After the abolition of serfdom in Russia, there is an economic recession caused by the restructuring of economic life. The landlords were left without workers, tools, livestock, they had to pay salaries to hired workers. Most of the landowners squandered state compensation, and in order to survive, they were forced to lease most of the land to the peasants. The peasant economy also experienced a crisis. Renting land tied peasant farms to landowners. Peasant farms were burdened with fees (redemption payments, state and zemstvo taxes, etc.). After the reform of 1861. the peasant community was preserved. She helped the peasants pay taxes, supported their prosperity. But in the community there was a mutual guarantee and restriction of movement, which fettered households. the activities of the peasants.
The government began economic reforms with changes in the activities of banks. In 1860 was opened National Bank, which was intended to finance private companies. In the 60-70s. private banks began to emerge. Their creation had a huge impact on the economic development of Russia.
The formation of banks was closely connected with railway construction, which was also encouraged by the government. 1868-1872 - the period of "railroad fever". If by 1861 length in Russia railways was 2 thousand km, then by the 80s. - over 22 thousand km. Since 1861 to 1877 the transportation of goods by rail increased 25 times, while by river transport it increased by only 59%.
The development of industry after the abolition of serfdom went into decline. This was due to the fact that the labor of serfs was widely used in factories and factories. Freed from addiction, they left enterprises in search of a better life. In 1861 the world economic crisis broke out, prices for raw materials imported from abroad (cotton) increased. By the second half of the 60s. began a rapid economic recovery. And by the 80s. the industrial revolution ended - factory production triumphed over handicraft and manufactory. Heavy industry also grew. The Urals continued to be the main area of metallurgical production. A new metallurgical region was created in the south (Donbass, Krivoy Rog). In the Caucasus, in the region of Baku, oil production was concentrated. In the 60-70s. construction of the machine-building industry is going on. The Putilov plant in St. Petersburg provided Russian roads with rails, the Kolomensky plant in the Moscow province was the first to organize the construction of a railway. bridges, freight wagons and platforms, steam locomotives. The output of the cotton industry has quadrupled in 30 years. The beet sugar industry, which developed in the black earth provinces of European Russia, achieved great success. It increased its production from 1.9 million poods in 1862 to 12.5 million poods in 1880. The development of industry contributed to the growth in the number of workers. From 1865 to 1879 the number of industrial workers increased one and a half times and reached almost 1 million people.
The abolition of serfdom contributed rapid growth capitalist structure in the Russian economy. The fastest development of new forms of economy occurred in industry. The growth of commodity production in agriculture was hampered.
The beginning of the post-war reconstruction.
No country had such losses during the Great Patriotic War and World War II as the Soviet Union and its component- Russia. The war claimed 27 million Soviet people, some of them - the civilian population who died in the Nazi death camps, as a result of fascist repression, disease, hunger. These losses accounted for approximately 40% of all casualties in World War II. More than 1 million soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces gave their lives during the liberation of the peoples of Europe and Asia from fascism. The Nazis turned into ruins 1710 cities and urban-type settlements, over 70 thousand villages and villages. 30% of the national wealth of the Soviet Union was destroyed.
In general, the losses of the Soviet Union and its peoples, including Russia, are estimated at 2.569 billion rubles (in comparable prices).
The process of restoration and development of industry, transport, and other industries took place at the cost of overexertion and concentration limited resources. As a result, the pre-war level of production in industry was reached by 1950.
The matter was significantly complicated by the fact that the grain harvest - the main food crop for 1949-1953. averaged only 81 million tons. Meat production barely exceeded the pre-revolutionary years, and grain resources per capita were much less. Trade in bread in many cities and industrial centers occurred intermittently. The protracted solution of the grain problem affected the well-being of millions of people and hindered the development of industry. There was a real threat of acute social problems.
Already in the first half of the 50s. the Soviet economy, which was only just rising after a devastating war, was faced with complex problems: to feed and clothe people, to raise culture and science, to carry out extensive structural changes in technology, organization and management of production, to strengthen the country's defense through the latest types of weapons.
Sufficient financial and material resources there was no way to solve all these problems at the same time. In the search for a way out of this situation, the correct definition of the main link in the chain of tasks and the corresponding priorities was of particular importance.
The food problem has become extremely acute. The program for the development of virgin lands, among others, was aimed at its solution. At the same time, a number of measures were implemented to redistribute the national income in favor of the countryside. Among them is a change in the tax system and an increase in purchase and procurement prices. Prerequisites were created for the growth of the welfare of the peasantry, which in turn increased their interest in increasing the yield of fields and the productivity of livestock. As a result, commercial products Agriculture in 1960 it increased by 60% compared to 1953.
The rise of agriculture was an important prerequisite for expanding the production of consumer goods. In 1953-1955. the Soviet leadership took measures to renew and develop light and local industries, additional production and improve the quality of goods for the population. Enterprises of the heavy and defense industries were involved in the implementation of this task, which was especially important for expanding the production of relatively complex and scarce household goods for that time: radios, watches, sewing machines, bicycles. The development of mass production of refrigerators, tape recorders, televisions began. All this served as a material basis for raising the standard of living of the population.
The development of the Soviet economy during the 50s. characterized by dynamism, which in turn was ensured by high growth rates capital investments and outpacing the rate of input of fixed assets. This was due to the fact that a significant part of the savings was spent on the restoration of objects destroyed by the war, and it is still easier to restore than to build again.
It is also important to note that the entire increase in agricultural production, including the harvest on virgin lands, was obtained through an increase in labor productivity. In industry, more than half of the growth in production was provided by additional labor, which, as a rule, migrated from the countryside.
The development of the social policy of the USSR.
In 1960-1962 ordering has been completed wages in industry, construction, transport and communication enterprises. A unified system of rates and salaries was introduced in the country, linked by industry, production and categories of working personnel.
By the end of 1960, all workers and employees switched to a seven- and six-hour working day. The average working week was about 40 hours. In the mid 50s. the foundation was laid for the establishment of a pension system for workers and employees.
An important task was to establish state system social security of collective farmers.
In the second half of the 50-60s. a lot of work has been done to streamline wages, improve the existing distribution mechanism, and raise the material standard of living of the people.
Among the most acute social problems faced by the country in the 1950s was the housing issue. As a result of the destruction, 25 million people were left homeless after the war.
To relieve the acuteness of the problem, at the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev, measures were taken to increase housing construction. The goal was to build more, faster and cheaper. Ways to solve it were indicated: widespread use standard projects, the introduction of industrial flow methods for the construction of residential buildings, the widespread use of reinforced concrete and block structures. In large cities, mainly four- and five-story buildings were built. In such houses it was possible to do without an elevator, to simplify special engineering equipment.
The scope of new construction has become significant. If in 1951-1955. In cities and towns, an average of 30.4 million square meters of living space was commissioned per year, in 1957 52 million square meters were commissioned. square meters(Capital construction in the USSR. M., 1961. S. 192-193). Tens of millions of people who had lost hope that their queue for housing would someday lead to the desired result suddenly began to move into their own rooms, and those with many children into separate two- or three-room apartments.
All these socio-economic measures contributed to the improvement of the people's well-being, which was especially felt in the second half of the 1950s.
One of the central places in the activities of Soviet power in the 50s. occupied by problems associated with the stimulation of scientific and technological progress and the wide application of its results in the national economy. At the end of the 50s. Soviet science has obtained important positive results in a number of areas of applied knowledge, including semiconductors and electronic computers. The launch of the first artificial Earth satellite and the first manned flight into space were clear evidence of the high scientific and technical level of production.
However, despite a number of successes of scientists, already in the 50s. contradictions arose in science, which, constantly growing and aggravating, served as one of the main reasons for our lagging behind those profound structural shifts in technology, quality and efficiency that took place in the production of developed capitalist countries.
And yet, in the 1950s, despite the objective and subjective difficulties, mistakes and miscalculations of management, it was possible to make significant progress in solving global problems which asserted themselves at the beginning of the decade: notable shifts took place in social policy; a number of achievements were chalked up by science and technology; greatly increased the country's defense power. Of course, many contradictions not only remained unresolved, but deepened. However, the high dynamism of development gave rise to great hopes for the future, especially since in those years it was mainly about satisfying the most pressing, urgent problems.
In May 1955, decisions were also made to further expand the functions and rights of the Union republics in the field of planning capital construction, on budgetary issues.
Transformation of the public administration system.
One of the most unexpected steps taken in the process of searching for new organizational forms of production management and carried out on the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev is the 1957 law, according to which all all-Union and Union-Republican industrial and construction ministries, with the exception of power plants, defense, aviation, shipbuilding, radio engineering and chemical industries were abolished. The management of industry and construction within the framework of large administrative regions was organized according to the territorial principle. Each of them created a council National economy(Sovnarkhoz), to which the functions of planning and direct management of the activities of enterprises and construction projects were transferred.
In November 1962, the all-Union planning bodies underwent another significant reorganization. The functions of the State Planning Committee of the USSR for operational planning and management were transferred to the newly created central body - the Council of the National Economy of the USSR (SNKh of the USSR).
Thus, in the first half of the 60s. in a latent or explicit form, a number of contradictions accumulated, which inevitably entailed an aggravation of the economic and social situation in the country.
Relatively high rates of growth in agricultural production, achieved to a large extent in an extensive way due to the development of additional arable land, obscured a significant lag in productivity.
The new situation and changed tasks demanded the expansion of the initiative and independence of enterprises, the strengthening of cost accounting, and, consequently, a change in methods and tools: planning, organizational structure. An endless chain of ill-conceived reorganizations did not give the desired effect. In this regard, since the beginning of the 60s. one of the most important socio-economic problems in the USSR, including in Russia, was the problem of economic renewal, changes in the forms and methods of management. Its promotion to the fore was dictated by the new socio-economic situation that had developed in the Soviet Union by the beginning of the 1960s. The fact is that since the second half of the 50s. it became clear that the management mechanism was largely outdated. It took shape in the late 1920s and early 1930s. in extraordinary, in many ways extreme circumstances. The economic system that arose during the years of the first five-year plans turned out to be necessary both during the years of the Great Patriotic War, and in the post-war, also very difficult conditions for the restoration of the national economy.
However, since the 1950s emergency factors have ceased to operate. The scale of the Soviet economy changed dramatically.
So, in 1966, the industry of the USSR already had more than 300 branches. The number of combinations of various economic ties was measured by astronomical figures. Under these conditions, it has become economically inexpedient, and technically impossible to manage by methods of direct administrative influence, to regulate, as before, the activities of enterprises. Difficulties in management increased. The previous level of centralization proved to be excessive. The question of expanding the economic independence of enterprises arose more and more acutely.
There were also changes in the personnel potential. If earlier a significant mass of highly qualified specialists was concentrated in the management system, then in the 50-60s. it has shifted to a greater extent in the sphere of production. The educational and professional level of the working class and peasantry has risen. Life required the creation of conditions for a more complete and effective use experience and knowledge of workers, to give more autonomy in the field.
The new economic situation was determined by the scientific and technological revolution that had begun in the country. It was associated with the mastery of nuclear energy, space exploration, the development of chemistry, and the automation of production.
However, the existing economic mechanism and planning practice held back the technical re-equipment of production. Enterprises were not sufficiently interested in removing obsolete products from production and replacing them with more advanced technology. For example, when in the early 60s. At Uralmash, for the first time in the world practice, the complex-mechanized and automated blooming "1300" was created with a productivity that was 2 times higher than that of any of the existing ones, it turned out that it was unprofitable for the enterprise to produce it. The new blooming weighed 1.5 thousand tons less. A huge savings in metal was achieved. The public benefit was obvious. But with the existing procedure for planning products in tonnage, the transition to the production of this more progressive equipment reduced the performance of large enterprises. Many factories and factories fell into this situation. The interests of scientific and technological progress demanded a restructuring of planning, the creation of conditions stimulating the interest of enterprises in technical re-equipment, expanding their economic efficiency and entrepreneurship in the field of introducing new technology.
Thus, a serious contradiction has arisen between the achieved level of development of production, the opportunities that scientific and technological progress has opened up, new phenomena in the economy, on the one hand, and obsolete administrative-command forms and methods of management, the old planning practice, petty regulation of the activities of enterprises - with another. As a result, negative phenomena began to appear in the country's economy. There was a decrease in the efficiency of industrial production. If the main production assets countries increased in 1959-1965. approximately 2 times, the volume of industrial output increased by only 84%. The growth rate of labor productivity has slowed down. The tasks of the seven-year plan in the field of agriculture were also not fulfilled.
From the end of the 50s. the search for new approaches in economic policy is becoming more and more active. In this regard, the restructuring of administration along the territorial principle, carried out in 1957, and the creation of economic councils at first had a certain positive effect. Within the framework of economic regions, opportunities for specialization and cooperation have expanded; business executives began to "see" each other better, the organization of material and technical supply improved, and so on. However, a recession soon began, and parochial tendencies intensified. The districts, as it were, closed in on themselves, losing the public market and creating their own smaller production. But most importantly, the sectoral perspective in the field of scientific developments and technical re-equipment was lost.
This weakened the possibility of implementing a unified technical policy in the country. Attempts to overcome the noted shortcomings by amalgamating the economic councils in 1962, the formation of republican economic councils, the Council of the National Economy of the USSR, and also by creating state committees for industries did not give the desired results.
Thus, the complex problems of economic progress were tried to be solved by the old, administrative methods. The calculation was mainly on the effect of organizational restructuring. Numerous subjectivist improvisations took place to the detriment of the scientific leadership. Most importantly, the measures taken to improve the management of the economy did not provide for major radical changes affecting the deep layers. economic ties and relationships, and partial improvement of individual elements economic mechanism could not give and did not give the expected effect. The need for economic reforms was obvious. On the way to its implementation, the first serious measure was the elimination of the economic council's system of territorial administration. But its implementation was carried out under the influence of the administrative-command way of thinking and the actions corresponding to them. Ministries were restored instead of economic councils. Moreover, the number of ministries constantly increased and reached by the mid-80s. about 100 union and 800 republican. Most of the ministries functioned in Russian Federation. This is understandable given the volume industrial production Russia in comparison with other union republics.
During 1964-1965. more than 100 enterprises of the country conducted experiments to test individual elements of the reform of the economic mechanism proposed by scientists. On the pages of the central press, a discussion of the problems of improving management began, and the emphasis was increasingly placed on the need to change the general conditions of management, to strengthen economic levers and incentives.
Implementation of reforms and economic methods of management. Reform 1965
In September 1965, a decision was made to start economic reform. The essence of the proposed reform was as follows: reduction of planned indicators brought to the enterprise; creation of financial incentive funds at the enterprise; the introduction of a firm, but profit-based payment for the production assets used by enterprises, i.e. a kind of introduction of a tax in kind in industry; financing of industrial construction not by issuing irrevocable subsidies, but through a loan; preventing changes in plans without agreement with enterprises.
In the sphere of agricultural production, a multi-year (for 5 years) plan was established, excluding its arbitrary changes, the issuance of additional, unscheduled tasks to collective farms and state farms. This determined more stable economic conditions, the possibility of more widely exercising economic maneuver, showing initiative and entrepreneurial spirit. The economic incentives for labor were strengthened: the conditions for the procurement and purchase of agricultural products were changed, material incentives were introduced for their sale in excess of the plan, and the wages of collective farmers and state farm workers were improved. These measures ensured the interest of workers in increasing agricultural production.
An active role in the attempt to implement the reform was played by A. N. Kosygin, who became Chairman of the Council of Ministers in those years. A native of the family of a St. Petersburg worker, a textile engineer by education, who passed in the 30s. in an exceptionally short period of time, from a foreman in a factory to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, during the war years he did a great job of organizing the mass evacuation of enterprises and the population. Among the leaders of the 50-60s. A. N. Kosygin was distinguished by professionalism, modesty, understanding of the need to solve economic problems with the help of economic methods.
During the implementation of the main provisions of the reforms in the economy of the Soviet Union, including in Russia, there have been positive changes.
The results achieved by agriculture in 1966-1970 were higher than in the previous period. Suffice it to say that the volume of production increased in 1966-1970. on average per year by about 4%, while in 1961-1965. - only 2%.
In the sphere of industrial production, the territorial management system was improved. The State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR, Gossnab of the USSR, Goskomtsen of the USSR were formed. All this created Better conditions for the development of scientific and technological progress.
However, the main thing for the industry was the course towards the development and implementation of economic management methods. A set of measures was adopted to expand the economic independence of enterprises and reduce the administrative regulation of their activities. The number of directive planned indicators of their work was reduced from 30 to 9, enterprises received the right to keep at their disposal part of the profits, to create funds for the development of production, material incentives, and social and cultural events from these funds. It was proposed to intensify the methods of economic stimulation and economic control over the activities of enterprises, to use, for example, such forms of economic control as the profit received by the enterprise. Payments for funds were introduced as a lever of economic control, which forced enterprises to avoid excess inventories and use machines, equipment, and raw materials more rationally. The role of credit increased. An indicator of the strengthening of economic methods in management were measures to strengthen the material interest of industrial workers.
The course of economic reform in 1966-1970. testified that it gave a certain impetus to the economic development of the country. The reform unleashed the initiative of enterprises, increased their responsibility for the results of work, for identifying internal reserves. The promotion of products to the consumer accelerated. The reform stimulated the emergence of production associations, within which issues of technical re-equipment, improvement of the organization of labor and production, and social problems were resolved at a higher level. The reform had a direct concrete impact on the improvement of the economy. The growth rate of production volume in 1966-1970 amounted to. 5.6% (on average per year), while in the previous five years they were equal to 4.9%, the growth rate of national income was 7.1%, respectively.
Why did the reform of the mid-60s. been defeated? The main thing was that the old, inefficient model of economic, extensive development continued to be preserved.
The failures of the 1965 reform were largely determined by miscalculations in the course of its practical implementation. The transfer to the new economic system proceeded slowly, unevenly across groups of enterprises and industries. In a number of industries (trade, public utilities, supply, marketing) reform was carried out only in the form of experience in groups of enterprises. Such sectors of the economy as finances, pricing, etc., were weakly affected by the reform. The reform did not capture the management echelons. Financial incentives in the governing bodies practically did not depend on the performance of industries. The cost accounting did not even reach a specific workplace.
There was a defect in some elements new system management (mechanism of economic control over the improvement of product quality, methods of economic impact on the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, etc.).
One of the essential reasons for the failure of the 1965 reform was that it was blocked by the forces of bureaucratic conservatism. In the central ministries and departments, and in the management of enterprises, there was a tendency towards the usual, stable, previously proven centralized, administrative forms of management. Inertia, momentary interests, the desire to brush aside what did not fit into the usual schemes prevailed. Many management cadres were not competent enough. They not only did not want, but could not quickly adjust to work in the new conditions.
Ministries and departments by inertia continued to impose old requirements on enterprises. Yes, Ministry light industry in 1968, it continued to plan production according to 15 indicators instead of 9. In 1969, the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy approved for its enterprises even schedules for the repair of open-hearth furnaces, rolling mills and other equipment. The Ministry of Agriculture began to plan for the collective farms overplanned delivery of products. The self-supporting rights and independence of enterprises were increasingly infringed. Economic Methods completely replaced by administration. Even when ministries and departments received funds to stimulate enterprises economically, this only strengthened their administrative dictates.
The forces of bureaucratic conservatism, incompetence, departmentalism and parochialism could be opposed by the development of initiative and control of the masses. However, this did not happen.
In the 70s. there was an increase in contradictions in the economic and social spheres.
The scientific and technical process acted sluggishly. The old system of planning and evaluating the activities of enterprises aimed them mainly not at replacing obsolete equipment, not at fighting for the integration of science and production and the production of fundamentally new technology, better products, but at fulfilling current tasks, sometimes at any cost. In this situation, when, moreover, the former regulation of the activities of enterprises was preserved, the initiative and creativity of the masses did not receive the due scope. The existing economic system did not interest labor collectives in the introduction of new technology, in working with the greatest return, since the fulfillment of the plan, the receipt of guaranteed bonuses could be achieved using the technology that had long been mastered. At the same time, the transition to new equipment, associated with the abandonment of the old technology, was fraught with underfulfillment of planned targets, loss of bonuses for the year. The economic mechanism gave little encouragement even to innovators.
One can give a typical example in this respect of the Ivanovo machine-tool association. The company started in the mid 70s. at its own peril and risk, a radical reconstruction and switched to the production of the latest equipment, high-quality machine tools, which then began to be acquired by many capitalist countries - the USA, Japan, Germany. However, the Ivanovites did not receive any economic benefits. Moreover, from year to year, the planning authorities continued to approve the assignments for the products that the association had produced before, machine tools that no longer met the latest technology. At the same time, the association received awards not for new equipment, but for the fulfillment of ordinary planned targets. It is no coincidence that not a single plant in the industry followed the example of the Ivanovo leaders (Economy and organization of industrial production. 1982. No. 1. P. 104-105).
The experience of the Shchekino Azot association is well known. A system of incentives for highly productive labor was introduced here, which ensures a significant increase in output, an increase in labor productivity while reducing the number of employees. In the course of the experiment, the technical level of production increased significantly, the content of the labor of workers was enriched, and their professional level increased. However, the dissemination of the Shchekin method proceeded with great difficulty, since the governing bodies carried out numerous changes in the experimental conditions in relation to the collectives that followed the example of the Shchekinites. Their work was planned from the "achieved level", which reduced the economic interest of enterprises in the release of personnel, in technical re-equipment and the search for reserves. As a result of these changes, the Shchekino association "Azot" lost 1.2 million rubles, which, under the initial conditions, could have been transferred to the material incentive fund (Kommunist. 1979. No. 11. P. 44).
Still progressive changes held back old system management.
Serious deformations accumulated in planning. At the initiative of the ministries and departments, the plans were overgrown with various additions of a sectoral and regional nature, and the real national economic possibilities were often not taken into account. There were unbalanced plans, instability, they lacked scientific validity.
Serious miscalculations have accumulated in commodity-money relations. Cooperative forms of farming were underestimated. Weakened economic control over the use of forms of ownership.
There were direct miscalculations in economic policy. Mechanical engineering, which formed the basis for the development of scientific and technological progress, was not given priority. The growth rate of development of this industry in 1971-1985. were at the level of the growth rates of the entire industry.
There were no transformations in the field of development of self-management in production, which restrained the activity of workers.
In 1971-1985. there was a negative growth trend in the most important economic indicators. So, if the growth rate of national income in the eighth five-year plan was 41%, then in the eleventh - 17% (Questions of Economics. 1986. No. 2. P. 16; Working class and the modern world. 1986. No. 6. P. 4). The "imbalance" of the economy began to intensify. One of its manifestations was the accumulation of material resources in trade, at enterprises, and in the population of money resources, and these flows did not occur. Energy and food problems have become acute.
But most importantly, the type of economic development continued to be extensive. There was a constant process of aging of production equipment. The production of the most advanced machines, equipment, and instruments was slowly increasing against the background of a relatively rapid growth in the gross output of engineering. About 30% of mass-produced products of the USSR corresponded to the world level. There was an increase in the cost of new technology, scientific and technical measures, and the lengthening of the payback period for scientific and technical measures. The protracted extensive development deepened the socio-economic difficulties. Problems and contradictions that arose in 1971-1985. did not decide.
In the 70s. The role of social factors has increased immeasurably and has become decisive for all spheres of public life. The social sphere began to stand out as a special area of state leadership. As main task economic development in these years, the task was put forward to ensure the well-being of the Soviet people, to raise the material and cultural level of the working people. In accordance with this, instructions were given to accelerate the pace of development of the light and food industries, agriculture and the service sector, industries that produce consumer goods. To some extent, approaches to assessing the activities of enterprises have changed, when they began to take into account not only the purely production results of their work, but also the solution of issues of improving the working conditions and living conditions of workers. Broad social programs began to be implemented. A course was set for a rapid increase cash income low- and medium-paid categories of workers. At the same time, rates and salaries of medium-paid categories of workers increased. Wages were regulated and increased by branches and regions of the Soviet Union, including Russia. However, the increase in wage growth revealed negative sides such an increase in income. The line towards the convergence of wage levels for various categories of workers actually led to a relative decrease in wages for more complex skilled labor of engineers, doctors, teachers, and scientists.
One of the serious miscalculations in social policy in the 70s and early 80s. there was insufficiently consistent and insufficiently comprehensive solution of social issues. On the one hand, the directive was given to concentrate more and more forces and resources on solving problems related to the well-being of people; on the other hand, the investment policy in this area did not provide the necessary conditions for their implementation. At the same time, the production of consumer goods, the development of the service sector, trade, transport, recreation and culture, and medical care did not keep pace with the new level of consumption.
A serious flaw was the "deafness" to social issues at enterprises. In general, about 50 million people were employed in manual labor in the Soviet Union. Approximately 70% of them lived in Russia. In the same time average level education of workers by the beginning of the 80s. reached 9 years of study.
If we look through newspapers and magazines of the 70s today. and look at articles on the development of industry in those years, the picture will be impressive. After all, it was then that KamAZ was put into operation, the development of oil and gas fields in Siberia was going on at an unprecedented scale and pace, construction works on the route of the Baikal-Amur Mainline, the mass production of "Zhiguli" and color TVs began. The largest event in the historical annals of those years was the joint flight of cosmonauts of the USSR and the USA ("Soyuz - Apollo").
But, no matter how tangible these successes were, the difficulties and contradictions were steadily growing. From five-year plan to five-year period, the efficiency of social labor decreased, the return on assets fell, and the quality indicators of industry as a whole worsened.
The transfer of the national economy to an intensive path of development was supposed to be carried out in one decade. However, in 1981, at the 26th Party Congress, it was necessary to admit that this would require two more five-year plans. In other words, the slogan to organically combine the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of socialism, put forward at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971, has not been implemented. In fact, the results of the ninth and especially the tenth five-year plans were far from the planned milestones.
Meanwhile, the industrialized countries of the world made a leap in the deployment of the scientific and technological revolution. This was reflected in rapid growth knowledge-intensive industries, the massive use of computers, the general progress of the culture of work and life of the general population. The consequences of such a leap turned out to be very significant, while the party-state leadership of our country made a miscalculation in determining the prospects for the development of science and technology at a new stage of scientific and technological revolution, did not take appropriate measures to reorganize the economic mechanism and train qualified personnel to meet the pressing needs of production.
And yet, the concept of "stagnation" cannot be invested with an unambiguous meaning. This very name, the "period of stagnation", established over a significant period of our history, suggests an analogy with a swamp in which all movement has froze. Meanwhile, the 15 years leading up to April 1985 were a tense time full of contrasts. Speaking of it, one cannot fail to see, on the one hand, the conscientious work of millions of workers, which made it possible to create anew entire branches of industry, build new enterprises, and make major scientific discoveries; on the other hand, the slowdown economic growth and the "residual" principle in the social sphere.
The basis of agriculture after the reform is the landlord and peasant farms. Agriculture What are the positive and negative aspects in the development of: A) landlord, B) peasant economy in the post-reform period (p.).
Make a conclusion Lack of money to pay salaries to employees; economic development. Existence of a labour-service system Temporarily obligated position of peasants Growth of rent for land Redemption payments Existence of a peasant community The rate of transition of the economy to capitalist rails is slow
The development of capitalism Indicate which facts of the development of Russia at the end of the 19th century are related to feudal remnants, which are capitalist. Feudal Capitalist Preservation of the labor system. Opening of the State Bank. Redemption payments. Liberation of the peasants. Preservation of the peasant community. Preservation of landownership. Conclusion
Fact 1. The ascribed peasants who worked in factories and factories, having received freedom, abandoned forced labor and returned to the village. Industrial development Fact 2. In 1861. A global commercial and industrial crisis broke out, and cotton prices rose sharply. The Russian cotton industry worked mainly on imported cotton. What conclusion can be drawn from these facts?
UralMetallurgical production South of Russia (Donbass) Mining of coal, iron ore, metallurgical industry Caucasus (Baku region) Oil production Center of Russia (Moscow province) Large-scale engineering St. Petersburg Large-scale engineering Central AsiaCotton and paper industry central Russia Sugar beet industry Economic development of the country
State Bank d. Financial reform 1. Financing of enterprises 2. Promoting the development of industries: metallurgical; textile; sugar; machine-building V.A. Kokorev
Donetsk Coal Basin Textile industry Central economic region Ural economic region. Metallurgical industry Sugar industry Chernihiv, Kharkiv Textile industry Poland Putilov machine-building plant
Question 1. What is the difference between capitalist agriculture and serf farming? Why were the landowners' farms slowly rebuilt in a new way?
Answer. Under the serf economy, the peasants worked for the landowner by virtue of their dependence, moreover, with their own equipment. Therefore, almost all the profits went to the landowner. Under the capitalist economy, the landlords had to buy their own equipment and pay the peasants for their work. They needed large sums of money. The landlords were supposed to receive them as a ransom for peasant lands. But all debts were deducted from this money, so many received small amounts in their hands. In addition, many nobles did not want and did not know how to become entrepreneurs. Moreover, the remnants of serfdom were preserved, and it was possible to run the economy in the old way: to lease the land that they did not get to the peasants, and as a payment to demand their work with their inventory on the master's land.
Question 2. What reasons hampered the development of peasant farms?
Answer. The reasons:
1) lack of land of the peasants;
2) large families, which only increased the lack of land;
3) the preservation of the peasant community and mutual responsibility;
4) numerous payments by peasants, including redemption payments;
5) the incompleteness of the rights of the peasants, class restrictions on their rights;
6) the growth of rent due to the increase in the price of bread in the world;
7) economic and general illiteracy of the peasants.
Question 3. What was characteristic of the development of the post-reform industry?
Answer. Character traits:
1) the first time after the reform, workers from among the serfs quit their hated work, because production was reduced;
2) due to global economic crisis increased cotton prices, which also created serious problems for the industry;
3) peasants from serfs basically became temporarily liable, therefore, immediately after the reform, the labor market did not grow significantly;
4) the hopes that the landlords would invest the money received during the reform in production in the vast majority of cases did not come true;
5) Helped industry development banking sector, which issued loans for the opening of a new production and refurbishment of the old one.
Question 4. What role did the government's financial reforms play in economic recovery?
Answer. A capitalist economy is not possible without loans. Their most obvious application is to open your own business, to what is called initial capital. But this amount, in principle, can be saved, although more often it is actually taken on credit. More important is the re-equipment of production. In this case, one cannot wait until the required amount is accumulated, because without transformations the product will become uncompetitive, its production will cease to be profitable. In this case, only a loan can help out. A re-equipment of production should occur quite often. That is why credits help the development of industry in the most direct way. They played the same role in Russia in the second half of the 19th century. Exactly financial sphere helped production to reach the world level in terms of equipment.
Question 5. What were the reasons for the "railway fever"? What is the role and place of railway construction in the Russian industrial revolution?
Answer. Transportation by rail is a necessary part of modernization, because without trade production is not possible (there is no one to sell what is produced), and it is difficult to trade without a perfect transport in which goods can be transported. Especially then the trade in bread with Europe was profitable. Also, the railways at that time helped to better protect the country (armies reached such a size that they could only be supplied by rail, other modes of transport at that time could not transport such volumes of goods), as well as to colonize underdeveloped countries (a typical example of the railway , built by Russia with the expectation of colonization - the Chinese Eastern Railway). For the industry of Russia, railway construction has become a great boon. It not only helped to develop trade better, it brought huge state orders, which helped to develop several branches of industry at once, primarily heavy industry.
Question 6. What new strata of society emerged as a result of the industrial revolution?
Answer. The industrial revolution in Russia, as in other countries, created a class of capitalists, as well as a class of proletarians who worked for them.
Savka N.V., teacher of history and social studies
