where the problems of the people of the modern community and scientific synthesis are combined, clarifying these problems: problems determine the direction of the synthesis, synthesis reveals the socio-historical perspective of posing and solving problems. Such a "pulsating" connection between experience and knowledge is not alien to philosophical and historical schemes, but they are mainly projected into the future and are not superimposed on it as ready-made measurement systems, but are used as a means of methodological and worldview orientation. M.-s. p. retains its focus on the scientific study of society and, in this respect, opposes concepts that cross out the significance of science. But the scientific nature of M.-s. p. is associated with a radical revision of the standards of cognitive activity; in this aspect, M.-s. The concept turns out to be "related" to such areas and disciplines as critical theory, hermeneutics, phenomenological sociology, synergetics, etc. (See "Social Time and Social Space", "Social Processes".)

Great Definition

Incomplete definition ↓

World-systems approach

World-systems analysis explores the social evolution of systems of societies, and not individual societies, in contrast to previous sociological approaches, in which theories of social evolution considered the development of individual societies, and not their systems. In this, the world-system approach is similar to the civilizational one, but goes a little further, exploring not only the evolution of social systems that embrace one civilization, but also those systems that embrace more than one civilization or even all the civilizations of the world. This approach was developed in the 1970s. A. G. Frank, I. Wallerstein, S. Amin, J. Arrighi and T. dos Santos. F. Braudel is usually regarded as the most important predecessor of the world-system approach, which laid its foundations. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the main world center for world-systems analysis (in Binghampton, at the University of New York) bears the name of Fernand Braudel.

Immanuel Wallerstein

The most common version of world-system analysis, developed by I. Wallerstein. According to I. Wallerstein, the modern world-system originated in the so-called. "long 16th century" (approximately 1450-1650) and gradually embraced the whole world. Until that time, many world-systems coexisted simultaneously in the world. Wallerstein divides these world-systems into three types: mini-systems, world-economy, and world-empires. Minisystems were characteristic of primitive societies. Complex agrarian societies are characterized by world-economy and world-empire. World-economies are systems of societies united by close economic ties, acting as certain evolving units, but not united into a single political entity. According to Wallerstein, all pre-capitalist world-economy sooner or later turned into world-empires through their political unification under the rule of one state. The only exception to this rule is the medieval European world-economy, which turned not into a world-empire, but into a modern capitalist world-system.

Andre Gunder Frank

The variant of world-system analysis developed by A. Gunder Frank differs markedly from this. Frank draws attention to the fact that statements about the possibility of simultaneous existence in the world of tens and hundreds of "world-systems" in many respects make senseless the very concept of the World-System. According to Frank, we should be talking about only one World-System, which arose at least 5000 years ago, and then, through numerous cycles of expansion and consolidation, embraced the whole world. In the course of evolution of the World-System, its center repeatedly moved. Until its movement in the 19th century, first to Europe and then to North America, this center was located in China for many centuries. In this regard, Frank interpreted the recent rise of China as the beginning of the return of the center of the World System to its "natural" place after a short-term European-North American "interlude".

Literature

• Brodel F. Material civilization, economy and capitalism, XV-XVIII centuries. / Per. from fr. L. E. Kubbel; intro. Art. and ed. Yu. N. Afanasiev. 2nd ed. Moscow: Ves Mir, 2006. ISBN 5-7777-0358-5
• Wallerstein I. Analysis of world systems and the situation in modern world/ Translated from English. P. M. Kudyukina under general ed. B. Yu. Kagarlitsky. St. Petersburg: University book, 2001.
• Wallerstein I. World-system analysis // Time of the world. Almanac of Modern Research on Theoretical History, Macrosociology, Geopolitics, Analysis of World Systems and Civilizations / Ed. N. S. Rozova. Novosibirsk, 1998. - Issue 1. - S. 105-123.
• Korotaev A. V., Malkov A. S., Khalturina D. A. Laws of history. Mathematical modeling of the development of the World-System. Demography, economy, culture. 2nd ed. Moscow: URSS, 2007. ISBN 978-5-484-00957-2
• Korotaev A. V., Komarova N. L., Khalturina D. A. Laws of history. Secular cycles and millennial trends. Demography, economy, wars. 2nd ed. M.: URSS, 2007.
• Korotaev A. V., Khalturina D. A. Modern trends in world development. Moscow: LIBROKOM/URSS, 2009. ISBN 978-5-397-00327-8
• Kirilyuk I.L. et al. Economic dynamics of the World System // History and Mathematics . M.: URSS, 2008. S. 102-119.
• The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? /Ed. by A. G. Frank and B. Gills. L.: Routledge, 1994. http://abuss.narod.ru/Biblio/WS/ws-5000_intro.htm

Prominent exponents of world-systems analysis

• World-systems engineers (category)

Links

• "World-system approach" part of the monograph by Yu. I. Semenov "Philosophy of history"
• Kradin N.N. Problems of periodization of historical macroprocesses. Section "World-system approach"
• Globalization began 10,000 years ago and will end in the 21st century

Wikimedia Foundation. 2010 .

See what the "World-systems approach" is in other dictionaries:

WORLD-SYSTEM APPROACH (world-system analysis)- a strategy of activity and cognition that models modern history 1) as a system of interactions between various social actors (regional unions, states, societies, cultures, ethnic and religious groups, between ... ... Modern Philosophical Dictionary

Explores the social evolution of systems of societies, and not individual societies, in contrast to previous sociological approaches, in which theories of social evolution considered the development primarily of individual societies, and not their systems. In this ... Wikipedia

The systematic approach is the direction of the methodology of scientific knowledge, which is based on the consideration of an object as a system: an integral complex of interrelated elements (I. V. Blauberg, V. N. Sadovsky, ... ... Wikipedia

The world of systems analysis explores the social evolution of systems of societies, and not individual societies, in contrast to previous sociological approaches, in which theories of social evolution considered the development primarily of individual societies, but ... Wikipedia

activity approach- ACTIVITY APPROACH is a philosophical concept that gives activity a more fundamental ontological status than statements of the existence of individual objects of things. As an explanatory principle in epistemology, this approach ... ... Encyclopedia of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

WORLD SYSTEM ANALYSIS- text by I. Wallerstein, published in 1987. According to Wallerstein, world systems analysis is not a theory about the social world or part of it. It is a protest against the way in which social scientific research has been structured in its... ... Sociology: Encyclopedia

Periodization of history is a special kind of systematization, which consists in the conditional division of the historical process into certain chronological periods. These periods have certain distinctive features, which are defined in ... ... Wikipedia

Or the Theory of Dependent Development is a theory in the field of related social sciences, which is based on the assertion that the economic backwardness and political instability of the underdeveloped, developing countries is the result of their integration ... Wikipedia

This article should be wikified. Please format it according to the rules for formatting articles ... Wikipedia