Demographic Analysis
Demographic Analysis- the main method of processing information to obtain demographic indicators. Two types of demographic analysis are most common.
Longitudinal analysis is a method of studying demographic processes in which they are described and analyzed in cohorts, i.e., in populations of people who simultaneously entered into any demographic state. This means that demographic events are considered in their natural sequence.
The advantage of longitudinal analysis lies in the ability to study the calendar of demographic events (ie, the distribution of events over periods of a cohort's life) and changes in this calendar under the influence of certain conditions. Comparing the frequency of demographic events in different cohorts at the stages of their life in a longitudinal analysis, one can get a correct idea both about the impact of changes in living conditions on the dynamics of demographic processes, and about this dynamics itself.
Disadvantages: “lagging” of observation results from real processes. The full demographic history of a cohort is known only when it emerges from a given demographic state. Data on the number of events for cohorts that have not yet exited this state are, as it were, “truncated”. Therefore, it is necessary to apply extrapolation of indicators or “expected” indicators.
Cross-sectional analysis is that the frequency of events is considered on a "slice" at any point in time. As a result, a conditional generation is studied, which includes people in each age interval, and during, for example, a year, some of them experience some demographic events. The frequency of events covers the full set of durations for a given state.
Cross-sectional analysis is the most common method of demographic description and analysis due to the availability of information. Most indicators are usually indicators for the conditional generation.
However, there is also a drawback: with sharp changes in the intensity of demographic processes over time, it can give a distorted picture of the pattern of change in this process.
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The population of Russia in 1950 2011 ... Wikipedia
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS- (from the Greek. analysis decomposition, dismemberment), the study of the process of changing generations of people and its factors. Demography section. According to the object of study, the analysis of fertility, mortality, marriage and termination of marriage, reproduction and growth of us are distinguished. in… …
Violation of the reproduction of the population, threatening the existence of the population itself. Under the demographic crisis can be understood as a decline in population and overpopulation. In the first case, this is the situation that develops in a country or region when ... Wikipedia
LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS- LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS, cohort method, real generation method, demographic method. processes, with Krom they are described and analyzed in cohorts, i.e., in sets of people who simultaneously entered the c. l. demographic state (ex. Demographic Encyclopedic Dictionary
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- (other Greek δῆμος people, other Greek γράφω I write) the science of the patterns of population reproduction, the dependence of its character on socio-economic, natural conditions, migration, studying numbers, territorial ... ... Wikipedia
Population of Russia in 1991 2008 As of January 1, 2009, the population of Russia, according to Rosstat, was 141,903,979 people. Year Population 1600 11,300,000 1700 13,000,000 1800 27,000,000 1890 ... Wikipedia
RUSSIAN UNIVERSITY OF FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES
Faculty: Economic
Direction: Economy
Department: Statistics and Finance
BACHELOR'S FINAL WORK
Topic: " Statistical analysis demographic situation in the Russian Federation"
Student: Oskanov Ruslan Sulambekovich
Group EE-402
Country Russia
Scientific adviser: academician of MAI
Professor Vishnyakov V.V.
Head department: academician of RADSI
Professor Sidenko A.V.
social statistics is one of the most important applications of the statistical method. It gives a quantitative description of the structure of society, the life and activities of people, their relationship with the state and law, allows you to identify and measure the main patterns in the behavior of people, in the distribution of benefits between them. Statistical analysis of phenomena and processes occurring in the social life of society is carried out using methods specific to statistics - methods of generalizing indicators that give a numerical measurement of quantitative and quality characteristics object, links between them, tendencies of their change. These indicators reflect the social life of the society, which is the subject of the study of social statistics.
Complex and multifaceted in nature social life society is a system of relations of different properties, different levels, different quality. As a system, these relationships are interconnected and interdependent. Among the most significant areas of research in social statistics are: social and demographic structure population and its dynamics , the standard of living of the population, the level of well-being, the level of health of the population, culture and education, moral statistics, public opinion, political life. For each area of research, a system of indicators is developed, sources of information are determined, and there are specific approaches to the use of statistical materials in order to regulate the social situation in the country and regions.
Unlike many other sciences demography has an exact date of birth. It dates back to January 1662, when a book by the English merchant and captain, self-taught scientist John Graunt (1620 - 1674) was published in London, which had a long title: “Natural and political observations listed in the attached table of contents and made on the basis of mortality bulletins. In relation to the government, religion, trade, growth, air, disease and other changes of the named city. Composition by John Graunt, Citizen of London. This book was the beginning of not one, but three sciences at once: statistics, sociology and demography.
The word "demography" is formed from two Greek words: "demos» - the people and "grapho"- writing. If we interpret this phrase literally, it will mean "people's description", or a description of the population.
In the twentieth century, the formation of demography as a science took place in two directions. On the one hand, its subject was gradually narrowed, more precisely, concretized, on the other hand, the range of factors affecting this subject, which demography included in the field of its consideration, expanded. By the mid 1960s. most specialists began to limit the subject of demography to questions vital movement . There are two types of movement: natural and mechanical (migration).
Vital movement of the population is a continuous change in the size and structure of the population as a result of births, deaths, marriages and divorces. The natural movement of the population also includes changes in the sex and age structure of the population due to the close relationship of its changes with all demographic processes.
In the first half of the 1990s, our country entered the stage of a demographic catastrophe. This catastrophe is expressed primarily in an unprecedentedly low birth rate (the level of which today is half that in the most difficult years of the Great Patriotic War), in a very high divorce rate (according to which the Russian Federation is now in second place after the United States), in a relatively low life expectancy of the population, especially male and rural. Since 1992, Russia's population has not been growing, but declining, and at a very rapid pace. Since 1992, it has decreased by almost 2 million people, or 1.3%. However, it should be taken into account that the population decline was to some extent compensated by the migration flow of the population from abroad. Due to the natural loss, i.e. the excess of the number of deaths over the number of births, the country actually decreased during this period by 4.2 million people.
The true purpose of research for any science is to reveal the laws (cause-and-effect relationships) of development in that area of being that constitutes its subject. In turn, the knowledge of the laws of development is unthinkable without the preliminary establishment of regularities, i.e. objectively existing, recurring, stable connections between phenomena, this development. In this way the subject of demography is the laws of natural reproduction of the population.
The population in demography is a set of people, self-reproducing in the process of generational change.
To identify the true trends in demographic processes, it is necessary to assess the reliability of statistical information and select indicators suitable for each case. Different indicators, depending on individual properties, can characterize the direction and intensity of the same process in completely different ways. Equally important is the study of the factors of demographic processes. A factor is a statistically observable reflection of a cause.
Based on the study of trends in demographic processes and cause-and-effect relationships of demographic processes with other social processes, demographers develop forecasts of future changes in the size and structure of the population. On the demographic projections is based on the planning of the national economy: the production of goods and services, housing and communal construction, labor resources, training of specialists, schools and preschool institutions, roads and means of transport, military conscription and so on.
On the basis of knowledge of the real tendencies of demographic processes, on the basis of formation and causal relationships with other social processes, on the basis of demographic forecasts and plans, the goals and measures of demographic and social policy are determined.
Demography in the study of its subject - the natural reproduction of the population uses various methods, the main of which can be combined according to their nature into three groups: statistical , mathematical and sociological . The objects of observation in demography are not individual people and events, but groups of people and events grouped according to certain rules, homogeneous in some respects. Such aggregates are called statistical facts. Demography seeks to establish and measure objectively existing relationships between statistical facts relevant to its subject, using methods also developed in statistics, for example, methods of correlation and factor analysis. Demography also uses other statistical methods, in particular, sampling and index methods, method of averages, alignment methods, tabular and others.
The processes of population reproduction are interconnected sometimes by simple, sometimes quite complex quantitative relationships, which leads to the use of many mathematical methods for measuring one demographic characteristics according to other characteristics. In demography, mathematical models of the population are widely used, with the help of which, on the basis of fragmentary and inaccurate data, one can obtain a fairly complete and reliable idea of the true state of population reproduction. The category of mathematical modeling in demography includes probability tables of mortality, as well as demographic forecasts, which are one of the types of mathematical modeling.
In the last quarter of a century (in our country, and in the West for more than half a century), demographics are increasingly using sociological methods studies of so-called demographic behavior, i.e. subjective attitudes, needs, opinions, plans, decision-making, actions in relation to the demographic aspects of the life of people, families, social groups.
Within the demographics, industries such as:
demographic statistics - the oldest branch of demography; its particular subject is the study of the statistical patterns of population reproduction. The task of demographic statistics includes the development of methods for statistical observation and measurement of demographic phenomena and processes, the collection and primary processing of statistical materials on the reproduction of the population. In the next chapter of this term paper the main demographic indicators are described, and methods for analyzing demographic phenomena using general and special vital statistics are considered in detail.
mathematical demography ; which develops and applies mathematical methods to study the relationship of demographic phenomena and processes, modeling and forecasting. Demographic models include probabilistic tables of mortality, marriage, fertility, stationary and stable population models, simulation models of demographic processes, etc.
historical demographics ; which studies the state and dynamics of demographic processes in the history of countries and peoples, as well as the history of the development of demographic science itself.
ethnic demographics ; explores the ethnic characteristics of the reproduction of the population. Ethnic features of the everyday way of life of peoples, customs, traditions, the structure of family relations have a significant impact on the birth rate, average life expectancy, and health status.
economic demographics ; explores the economic factors of population reproduction. Economic factors are understood as the totality economic conditions the life of society, and the impact on the topics of population growth, birth rates, death rates, marriage rates, etc.
sociological demography ; studies the influence of sociological socio-psychological factors on the volitional, subjective actions of people in demographic processes.
Demographic statistics(population statistics) - part of demography, a science that collects, processes and analyzes information about the reproduction of the population.
The main sources of information in demography:
1 Regular censuses, usually every 10 years;
2 Current statistical records of demographic events (births, deaths, marriages, divorces) carried out continuously;
3 Current registers (lists, file cabinets) of the population, also functioning continuously;
4 Sample and ad hoc surveys. For example, microcensuses conducted in the middle of the intercensal period. The first such work was carried out in 1985, the second - in February 1994.
1 Definition of a population census given by UN experts:
« Population census- is the general process of collecting, summarizing, evaluating, analyzing and publishing demographic, economic and social data on the entire population living at a certain point in time in a country or a clearly defined part of it.
Although it is traditionally called a population census (or demographic census), in fact, the census shows a number of population structures that go beyond the boundaries of the subject of demography (ethnic and social-class structure, distribution of the population by territory and migration, distribution of the population by sectors of the national economy and by occupation, unemployment, position in employment, etc.). For the census, a special unit is created in the bodies of state statistics. Its functions are the methodological and technical preparation of the census, the organization of its direct conduct, the processing of the results and their publication. In our country, such a unit is the board of censuses and surveys. State Committee Russian Federation on statistics.
The following questions are considered in population censuses:
The number and distribution of the population throughout the country, by urban and rural types of population, population migration;
Structure of the population by sex, age, marital status and marital status;
The structure of the population by nationality, native and spoken language, by citizenship;
Distribution of the population by level of education, by sources of livelihood, by branches of the national economy, by occupation and position in occupation;
The number and structure of families for a whole range of social characteristics;
fertility;
Housing conditions of the population.
To avoid omissions and double counting, censuses distinguish between categories of people, depending on the nature of their residence in a given territory, the actual and permanent population.
PN=NN+VO-VP
HH=MON+VP-VO
In the Russian Federation, the legal basis for conducting population censuses is government decrees, specially adopted on the proposal of the statistical authorities some time before each census, sometimes several years, sometimes months.
On December 28, 2001, the State Duma adopted a draft federal law"On the All-Russian Population Census". In 2002 the census in our country will be conducted from 9 to 16 October.
2Current record of vital events - births, deaths, marriages, divorces - is based on the registration of these events. When registering demographic events, records of acts of civil status in special books are made in two copies, one is stored in the archive, and the second is transferred to the statistical authorities for processing and summarizing the information contained in it. However, these data, even in summary form, do not characterize the intensity of demographic processes. The volume of demographic events depends on the population that produces these events. The aggregates of demographic processes must be compared with the population aggregates corresponding to them (the number of births - with the number of women of a certain age and marital status, the number of deaths - with the population of the corresponding sex, age, nationality, etc.). Censuses provide data on the size and composition of the population. That. The data of the current record of demographic events form an inseparable unity with the data of population censuses.
3Current registers (lists, file cabinets) of the population are maintained by various administrative state bodies. These card indexes are created to perform specific tasks and usually do not cover the entire population, but some of its groups (residents of microdistricts, categories subject to social care, etc.). All of these registers include the legal population, which may not be exactly the same as the actual population (current or permanent, as defined in the censuses). Therefore, population list data are of limited use.
4 Sample and special surveys allow, at a lower cost than censuses, to study the problem of interest on a small, selected group of the population according to special rules in order to then disseminate the results to the entire population.
1.2.2. Key demographics
All indicators can be divided into two main types: absolute and relative. Absolute indicators (or values) are simply the sums of demographic events: (phenomena) at a point in time (or in a time interval, most often for a year). These include, for example, the population on a certain date, the number of births, deaths, etc. for a year, month, several years, etc. Absolute indicators are not informative in themselves, they are usually used in analytical work as initial data for calculating relative indicators . For comparative analysis, only relative indicators are used. They are called relative because they always represent a fraction, a ratio to the population that produces them.
Population figures.
The population is a momentary indicator, that is, it always refers to the exact moment in time. The decline in population is called depopulation.
Based on population data for a number of years, it is possible to calculate absolute growth, growth rates and average population.
Population S:
1) - data at the beginning and end of the year. (one)
2) at equal intervals (based on quarterly data) - this formula is the chronological average. (2)
3) for unequal intervals - this is the weighted average formula. (3)
The natural movement of the population.
This is the change in population due to the processes of birth and death.
Natural increase: = P - Y, (4)
Where P is the number of births; Y is the number of deaths.
The simplest indicators of the natural movement of the population - general coefficients - are called so because when calculating the number of demographic events: births, deaths, etc. - they are correlated with the total population, see tab. one.
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thousand |
2001 by 2000 |
Per 1000 population 1) |
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increase (+), decrease (-), thousand |
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born |
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including children |
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natural growth |
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Divorces |
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____________________ 1) Here the indicators of monthly operational reporting are given in terms of the year. 2) Per 1000 births. |
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Today, the main factor on which the demographic future of our country depends entirely is the birth rate.
Crude death rate:
The total vital rates are calculated with a standard accuracy of tenths of a per mille.
Indicators of mechanical movement. Migration
Migration- this is the mechanical movement of the population within the territory of the country or between countries, see Table 2.
P - B, where P - the number of arrivals in this territory, (8)
B is the number of those who left the given territory.
table 2
Migration flows
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Reference 2000. |
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number |
Number |
migra- |
number |
number |
migra- |
|
|
Migration |
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|
including: |
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within Russia |
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international migration |
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including: |
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with participating States |
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with countries outside the CIS and the Baltics |
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Total population growth:
Where is the natural increase of the population; - migratory (mechanical) population growth.
Mechanical gain coefficient: (10)
where is the average annual population.
Overall growth rate: (11)
Advantages of common coefficients:
General coefficients have a drawback, stemming from their very nature, which consists in the non-uniform structure of their denominator. When using general coefficients to study the dynamics of demographic processes, it remains unknown - due to what factors the value of the coefficient has changed: either due to a change in the process under study, or due to the structure of the population.
More precise special coefficients are considered in this work below, in a separate chapter.
Estimated at the beginning of 2002. The permanent population of the Russian Federation totaled 144,924.9 thousand people, and at the end of 2002 - 144,184.8 thousand people. Number of births P=1259.4 thousand Number of deaths Y=2217.1 thousand
Calculate the average annual population for 2003:
Thousand human
Total Fertility Rate:
Crude death rate:
General coefficient of natural increase:
Total growth for 2000:
145184.8-145924.9 = -740.1 thousand people (15)
natural increase:
1259.4-2217.1= -957.7 thousand people (16)
Migration growth:
=(-)740.1-(-)957.7=217.6 thousand people (17)
conclusions : The population in the Russian Federation in 2002 decreased in relative terms by 6.5%o due to negative natural growth, but increased by 1.5%o due to positive migration (mechanical) growth. As a result of the opposite impact on the total population growth of differently directed natural and migration increases, the total population growth in Russia in 2002 amounted to a negative value of 5.1%o. According to the obtained coefficients of natural movement, it is impossible to catch a change in trends, identify stable characteristics of the dynamics and choose the forecast period, since all indicators must be considered in dynamics over a long period of time.
In addition to general indicators for characterizing the natural movement of the population, there are partial coefficients that reflect internal processes, birth, death.
Birth rate in demography is a central issue.
Fertility indicators:
There is a relationship between special and general coefficients, which can be expressed as follows:
Where W is the proportion of women aged 15 to 49 of the total population. (21)
The lack of a special coefficient depending on its value on the characteristics of the age structure. True, already from the characteristics of the age structure within the female contingent (from 15 to 50 years), and not the entire population.
2. Age-specific fertility rates.
The age coefficient is the ratio of the annual number of births to mothers of age "x" to the number of all women of this age:
Age coefficients are calculated for one-year and five-year age groups. The most detailed - one-year age coefficients provide the best opportunities for analyzing the state and dynamics of fertility.
3. Total fertility rate.
The total fertility rate is a summary, final indicator. It shows how many children, on average, one woman gives birth to in her life from 15 to 50 years, provided that throughout the reproductive period of the life of this generation, the age-specific fertility rates in each age group remain unchanged at the level of the calculation period.
where n- the length of the age interval (with the same length of the interval).
Advantages of this indicator:
Mortality rates:
1. Age-specific mortality rates.
The rates are calculated separately for males and females and are the best for analyzing the status and trends of mortality rates. They are calculated for one-year and five-year age groups.
where is the age-specific mortality rate; - the number of deaths at the age of "x" in the calendar period (per year); - population at the age of "x" in the middle of the calculation period (annual average).
2. Child mortality rate (under 1 year):
where - the number of children who died before the year, - the average number of children born in this year. (24)
3. Child mortality rate:
where is the number of children who died before 1 year of age per birth in this year; R - the number of births in this and last year. (25)
This coefficient reflects the health of the nation, the state of medicine.
Where t is the period. (26)
Calculation of the prospective population.
The simplest way is:
Where K = const. (27)
Calculation of the population based on the predicted population time series: if there is a clear trend, then it can be extended into the future:
Population calculation based on mortality table.
The mortality table is a system of interrelated indicators based on the probability of surviving to the next year for each age group. Survival rates require a large amount of statistical information.
The probability of surviving to age "x + 1" for those who survived to age "x" is defined as the ratio of the number of people surviving to age "x + 1" to the number of surviving to age "x":
For each generation, a different coefficient is calculated.
Number calculations in this case are carried out separately for each generation. The total population in a given year is equal to the sum of the populations of all generations living in that year.
Method in the most general sense means a way to achieve the goal, regulation of activity. The method of concrete science is a set of methods of theoretical and practical knowledge of reality. For an independent science, it is necessary not only to have a subject of study that is special from other sciences, but also to have its own methods for studying this subject. The totality of research methods used in any science is methodology this science.
Since population statistics is sectoral statistics, the basis of its methodology is statistical methodology.
The most important method included in the statistical methodology is obtaining information about the processes and phenomena being studied - statistical observation . It serves as the basis for data collection both in current statistics and in censuses, monographic and sample studies of the population. Here, the full use of the provisions of theoretical statistics on the establishment of the object of the unit of observation, the introduction of concepts of the date and moment of registration, the program, organizational issues of observation, systematization and publication of its results. Statistical methodology also contains the principle of independent assignment of each enumerated person to a certain group - the principle of self-determination.
The next stage in the statistical study of socio-economic phenomena is the determination of their structure, i.e. selection of parts and elements that make up the totality. We are talking about the method of groupings and classifications, which in population statistics are called typological and structural.
To understand the structure of the population, it is necessary, first of all, to identify the sign of grouping and classification. Any feature that has been observed can also serve as a grouping feature. For example, on the question of the attitude towards the person recorded first in the census form, one can determine the structure of the population being enumerated, where it seems likely to distinguish a significant number of groups. This attribute is attributive, therefore, when developing census questionnaires on it, it is necessary to compile in advance a list of classifications (groupings according to attribute characteristics) needed for analysis. When compiling classifications with a large number of attribute records, the assignment to certain groups is justified in advance. So, according to their occupation, the population is divided into several thousand species, which statistics reduce to certain classes, which is recorded in the so-called dictionary of occupations.
When studying the structure by quantitative characteristics, it becomes possible to use such statistical generalizing indicators as the mean, mode and median, distance measures or variation indicators to characterize different parameters of the population. The considered structures of phenomena serve as the basis for studying the connection in them. In the theory of statistics, functional and statistical relationships are distinguished. The study of the latter is impossible without dividing the population into groups and then comparing the value of the effective feature.
Grouping according to a factor attribute and comparing it with changes in the attribute of an effective one allows you to establish the direction of the relationship: it is direct or reverse, as well as to give an idea of its form. broken regression . These groupings make it possible to construct a system of equations necessary to find regression equation parameters and determining the tightness of the connection by calculating the correlation coefficients. Groupings and classifications serve as the basis for using dispersion analysis of relationships between indicators of population movement and the factors that cause them.
Statistical methods are widely used in the study of the population. dynamics research , graphic study of phenomena , index , selective and balance . We can say that population statistics uses the entire arsenal of statistical methods and examples to study its object. In addition, methods developed only for the study of the population are used. These are the methods real generation (cohorts) and conditional generation . The first allows us to consider changes in the natural movement of peers (born in the same year) - a longitudinal analysis; the second considers the natural movement of peers (living at the same time) - a cross-sectional analysis.
It is interesting to use averages and indices when taking into account the characteristics and comparing the processes occurring in the population, when the conditions for comparing data are not equal to each other. Using different weightings when calculating generalizing averages, a standardization method has been developed that allows eliminating the influence of different age characteristics of the population.
Probability theory, as a mathematical science, studies the properties of the objective world with the help of abstractions , the essence of which consists in a complete abstraction from qualitative certainty and in highlighting their quantitative side. Abstraction is the process of mental abstraction from many aspects of the properties of objects and at the same time the process of isolating, isolating any aspects of interest to us, properties and relations of the objects under study. The use of abstract mathematical methods in population statistics makes it possible statistical modeling processes occurring in the population. The need for modeling arises when it is impossible to study the object itself.
The largest number of models used in population statistics has been developed to characterize its dynamics. Among them stand out exponential and logistics. Of particular importance in the population forecast for future periods are models stationary and stable population, which determine the type of population that has developed under these conditions.
If the construction of exponential and logistic models of the population uses data on the dynamics of the absolute population for the past period, then the models of the stationary and stable population are built on the basis of the characteristics of the intensity of its development.
So, the statistical methodology for studying the population has at its disposal a number of methods of the general theory of statistics, mathematical methods and special methods developed in the population statistics itself.
Population statistics, using the methods discussed above, develops a system of generalizing indicators, indicates the necessary information, methods for calculating them, the cognitive capabilities of these indicators, the conditions for use, the order of recording and meaningful interpretation.
Emigration from Russia, the right to freely leave and return its citizens, the ability to change the country of residence and work within the framework of the law is a new phenomenon in a country where for several centuries the annexation of any territory has always been accompanied by attempts by the state to control the possibility of movement of people not only to another country, but also within its borders. emergence legal basis emigration at the post-Soviet stage is evidence of profound qualitative changes.
In recent years, the scale of emigration from Russia has not been too great. Nevertheless, its significance seems to be quite large, primarily in connection with the possibility and necessity of considering it as the most important and still insufficiently assessed indicator of the state of society, mass moods, and the state of individual groups. Emigration can be seen as an indicator of deep, often hidden processes. Using emigration as an indicator requires studying it against a broad background of societal dynamics.
“No country has experienced so many waves of political emigration in the last century. Neither Germany, nor Argentina, nor Italy, nor Ireland... Only Russia. Her emigration was the most massive and the most terrible.”
At the end of the golden 19th century (although people realized what was golden only in the 30s of the next century), Russia did not know emigration at all as a phenomenon that to a large extent shapes the life of the Russian nation. It's not that there was no emigration at all, but (by analogy with "background inflation", "background radiation") it was purely background. The gentlemen went to Paris, and many stayed there for a long time; Jews (Pale of Settlement) and Ukrainians (agrarian overpopulation) emigrated from Southwestern Russia to America, with the active help of c. L.N. Tolstoy, the Doukhobor sectarians left for America by a whole big steamer; finally sat in Geneva
social democrat G.V. Plekhanov. But although departures and departures were observed, unlike in subsequent epochs, no one - either leaving or remaining - was considered either as a cleansing of Russia from an alien element, or as a bleeding of Russia, parting with the best and most active hands and heads; they were not considered at all. Even when the turmoil of 1905 sharply increased the outflow of Russian subjects from the borders of the empire (Jews fleeing pogroms and "kosnetutsii" - see Sholom Aleichem, revolutionaries and near-revolutionary intelligentsia - from the Bolshevik V. I. Ulyanov to the decadent poet K. D . Balmont), all the same, the borders remained so permeable, and the Russian giant was so self-sufficient that, as there was background emigration, it remained.
Real waves - not even waves, but the ninth waves of emigration were ahead.
The prologue to the tragedy of the Russian emigration of the 20th century was the arrival from emigration of V. I. Ulyanov-Lenin in April 1917. Less than a year later, the flow of refugees from Russia began to grow rapidly, reaching a peak in 1920 - with the final evacuation of parts of the Volunteer Army. By inertia, flight and non-returning added new human destinies to the emigration flow until about 1927, after which the borders of the USSR began to rapidly lose any kind of permeability. Who did not have time, he was late. This explains the phenomenon of the subsequent offensive of socialism along the entire front. And the gravest, unheard-of disasters experienced by the country in 1929-1933, and the subsequent great terror did not cause any emigration wave (the number of defectors of that time, more and more residents of the NKVD abroad, can be counted on the fingers), because the Soviet government prudently took away from its subjects even the last opportunity to save freedom and life itself is the opportunity to escape in whatever is and where one's eyes look.
The cocked spring straightened out during the war years, giving rise to the flow of the Second Emigration. And mass surrender, and unheard of in recent history the mass (up to 300 thousand people) participation in the anti-Soviet formations of the Wehrmacht, i.e. the war against their own country on the side of the worst enemy of this country, and the mass exodus of the population (North Caucasus, Ukraine), together with the retreating German, all this was purely emigration in essence by its phenomenon, its readiness to run to hell, to the devil, just to get away from the native Soviet power. The gate, which slammed shut in 1927 completely and, as it seemed, forever, during the war years was not exactly thrown open again, it was just that the fence itself was broken, because that's what the war is for, to destroy the familiar concept of the state border. Future displaced persons rushed chaotically into this gap in the fence. They poured in without long calculation and reflection, driven only by two desperate thoughts "Now or never" and "Though more, that more." So, to the one and a half million Russians from the First, White, emigration, a couple of million more refugees were added - no longer from the young, as in 1918-1922, but from the completely mature Soviet government. Then, in 1945, the fence was patched up again and strengthened stronger than ever. It would seem like forever.
Strange, but the more the socialist fatherland strove to teach the two hopeless words "forever" and "never", the more often history sneered at the menacing sound of these words. In the early 70s, a gate appeared again in a blank wall. This time, Jewish under the sauce of family reunification became possible, not always smooth and not always guaranteed, but still leaving the country. If it was only about Jewish emigration, this wave would hardly have been called the Third. Around the same years, the Jewish population was finally squeezed out of Poland by the Polish authorities. The departure of the Jews was directly encouraged, but the Poles did not at all perceive this as a powerful emigration wave that radically changed the life of the country. The inhabitants of the USSR accepted, because in essence emigration was not so much national (i.e. Jewish) as class (i.e. intellectual), and to a large extent people were driven not so much by the desire to reunite with relatives (mostly mythical) or craving for the warmth of the Jewish national home (the lion's share of emigrants stuck in Vienna or Rome, waiting for a residence permit in the Western countries proper and not really striving for the home), how much longing for free air.
It is difficult to say whether they should be blamed for that. The prospects for the Soviet system even in 1988-1989 were not clear to anyone, the system always had a rather bad reputation, and it cannot be said that Gorbachev greatly improved it in the eyes of fellow citizens, there was nowhere for the traditions of conscious citizenship to come from (even now, after ten years of life without communists, they are barely making their way), what to take from people who reasoned that we live once and do not want to spend the rest of the days in the same disgusting Soviet barracks.
So the Third emigration under Gorbachev began to smoothly flow into the Fourth, which is also sausage. Sausage because under the late Gorbachev, especially under Yeltsin, both breathing and consciousness became possible, and the borders became steadily permeable. The main motive of the previous three emigrations to escape from the plague-ridden country for the sake of preserving freedom (or even just life) and to do it now and quickly, until the gate slammed shut again, ceased to work. You can breathe, think and talk, but if problems with the gate arise (and the farther, the more), it is not on the domestic side of the border crossing, but on the completely opposite side. Back in the mid-seventies, departure for emigration was accurately described in poetic lines: "The airfield is like a crematorium, the dead man is alive and writhing, moreover." In our difficult time, God have mercy, what kind of dead man? which crematorium? read these lines now, they won't even understand what they are talking about. Everyone has already quickly forgotten what it means to say goodbye to eternal separation.
A serf who has received his freedom has no need to gain freedom by running away from a cruel landowner. It's another thing to get a sausage, a green card, a place in a Western university, a job in a computer company, belonging to an international bohemian. An undeveloped Russia cannot satisfy these needs, and this will continue for more than one year. Getting up from your knees after seventy years of hard times does not happen quickly.
There really is a place for sausage, but a decisive shift in emphasis from salvation to sausage-eating, or, to put it more elegantly, from political to economic motives, significantly changes both the self-awareness of the current emigration and its relationship with the metropolis.
The first, White, emigration had the greatest right both to honor and to the motto "We are not in exile, we are in a message." First of all, had
because, apart from the mass of peaceful inhabitants pushed into a foreign land by revolutionary chaos, and apart from those who, like Milyukov, Kerensky and other representatives of the "progressive public", have been preparing for many years for themselves and for others the replacement of rich and divided Russia with an emigrant Parisian attic ( revered for the highest happiness), there were also third. There were Drozdovites, Markovites and Kornilovites, there were those who fought to the end for their Russia and were forced to leave it only under the onslaught of the invincible forces of the enemy. If it weren’t for this hopeless resistance to Bolshevism that saved Russian honor, it would be impossible to talk about any mission of white emigrants. All the spiritual and cultural service of the White emigration, which really saved the fragments of the great Russian heritage for the future Russia, partly for the history, would be internally impossible if it did not have an excuse before history in the person of those very staff captains who fought for Russia.
The second emigration in the sense of service and message was distinguished by maximum wordlessness, for it consisted more and more of people
simple and unlearned, and the stigma of Nazi accomplices was doomed to wear forever, and this, perhaps, the most important knowledge that she took out of Russia was so terrible and tragic that it was indescribable. How much do we know about the spiritual mission of the survivors of Auschwitz? There was no mission, but there was a severe mental trauma for the rest of my life and a desire to forget everything and never remember.
The third emigration, if not entirely, then at least partially, could express its self-consciousness with the words "I chose freedom", that is, something that was definitely absent in the USSR. The readiness to die forever for the former country and for the former life for the sake of realizing some spiritual potential (another matter, how it was then practically realized, emigre life, by definition, suffers from pettiness and squalor) is a respectable impulse. There is at least a subject for conversation.
Worst of all in this sense is the last, Fourth, emigration. Replacing ideal motivations with practically sausage ones
gave rise to a number of new problems. I had to face the fact that the very concept of the quality of life is by no means exhausted by its material component. As soon as a certain, not very high limit of satisfaction of needs is surpassed, the question immediately arises not of absolute goods (a car, an apartment, a bank account, an annual salary, the same sausage), but of relative goods - the degree of integration into a new society and into a new environment and about the place occupied in this new human hierarchy. And here it turns out that unfortunate thing that, significantly (and sometimes even insignificantly) surpassing in the level and quality of consumption, i.e.
As if having greatly outstripped his former compatriots in social status, the emigrant of the last wave at the same time finds himself at the very bottom of the status ladder when it comes to comparing him with his new compatriots Americans, Germans, etc. but to live with them, not with the Russians.
Such a defeat in status, of course, was also among the former emigrants, however, they had a compensatory mechanism working - "We are not in exile, we are in a message" (the First and partly the Third wave), "Thank God that they are generally alive and that they are not under the Soviets "(Second). The fourth wave does not have this compensation, and since the need for consolation remains, the former compatriots of the last wave are forced to resort to the most unsuccessful form of compensation - the devilization of the former fatherland. In Russia, everything must be terrible, nowhere more terrible - because only in this way does the decision to part with their native country receive a clear and convincing justification.
At the end of August 1998, when the ruble went crazy, and with it the Russians, citizens reacted to the crisis in different ways. Who frantically
walked ("the last days at Kolchak's headquarters"), who was in a stupor, who cursed fate, who tried in vain to save the rest of the money. But there were people in those days who finally experienced the bright Paschal joy. Never before and never after have so many jubilant (sometimes even poetic, that's what joy does to a person) messages from former compatriots appear on the Russian Internet.
In that black August short time it turned out (or it seemed) that all emigre humiliations were now justified, that the decision to leave Russia turned out to be the right one, that the former compatriots who remained there were fools, and we were smart. For greater persuasiveness, the last thought was accompanied by specific references to the level of annual income ($60,000 and above, and a story about the number of cars).
Russia has never been a country of mass emigration, in history Russian Empire a much greater role was played by internal colonization, resettlement to free lands within the country. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the history of Russia did not know emigration at all, Russia participated in the great intercontinental migrations of the end of the past - the beginning of this century. From 1861 to 1915, 4.3 million people left the Russian Empire, including almost 2.6 million in the first 15 years of the 20th century. Two-thirds
emigrants were sent to the United States, and of those who left in the twentieth century - about 80%. True, most of the emigrants did not leave Russia within its current borders, but from other parts of the former empire - Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic provinces.
Emigration from the USSR was far from negligible. It breaks up into three main streams, usually called the "first", "second" and "third" emigration. All three streams were driven primarily by political reasons. The "first" and "second" streams are mainly forced "waves" of emigration during the First World War, the Civil War and the Second World War, the "third" stream is voluntary, predominantly "ethnic" emigration during the Cold War. Of course, such a division is arbitrary, emigration flows, now weakening, now intensifying, almost never dried up. We are talking, in essence, about the three peaks of emigration, see Table 8
The third - for the first time relatively voluntary - emigration was in every possible way limited by the authorities and was significantly inferior in scale to the first two. When the artificial restrictions disappeared, the scale of the flow, its composition, the purposes of emigration and the conditions in which it proceeds, became so different that there is every reason to speak of a new, "fourth" wave of emigration. It is increasingly characterized by features that are typical of emigration from many countries in our time, and is predetermined not by political, as before, but by economic factors that push people to go to other countries in search of higher earnings, prestigious work, a different quality of life, etc. . Emigrants of the "fourth wave" leave, of course, not only from Russia, but also from other former republics
The USSR, nevertheless, Russia has a very prominent place in this emigration.
After the major migration movements caused by the Second World War ended, the flow of emigration from the USSR almost completely disappeared. In the 70s, the size of net emigration (i.e., emigration minus immigration) ranged from 10-15 thousand people, only in some years rising to 30-40 thousand, despite the fact that both the number of emigrants and the number of immigrants was small . In the first half of the 1980s, emigration was even less. Only after 1986 did the first signs of an increase in the flow of emigrants appear, which increased rapidly in subsequent years. Since 1989, as an exception, the emigration of Germans, Vrei, Greeks was allowed, and in 1993 a law was enacted on freedom of entry and exit for all citizens of Russia.
In the early 1990s, both in the USSR (including Russia) and in the West, there was an opinion that the opening of borders would cause a huge surge in emigration. According to the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), which conducted a survey in 1990 "Attitude of the population of the USSR to work abroad", 1.5-2 million people were ready to leave the former USSR for labor reasons, and another 5-6 million considered this possibility. When interviewing experts - representatives of the apparatus government controlled, Science and Business, conducted in 1991 by the Center for Human Demography and Ecology, half of the experts said that in the next 5 years from 2 to 4 million people could be expected to leave the country, and another 30% estimated the possible scale of departure at 4-5 million people.
Western experts were also alarmed by the threat of mass emigration from the newly independent states, including Russia.
Their estimates of possible emigration from the former USSR sometimes reached 20 million people.
However, even then it was clear to many specialists that the danger of a "ninth wave" of emigration from the post-Soviet space was being exaggerated. "The danger of multi-million emigration from the former USSR is unlikely. There are quite serious limiting factors - both in the country (countries) of emigration and in countries of immigration, they will undoubtedly have a limiting effect on the formation of emigration flows."
Indeed, contrary to expectations, there has not been a sharp increase in emigration from Russia outside the former USSR. Since 1990, reported emigration has remained roughly at the same level, ranging from a maximum of 114,000 in 1993 to a minimum of 78,000 in 2002. In 1999, apparently due to the financial crisis of August 1998, emigration increased markedly - up to 108 thousand people, but did not go beyond the usual fluctuations, and in 2002 again fell even below the 1998 level. In general, over the twelve years - from 1990 to 2002 - about 1.1 million people left Russia, but not 2, much less 4 or 5 million, which some experts spoke about in the early 90s, predicting the scale of emigration of all five years ahead.
But, of course, even a million emigrants is a lot, especially if we take into account the general demographic situation in the country, the negative natural population growth and the decline in its numbers.
In addition, it should be borne in mind that the data provided may not be complete. As follows from the table, there are now two different official estimates of the number of those who left - the estimate of the State Statistics Committee of Russia and the estimate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. So far, we have been talking about a slightly higher assessment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But even it does not take into account those who left the country without obtaining an official permit for permanent residence, for example, those who went to study, on a tourist trip, on a business trip and did not return, and there are undoubtedly such people.
Table 4
Still, it is unlikely that under conditions of free exit from the country the number of unaccounted for emigrants would be too large.
Refinements are possible, but the order of magnitude, apparently, is still not distorted by the official figures.
All the inhabitants of Russia are gradually involved in emigration. If in 1992 Moscow and St. Petersburg sharply prevailed, giving about 40% of emigrants, then in 1997 their share fell to 18%, in 1998 - to 12.2%, in 1999 - to 10.6%. The share of Muscovites and Petersburgers in the flow directed to the USA is also decreasing: in 1995 they accounted for half, in 1996 - 44%, in 1997 - 39%, in 2000 - 29%, in 2002 - only 9.4%.
The ratio of men and women among emigrants is more balanced than in the entire population of Russia (in 2002, the proportion of women among emigrants was 51.6%, in the population - 53.1%). The age structure of emigrants, in comparison with the population of Russia, is shifted towards younger ages - mainly due to a larger share of the able-bodied age group (64.3% among emigrants and 58.5% in the population, 2002) and one and a half times smaller pension group (13.3% and 20.8%), while the proportion of the children's group (0-15 years) differs little (22.4% and 20.7%).
Emigration from Russia bears clear features of a brain drain. Every fifth emigrant had a higher education, including among those who left for Israel - 30%, in the USA - more than 40% (in the country's population - 13.3%). Many students and trainees studying in the West become emigrants.
Only 13% of all Russians have higher and incomplete higher education; among emigrants, more than 20% had it. This
the disproportion is further increased when considering the educational characteristics of emigrants to individual countries. Among
60% of Russian citizens who left for Australia had higher and incomplete higher education, 59% for Canada, 48% for the USA and 32.5% for Israel. In the total number of those who left for Germany and Israel, 79.3% were people employed in science and public education. At the same time, 40.5% of immigrants who arrived in Israel from the former USSR general term education is 13 years or more (only 24.2% of local residents have a similar educational level). It is also known that as of January 1, 1996, 110,000 scientists, not counting engineers, emigrated to Israel from Russia and other states - the heirs of the Soviet Union. All this suggests that some (and, apparently, a considerable) share of irrevocable migration can be qualified as a typical "brain drain".
The determination of the scale of intellectual emigration, based only on the data of the UVIR of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ..., gives a picture of a very
very truncated. The fact is that leaving with the wording "for permanent residence" can in no way be considered predominant. A survey of 16 research institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, conducted in the mid-90s, found that the departure of scientists on temporary contracts is much more common. So, from the Institute of Chemical Physics. N. N. Semenov in two years under contracts left 172 scientists, for permanent residence - not a single one, from the Physico-Technical Institute. A.F. Ioffe - 83 and 15 people, respectively.
People who already belong to the scientific elite, as well as young researchers who are going to improve their scientific qualifications, leave, including irrevocably, mostly with temporary contracts in their hands. The total departure under such contracts for internship and study exceeds the departure for permanent residence by 3-5 times. If the Russian scientific diaspora permanently residing abroad numbers about 30,000 people, then the number of "contract workers" is four times higher - at least 120,000.
A special problem is the outflow of highly qualified specialists from the field of R&D of the military-industrial complex, from closed cities ... There are no exact data on this contingent, according to preliminary estimates, since the beginning of the 90s, about 70 thousand employees of our defense institutions and enterprises have dispersed around the world
According to UNESCO, in the mid-1990s, the approximate total number of Russians studying at foreign universities was about 13,000 people. About 40% of them studied in the USA, another 40% - in Germany, France and the UK. The number of Russian students in the United States is growing all the time: in the 1997/1998 academic year there were 1582, in 1999/2000 - 5589, in 2000/2001 - 6900.
The basis of the "fourth emigration" from the very beginning was made up of several ethnic minorities, and this feature of it is still preserved, but gradually the role of these minorities is falling and the ethnic structure of emigration is normalizing. In 1993-1995, more than half of the flow was Germans and 13-15% - Jews. By 1999, the proportion of Germans had fallen to one third, so that together with Jews they now make up less than half of the emigrants. Emigration of Russians, on the contrary, is growing: compared with 1993, it has increased one and a half times - from 21.3 to 34.5 thousand people (according to the State Statistics Committee). In 1993, there were 3 times fewer Russian emigrants than the total number of Germans and Jews; in 1997, the departure of Russians equaled the departure of Germans, and then surpassed it. In 1999-2000 Russian
accounted for more than 40% of emigration, significantly surpassing the Germans and many times - the Jews, including 2 times - in the Israeli stream.
Table 5
According to the State Statistics Committee, which is slightly lower than the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, since the surge in emigration that began in 1987, more than half of those who left went to Germany, more than a quarter to Israel, a little more than 10% to the USA, more than three percent to Greece , Canada and Finland and another three percent - to all other countries, see Table 6.
Table 6
Distribution of those who emigrated from Russia outside the former USSR by countries of destination, 1991-2002, (according to the State Statistics Committee)
Table 7
Distribution of those who emigrated from Russia outside the former USSR by countries of destination, 1994-2002, thousand people (according to
The direction of emigration is affected by the weakening of its ethnic character and the increase in the share of Russians in the flow. The geography of Russian emigration is very wide, they master literally the whole world: in 2002, 52% of Russians went to Germany, 21.8% to Israel, 12% to the USA, 2.6% to Canada, 2.1% to Finland, etc. The news of recent years is the reduction in the number of Russians leaving for the United States. In 1998, 4418 Russians received permission to travel to the United States, in 2000 - 3490, in 2002 - 3118.
When studying the history of Russian international migration, researchers often rely on foreign statistical sources.
Thus, on their basis, estimates were made of the volume of the emigration flow from the Russian Empire to North America, white emigration during the civil war and revolution, and the emigration of Soviet citizens to the West after World War II.
Foreign sources sometimes turn out to be no less, and sometimes even more significant than national ones. Apparently, they should not be neglected when studying the current emigration of Russians. The official statistics of those states where emigrants from Russia enter can undoubtedly supplement our knowledge of the process of emigration, which is far from always transparent and difficult to account for.
Since the late 1980s, after the opening of the state borders of the USSR, migration ties between the former Soviet republics and other
states have expanded significantly. In particular, the number of emigrants from Russia in 1990 exceeded the number of emigrants in 1986 by more than 36 times. In subsequent years, the emigration flow from the country stabilized at the level of 100 ± 15 thousand people. In total, in 1989-2002, according to Russian data, 1046 thousand people left the country for permanent residence
In the "Demographic Yearbook of Russia" and other official publications, information on migration between the Russian Federation and countries outside the CIS and the Baltics is given according to the data of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The number of emigrants, or those who left Russia, is defined as the number of persons (including foreigners permanently residing in Russia and stateless persons) who received permission to leave the country for permanent residence abroad. In published materials for 1987-2002, those who subsequently refused to leave are excluded from those who received permission to leave.
It should also be taken into account that the Russian definition of international migration covers only that part of long-term
international movements, which is associated with a change of permanent residence. Simply put, those who declare that they are leaving Russia forever or are coming to Russia are included in the number of emigrants or immigrants. A Russian citizen who travels under a contract to work or study in non-CIS countries for a period of more than 1 year, as a rule, does not fall into the number of emigrants recorded by Russian statistics.
In addition to the MIA data, there are also emigration estimates made by the Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. They are based on
data on deregistration of emigrants at the place of residence. Estimates of the emigration outflow by the State Statistics Committee turn out to be less than
estimates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in some years - by almost 25%).
According to Russian data, in the late 1990s, almost 97% of the emigration outflow from Russia went to 5 countries: Germany, Israel, Canada, the USA and Finland. Invoking the data of the current accounting of international migration of these countries, comparing them with
Russian data, one can try to correct the estimate of the number of those emigrants from the Russian Federation who went abroad for permanent residence (permanent residence) or at least for a long time.
It is clear that emigrants from Russia are treated as immigrants in other countries. In Germany, Canada, the USA and Finland, the registration of immigrants from the Russian Federation began immediately after the collapse of the USSR - in 1992. In Israeli statistical publications, the distribution of immigrants from the USSR in the former Soviet republics begins in 1990.
In the immigration statistics of Germany, Israel, Canada, the USA, Finland and other Western countries, a group of immigrants from the former USSR is distinguished, who indicate the USSR as their last place of residence or place of birth, and not some former Soviet republic. The share of such undistributed migrants was especially significant in the first half of the 1990s, and then, as the quality of accounting improved and the composition of migrants changed, it gradually decreased. Thus, in Canadian data for 1992, the share of immigrants not distributed among the Union republics was 82% of the total number of immigrants from the USSR, and in 1998 - only 12%. This circumstance prompts us to use not only explicit estimates of Russian immigration from national statistical publications, but also adjusted estimates taking into account non-distributed immigrants from the former USSR, in a comparative analysis of statistical data. Both explicit and adjusted foreign estimates of the number of immigrants from Russia to the respective countries are given.
Comparison of Russian estimates of emigration for permanent residence to Germany, Israel, Canada, the USA and Finland with estimates of immigration flows to these states from Russia, carried out by the statistical services of these states. This comparison suggests that the emigration outflow from Russia was at least 1.2 times higher than that registered in Russia. Russian data differ most strongly from Canadian and Finnish ones.
countries - their estimates are always higher than Russian ones - quite reliably indicates that the emigration outflow in Russia
underestimated.
The reasons for this underestimation require detailed study. Without this, it is impossible to establish a system of reliable registration of immigration and emigration in the country. The main of these reasons, in our opinion, lies in the fact that today the importance of such a source of data as the recording of exit permits has decreased. A person who is about to leave for another country for several years or even for permanent residence may well do without such permission. Many people simply do not need it: it allows them to keep housing in Russia, often a place of work or study, and ultimately protect themselves from possible risks associated with immigration.
The topic of immigration is one of the most pressing for Germany, because, according to German statistics, on January 1, 2002, there were 7.3 million foreigners in the country. Almost every 11th inhabitant of Germany is a foreigner. The German government pursues an active migration policy and at the same time develops effective programs aimed at the economic and cultural adaptation of immigrants and especially their children.
Definitions of international migrants in Germany differ from those recommended by the UN. Foreign citizens are considered immigrants if they have received a residence permit and intend to stay in Germany for at least 3 months or more.
Another category of immigrants is represented by German citizens and persons of German origin (Aussiedler), who return to their historical homeland and almost automatically become German citizens. It should be noted that the development of data on most of the socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants is carried out only by Aussiedler. Emigrants include all those who left Germany, regardless of their citizenship, for a period of 3 months or more.
Thus, it is possible to compare German and Russian data based on some significant assumptions. German statistics include both short-term and long-term movements in their estimates of immigration flows. Because of this, in particular, the differences between Russian and German data reach significant values. At the same time, the immigration of people of German origin in Germany is considered as a long-term migration. If we agree with this point of view, then at this point the Russian data become comparable with the German estimates. It can also be assumed that the net migration reflects the magnitude of long-term migration to Germany, since those who came for a short period of less than one year must
were to return to Russia.
Immigration from the Russian Federation and the former USSR plays a significant role in the life of modern Germany. According to German data, more than 2.2 million people arrived in Germany from the former Soviet republics in 1990-2001, which accounted for 21.5% of the total number of arrivals in the country during the specified period. More than 1.5 million immigrants were people of German origin, 675 thousand - foreigners. Immigrants from the former USSR come mainly from Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. They account for 42.6% and 36.6%, respectively, of all arrivals in Germany from the former Soviet republics, 53.4% and 36.9% of Aussiedler arrivals, 21.7% and 36.1% of foreign immigrants.
Between 1992 and 2002, between 590,000 (according to published estimates) and 674,000 people arrived directly from Russia to Germany (including "immigrants from the former USSR"). Of these, persons of German origin ranged from 392 to 458 thousand, foreigners (primarily Russian citizens) - from 198 to 218 thousand people. The maximum influx of immigrants from Russia - more than 100 thousand people - was observed in 1994 and 1995
According to Russian data, 450.5 thousand people emigrated to Germany in 1992-2002. The emigration outflow peaked in 1995. This year, the immigration influx to Germany of people of German origin reached maximum value, both according to Russian and German data. According to Russian data, from 1993 to 1999, 243,000 Germans left the country, which accounted for about half of the entire emigration outflow to Germany. According to German data, this figure was at least 331.8 thousand people, or 65% of the total number of immigrants.
According to German sources, the return emigration outflow to Russia during the specified period amounted to 90 to 98 thousand people, and of these, about 16-18 thousand were Germans. Consequently, the balance of migration exchange between Germany and Russia was probably in the range of 500-570 thousand people in favor of Germany. We will take this value as an estimate of long-term immigration from Russia to Germany. With this hypothesis, the number of long-term immigrants, according to German estimates, was 1.1-1.25 times higher than the number of emigrants from Russia to Germany according to Russian data. A comparison of all immigrants from Russia, recorded by German statistics, with Russian estimates for emigration to Germany reveals a greater discrepancy between the data.
2.2.9. Russia's special role for Israel
In Israel, immigration is seen not only as vital economic and demographic development process, but also as one of the key elements of the state ideology. Therefore, it is not surprising that the immigration flow into the country is subject to careful statistical observation. In order to facilitate the accelerated and painless adaptation of immigrants in Israel, the Ministry of Absorption of Immigrants was established. Control over immigration processes is based on the developed legislative framework, which is based on the Law of Return or the Law on Entry into the Country.
The definition of an international migrant in Israel's national statistics differs from that recommended by the UN. Citizens of other states arriving or leaving Israel fill out special forms when crossing the border in accordance with the type of visa issued to them: immigrant, tourist, temporary residence, etc. Information about persons with an immigrant visa is then transferred to the population register. According to the definition, an immigrant in Israel is a citizen of another state who enters Israel for the purpose of permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of the Law of Return or the Law of Entry into the Country. In addition, such a specific category as "potential immigrants" is singled out in Israel's international migration statistics. According to a circular from the Ministry of the Interior, since 1991, this category includes persons who entered the country on an immigrant visa or certificate in accordance with the Law of Return with the intention of staying in Israel for up to 3 years in order to ascertain the conditions for settling as immigrants. Potential immigrants are included in the total number of immigrants for the year. In general, a reliable record of immigrants with their various socio-demographic characteristics has been established in Israel.
International migration of Israeli citizens is defined differently than foreigners. Israeli citizens who are going to stay abroad for 365 days or more, but have stayed in Israel for at least 90 days before leaving, fall into the category of "departed Israelis". The category "returning Israeli citizens" includes those who have lived abroad for 365 days or more and intend to stay in Israel for at least 90 days.
During the period from 1919 to 1989, 270,000 immigrants born in the territory of the former USSR arrived in Israel, or approximately 12% of the total number of immigrants during this period. From 1990 to 2002, Israel received more than 870,000 natives of the former Soviet
republics. This figure was 26% of the total number of 3333 thousand registered immigrants who arrived in Israel from 1919 to 2000.
The distribution of migrants by the republics of the former Soviet Union as a previous place of residence in Israeli statistics has been given since 1990. During the period from 1990 to 2000, most of the immigrants came from Ukraine (more than 225 thousand), the Russian Federation (more than 220 thousand), Uzbekistan (about 70 thousand) and Belarus (more than 61 thousand).
The definitions of emigrants in Russia and immigrants in Israel are generally identical, since the main criterion for their definition - leaving the country and entering the country for the purpose of permanent residence - is the same. In general, for 1990-2000, a balance is maintained between Russian data on emigration to Israel and Israeli data on immigration from Russia. According to Russian data, a little more than 203 thousand people left for Israel, according to Israeli data, about 215 thousand people arrived from Russia. However, in some years there are quite significant differences. So, in 1990, according to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, permission to travel to Israel
received 61 thousand inhabitants of the RSFSR. According to Israeli statistics, a little over 45,000 people from the Russian Federation arrived in the country (including potential immigrants). Probably, not all of those who received permission to leave Russia used it, and some of those who left did not go to Israel, but to another country. In subsequent years, the differences between the statistical estimates of the two countries narrowed, but at the same time, there was a steady excess of Israeli estimates of Russian ones (Table 3). In 1995-1997, the difference between them was approximately 10%. With all the degree of caution, it can be assumed that the probable flow of immigrants from Russia to Israel is 1.1 times greater than the emigration outflow noted in Russian statistical reference books.
In Canada, as in the United States, immigration processes have played and continue to play one of the key roles in shaping the country's population. The country has a long tradition of recording and controlling immigration processes. In modern Canada, the legislative framework governing international migration movements, the definition of the main categories of migrants are the Immigration Act of 1976 and the Immigration Rules of 1978. Control over migration processes is carried out by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.
According to the definition adopted in Canada, immigrants are people who move to the country for the purpose of permanent residence (landing). This definition corresponds to the definition of emigrants adopted in Russia. It is on immigrants that our attention will be focused further. Canadian statistics also develops information on other types of international movements. So, long-term visitors (long-term visitors) include those people who arrived in Canada for a period of more than one year. Accordingly, the number of short-term visitors (short-term visitors) includes those who arrived in the country for a period of less than one year. An important place in Canada's statistics is occupied by the temporary foreign population. It includes those who arrived in the maple leaf country with permission to work or study, refugees and some other categories of people who arrived from abroad. As of June 1, 1999, Canada's temporary foreign population was 271,000, of which 77,000 were foreign workers and 87,000 were foreign students.
In the 1990s, immigration from Russia was not as significant for Canada as it was for Israel, Germany, Finland and
even the USA. In 1992, the share of immigrants from the former USSR was only 1.3% of the 250,000th immigration flow into the country.
About 40% of the immigrants that year came from Hong Kong, China, the Philippines and India. However, by 1998 the share of immigrants from the USSR
increased and amounted to 6.3%. At the end of 1998, Russia ranked tenth among other countries in terms of the number of immigrants,
overtaking Canada's longtime migratory partner, Great Britain.
It is only possible to estimate the volume of immigrants from Russia for the period from 1992 to 2003, since the share of immigrants who were not distributed among the former Soviet republics as their previous place of residence was in 1992 and 1993, respectively, 82% and 38% of the total number of immigrants from the USSR. In subsequent years, this value fluctuated between 6% and 18%. Taking into account these figures, it can be assumed that the probable estimate of the number of immigrants from Russia is in the range from 14.5 to 17.5 thousand people. According to Russian data, 6.3 thousand people went to Canada during the same time period.
Thus, the differences between Canadian and Russian data are quite significant for individual years. On average, in the second half of the 1990s, Canadian estimates were 2.6-3 times higher than Russian ones.
For many people around the world, the concepts of "wealth" and "immigration" are associated with the United States of America. From 1820 - the year continuous immigration registration began - to 1998, 64.6 million people entered the United States. Immigration data is compiled by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, which is a division of the Department of Justice.
The basis of immigration statistics is information on entry visas and forms of changes in immigration status. Immigrants to the United States include people who have been legally authorized to permanent residence in the USA. Basically, similar permission is obtained in other countries of the world. However, since 1989, it can also be obtained in the United States, changing the status of a non-immigrant (non-immigrant), temporarily located in the United States, to the status of a permanent resident of the country. The latter category of persons is also included in immigration statistics. In addition, according to the 1980 Refugee Act, refugees who have lived in the country for more than 1 year can also receive permanent resident status. According to statistics, in 1992-1998, the numbers of newly arrived immigrants and immigrants who received this status in the US itself were approximately equal. In 1989-1991, this ratio was sharply broken in favor of those who changed their status, since during these years more than 2.6 million illegal immigrants and agricultural workers legalized their position in the United States under the 1986 Reform and Control Act.
In the formation of the US population, immigrants - immigrants from the Russian Empire - played a significant role at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. From 1891 to 1920, 3 million people arrived in the United States from Russia. After a period of long lull in the late 1920s, immigration from the former USSR began to slowly revive in the 1970s. Immigration to the United States increased markedly following the opening of borders and the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, in the mid-1990s, the former Soviet republics ranked second after Mexico in terms of the annual number of immigrants. In total, in the United States for the period from 1990 to 2002, there were more than 450 thousand immigrants from the former USSR, which is 5% of the total number of registered immigrants in the United States during this period.
In American statistical publications containing information on immigration, the most common characteristic of the origin of an immigrant is not the country of previous residence, but the place of his birth. Comparing these data for the USSR for 1991-2002, one can see that the number of immigrants born in the former Soviet republics is 10% higher than the number of immigrants who arrived from their territory. Thus, part of the immigrants - natives of the former USSR - arrived in the United States from other countries. The Russian Federation appears in American directories more often as the birthplace of immigrants. In 1992-1998, 98.7 thousand people who were born on the territory of the Russian Federation received immigrant status in the United States, and, taking into account the adjustment for unallocated immigrants from the former USSR, about 110 thousand. The maximum number of immigrants falls on 1996 (Table 2). At the same time, it should be noted that of those natives of the Russian Federation who received immigrant status after 1991, 53.5 thousand people arrived in the country before acquiring this status as refugees.
Comparing Russian and American data is a rather difficult task. First, in American statistics, the place of origin of an immigrant is determined more often by the place of his birth, and not by the country of his last place of residence. Taking into account the recommendations of international organizations and the specifics of Russian data, for comparison, it is better to use those estimates where the origin of immigrants is determined by the last place of residence. True, it should be noted that in the late 1990s, the number of immigrants born in the Russian Federation was only 3% less than the number of immigrants who arrived from the Russian Federation. Secondly, in US statistics, estimates of migrants are given not for the calendar, but for the fiscal year, which begins on October 1. Thirdly, a significant proportion of people from Russia obtained immigrant status while already in the United States as a refugee or non-immigrant (non-immigrant), and most of them lived in the United States for one to three years or arrived there in the same fiscal year. Perhaps this circumstance explains the discrepancies between Russian and American data in favor of Russian data for 1992 and 1993 (Table 3). In 1996, the proportion of newly arrived immigrants was approximately 35% of all immigrants from Russia who received immigrant status, in 2000 - 55%. Fourth, unlike the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Russian statistics provide practically no information about who and how receives permission to leave the United States.
Thus, when comparing data, one should take into account the difference between the calendar and fiscal years, as well as the fact that some migrants receive immigrant status with a time lag of 1-3 years. Comparison of data shows significant differences in the annual dynamics of immigrants between Russian and American estimates.
The number of immigrants to the United States in 1996-2002 is 1.2-1.35 more than the number of emigrants from Russia according to Russian data. These estimates will help determine the likely magnitude of Russia's underreporting of emigration to the United States. Approximately the same estimates can be obtained if we compare the annual Russian and American data for 1993-1998. At the same time, given the wealth of American statistics, these conclusions should be clarified after their detailed study.
Finland belongs to the category of states in which an ideal, from a modern point of view, population accounting has been established. The country has a regularly updated centralized population register that can provide varied and reliable information on migratory movements. The definition of external migrants in Finland follows the UN definition. Emigrants include Finnish citizens and foreigners who leave the country for more than a year. Immigrants include Finnish citizens who return to the country after staying abroad for more than 1 year, and foreigners who come to the country for more than 1 year.
Migration exchange with the former Soviet republics, especially with the Russian Federation and Estonia, plays a significant role in the functioning of the Finnish migration system. In 1992, more than 50% of the total number of immigrants to Finland came from the former USSR. By the end of the 1990s, this share dropped to 30%, mainly due to a decrease in immigration inflow from Estonia. More than 20% of all immigrants come from the Russian Federation, and this share is fairly stable.
In total, about 15 thousand people arrived in Finland from Russia during the period from 1992 to 2000 for a period of more than 1 year, and about 1200 people left for Russia. last digit ten times different from those provided by the State Statistics Committee on immigration to Russia from Finland. Finnish estimates of the number of immigrants from Russia also differ significantly from Russian estimates, according to which
From 1992 to 2002, 4457 people left Finland. Thus, over 7 years, the migration increase in the population of Finland at the expense of Russia amounted to about 13,800 people.
It is curious that if the origin of migrants is determined not by the country of the last place of residence, but by their citizenship, then about 16 thousand Russian citizens arrived in Finland. This means that part of the Russian citizens arrived in Finland not from Russia. It should also be noted that if at the beginning of 1990 slightly more than 4 thousand citizens of the former USSR were registered in Finland, then at the end of 2002 the number of Russian citizens alone was 20.5 thousand.
To some extent, differences between Finnish and Russian estimates of immigration are due to differences in definitions. The Finnish definition of immigrants does not only include those who have arrived in the country for permanent residence. In terms of long-term migration in Russia, the total number of emigrants to Finland (corrected for underestimation) is approximately 3 times the size of the registered emigration outflow.
The real scale and prospects of modern emigration are determined not only by the internal situation in the CIS, but also by the situation in those countries and regions where potential emigrants are sent.
From the beginning of the 70s European countries pursuing an increasingly restrictive immigration policy, and in some cases even encouraging the return of immigrants to their homeland, which, however, has no success. These measures are due different reasons, among which
called the energy crisis and the general economic downturn, the restructuring of the economy, the influx of more
numerous cohorts born in the 50s and 60s, the growth of foreigners, the increase in ethnic tensions and the rise
racist sentiment. In the past two decades, the growth in the number of foreigners in Western Europe goes mostly out of
purposeful attraction of labor from abroad, as was the case after the war, and as a result of family migration, partly
illegal labor migration, the influx of refugees, as well as the relatively higher birth rate of immigrants.
If we leave aside special cases of ethnic emigration (Jews to Israel, Germans to Germany), then in world migration
immigration from the former USSR occupies now and may in the future only a very limited place. In any case, Europe, under the influence of events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, anti-immigration sentiments are on the rise, although a clear attitude towards possible mass immigration from these regions has not yet been developed.
A marked reticence towards potential immigration from the former USSR is observed in the US as well. multi-million dollar
emigration from the former USSR is really unlikely; there are quite serious limiting factors. At the same time, new political and economic realities can act in the opposite direction. Now it is not entirely clear, for example, how the independence of the republics and their transformation into sovereign states will affect migration processes. For at least some of them, the euphoria of independence and the upsurge of national sentiment can serve as a counterbalance to economic push factors. The Baltic states, which have a significant foreign diaspora, may even seek to return some of their compatriots to their homeland. However, in the large republics in Russia, and probably in Ukraine, the new state-political situation will hardly be able to reduce emigration flows.
What seems to be the general strategic line of both countries of entry and countries of exit in such, so far rather uncertain conditions?
We have a long ideological tradition of an unfriendly attitude towards emigration. Although now there is a turning point in public sentiment and going abroad is beginning to be perceived more calmly, a certain wariness of public opinion remains. At the same time, the problems that not the states (Russia and others), but the emigrants themselves will face if their departure takes on any mass scale, are poorly understood and attract little attention. Such a departure presupposes, in addition to a certain degree of psychological readiness (and it is not particularly high, there were no corresponding traditions), also a rather developed and complex infrastructure. Already now it is running into great difficulties of a purely technical nature: rail and air transport, visa, border and customs services cannot cope with the growing flows of people traveling abroad.
But there is also social infrastructure. We need a more or less established network of emigration links, a system of capillaries facilitating the movement from the familiar to the unaccustomed social environment. Such a system is taking shape gradually, as immigrants self-organize, create fraternities, immigrant communities, etc. So far, only the “third emigration” has this. For the “fourth”, however, at least in the coming years, the emergence of self-braking forces will be characteristic. The manifestations of these forces can be very painful, dramatic for many, which will inevitably limit emigration flows.
The foreseeing of such difficulties is already forcing society (Russian, Ukrainian, etc.) to start developing a new strategy for emigration. It is becoming more and more clear that it is necessary not to prevent it with the help of any kind of prohibitive measures, but to look for ways to turn unorganized, “wild” emigration at your own peril and risk, to which many former Soviet citizens are now inclined, who do not count on state assistance in such an unseemly ( from the point of view of the ideology of the recent past) into an organized, civilized one. The new strategy in the countries of origin should contribute to the gradual transformation of the “crisis” emigration of the labor force, which everyone is so afraid of now, into a “normal”, if possible temporary, elimination of all obstacles to exit and entry, the formation of stable flows of direct and return migration. One of the elements of such a strategy is intergovernmental agreements between the countries of emigration and immigration (here, however, the counter strategy of the latter is important, which has not yet been worked out either).
It is also important to see the pitfalls that mass emigration may face, the political consequences, including international ones, that it can generate. Already now in Europe there is concern not only of official authorities, but also of representatives of immigrants from African and Asian countries, who fear discrimination in competition with Russians and other “Europeans” of the former USSR who are more prepared and closer in culture to Western Europeans. Our emigrants may face hostile attitudes and find themselves in an even more difficult situation than at home. In the event of serious excesses on this basis, a certain interstate tension may arise between countries of emigration that protect the rights of their citizens abroad, and countries of immigration that do not fully ensure these rights.
You will not turn a blind eye to other aspects of the new emigration. Suffice it to recall the reaction of Israel's Arab neighbors to the massive influx of our emigrants into this country and their settlement in territories that the Arabs do not consider Israeli. Another example is the concern of Western countries about the possible emigration to countries such as Iraq or Libya of Soviet specialists who possess atomic or other military-industrial secrets.
All this speaks not only of the complexity of the problems generated by a possible large-scale emigration from the former USSR, but also of the special geopolitical importance of their solution. It is not enough to consider the very phenomenon of such emigration only as "economic" or "ethnic". It is also (and perhaps primarily) a necessary, most important step towards the transformation of one of the largest industrial societies on Earth from closed to open.
According to the calculations of the State Statistics Committee, the actual population of Russia at the beginning of 2001 amounted to 145,184.8 thousand people and decreased in 2000 by 740.1 thousand. Thus, in 2001, the decline in the population of Russia somewhat decreased, which happened due to an increase in migration growth by 59 thousand people, while the natural increase decreased, but only by 30.7 thousand.
Table. 9
|
years |
Population at the beginning of the year |
General gain |
Average annual growth rate, ppm |
natural growth |
Migration growth |
Population at the end of the year |
The country's population began to decrease in 1992. For 9 years from 1992 to 2002, it decreased by 3519.5 thousand people, including in 2002 - by 740.1 thousand people. Due to its internal conditionality, the trend of population decline is quite stable.
Age structure of the population plays an active role in demographic processes.
The age structure accumulates and stores a stock of demographic inertia, the potential for population growth, by virtue of which the population movement continues for a long time after the driving forces of this movement have already dried up or changed their direction to the opposite. Therefore, the influence of the age structure is always taken into account when analyzing the dynamics of demographic processes.
Throughout the twentieth century. Russia's population is declining for the fourth time. But unlike the first three periods - the First World War and the Civil War, the famine and repressions of the 30s, the Second World War - when the population decline was due to non-demographic factors, in the 90s it was predetermined by the very course of demographic development. It was predicted by demographers at the end of the outgoing century. The systemic crisis that unfolded during the transition period only accelerated and aggravated the realization of long-standing forecasts. Although the population decline is not yet as large and catastrophic as in the previous three periods, this trend, due to its internal conditionality, is stable and, most likely, will continue in the near future.
The general trend in the change in the age structure of the population of all countries as the birth rate declines and life expectancy rises is a steady increase in the proportion of the population of older ages in the age structure. This process is called demographic aging of the population.
Population decline occurred mainly due to natural loss, i.e. excess of the number of deaths over the number of births (about 7 million people in 1992-2000), as well as due to emigration to the "far abroad" (about 850 thousand people). However, the actual reduction in the population was almost three times less due to a rather significant migration influx of population from the CIS and Baltic countries.
The natural decline in the population of Russia is due to the mode of population reproduction with low levels of mortality and fertility, which developed in Russia by the 1960s and which even earlier became characteristic of most developed countries. For some time, the natural increase still remained relatively high - mainly due to the favorable age structure of the population, in which some potential for demographic growth was "accumulated". But as this potential was exhausted, natural growth began to decline.
Nevertheless, up until the 1990s, it was the determining component of Russia's population growth. For a long time, it even combined with the migration outflow from Russia, more than covering this decline. Beginning in 1975, population growth was already due to both natural growth and migration inflow from the Union republics, which, as a rule, did not exceed 1/4 of the total increase. But then the role of the migration component changed dramatically - at first, its contribution to population growth simply increased, and since 1992, when the natural population decline began, migration has remained the only source of population growth. However, even the volumes of net migration that increased after the collapse of the USSR could not cover the natural decline of Russians; in recent years, net migration has also been declining.
Let's consider graphically how much the migration growth of the population compensates for the natural decline since 1992:
Table 10
Migration growth of the country's population in January-August 2002 only 5.1% compensated for the natural decline. (In 2000, the natural population decline was offset by 21.6% by the increased migration growth of the country's population, in 1999 by 16.7%). This is the lowest figure for the entire period of population decline since 1992. to 2001. This ratio, despite the decrease in natural loss, was the result of a significant (in comparison with January-August 2000) reduction in migration growth.
Since 1992, the death rate in Russia has exceeded the birth rate, and depopulation , i.e., a decrease in the number of indigenous people. Its occurrence occurred abruptly, according to an epidemic type.
The natural decline in the population was the largest in 1994, then, on the whole, its level was quite stable - 0.5-0.6% per year until 1999. Fluctuations in migration growth were more significant, and they caused fluctuations in the overall population decline. In 1999 society responded to the August financial crisis with a sharp rise in mortality.
Dynamics of demographic indicators in Russia (per 1000 people):
Tab. eleven.
|
fertility |
Mortality |
Natural. growth |
total fertility |
|
The maximum rate of decline in the birth rate occurred in 1987-1993. During this time, the number of new residents born annually has almost halved. If in 1986 there were 17.2 per 1000 of the population, then in 1993 - 9.2, and in 2000 - 8.8 ppm (Table 5). As a result, Russia has lost more than 12 million citizens unborn. The decline in childbearing activity was observed in women of all reproductive ages.
The total fertility rate, i.e., the number of children per woman aged 15–49, fell critically from 2.2 in 1986–1987 to to 1.2 in 2000
The decline in the birth rate over six years by almost 30% occurred for two main reasons: a) - in the early 90s, the number of women of childbearing age, which became "children of war children" decreased; b) - today two-thirds of families refuse to have children for material reasons, postponing their appearance (and thereby changing the "timing" of births) or generally preferring childlessness. For 10 years (1987-1997), the absolute number of births has almost halved: from 2.5 to 1.26 million per year.
The decline in the birth rate is becoming extremely dangerous for Russia. First, the internal potential of demographic reproduction has been exhausted. After all, to replace generations of parents, you need a birth rate, measured by a total fertility rate of at least 2.1, and today it is only 1.26. Secondly, the population and labor force are aging, people's health is declining, the one-child family is becoming dominant.
However, the main factor of natural decline is exorbitant increase in mortality . Over the past six years, the crude mortality rate has increased by more than 20% (from 11.4% in 1991 to 14.2% in 2002). It became the highest in Europe. The inertial causes of the increase in mortality are very insignificant, and this is evidenced by the dynamics of age-specific mortality rates. It shows that, contrary to natural processes, more young people die today than old ones. Thus, over the period from 1991 to 2002, the crude mortality rate did not increase for groups under the age of 15 years; in the elderly, its growth was 1.1, and in working age it reached 1.4. Moreover, among young people (20–25 years old) and among the most effective working ages (45–49 years old), mortality increased by 1.5 times.
These shifts are largely associated with the exacerbation of the "external causes" of mortality (accidents, poisoning, injuries, murders and suicides). Over the past 30 years, this figure has increased 30 times.
Thus, today the following features are characteristic of mortality in Russia:
Demographic forecasts are at the heart of any social forecasting and planning.
The forecast of the total population is of interest for assessing the long-term consequences of the demographic situation that has developed by the beginning of the forecast period.
Most often, such a forecast is based on the hypothesis of a constant observed or assumed population growth rate. In this case, the population changes exponentially according to the formula:
where is the total population at the end of the forecast period; - total population at the beginning of the forecast period; k- estimated population growth rate in the forecast period; t- the value of the forecast period.
Let's determine what the population in Russia may be in 2011. The population at the beginning of 2001 was 145,184.8 thousand people. The overall population growth rate observed in 2000 is -0.51%. Assuming that this coefficient does not change for ten years, we get:
137966.0 thousand people (22)
In 2000, the overall population growth in Russia (-0.51%) was the result of the summation of negative natural growth (-0.66%) and positive migration growth (0.15%). It is quite obvious that the migration influx will dry up rather quickly. It mainly consists of Russians who are leaving the former Soviet republics. But, firstly, the number of potential immigrants is not infinite. Secondly, not all Russians will leave the independent countries for which they are indigenous people.
The State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics has published a forecast of the population of Russia until 2016:
All three forecast options (medium, low and high) predict a further decrease in Russia's population. It is expected that by the beginning of 2016 it will be, depending on the option, from 128.4, 134 or 143.7 million people. According to the middle variant, the number of 81 out of 89 subjects of the federation will decrease by 2016. Exceptions are Moscow, the Republic of Kalmykia, Dagestan, Ingushetia and the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Republic of Altai, the Ust-Orda Buryat and Aginsk Buryat Autonomous Okrugs.
The aging of the Russian population will continue. Although until 2006 the population of working ages will increase, then it will begin to decline rapidly. The low birth rate and rising life expectancy will lead to an increase in the proportion of older people in the population structure and a decrease in the proportion of children. As a result, the total burden on the working-age population will first fall to 57 per 100 people of working age in 2007, and then rise again to about the current level.
All population forecasts made for Russia by the leading centers are pessimistic. “The demographic weakness of Russia is undoubted, and one should not build illusions about the future change in the demographic situation for the better”.
The way out of the hopeless situation appears with the discovery of the law of "spiritual-demographic determination". It testifies to the possibility of a powerful non-economic management of the health of the population. Overcoming depopulation in Russia is possible in 3-4 years through non-economic regulators of a moral and emotional nature. The structure of health measures should consist of 20% efforts to improve the standard of living and 80% quality of life. First of all, it is the achievement of social justice in society and finding the meaning of life.
As a result of the work carried out, the following conclusions were obtained:
1 The collapse of the USSR inevitably entails the emergence of a new migration situation. Changes can be very significant and give rise to consequences that are important not only for the CIS states, but for the entire international community. Established migration trends are characterized by at least three fundamental important elements: displacement of the newcomer population from the social niche that it occupied until recently, emigration from overpopulated areas and increasing emigration outside the former Soviet Union .
2 Demographic processes develop under the influence of other social processes: economic, political and others. In turn, demographic processes influence the course of all other social processes. For example, low level the birth rate leads to an increase in the percentage of pensioners in society and to an aggravation of the problem of "fathers and children". Fluctuations in the birth rate after a certain time are manifested in the corresponding (or opposite) fluctuations in the level of employment in the labor market, the level of crime, competitions between applicants for admission to educational establishments etc.
3 The country is experiencing demographic degradation.
4 In the near future, Russia will be overtaken by two powerful demographic blows in 2013 and 2033, the prerequisites for which arose in 1990-1993. by doubling the number of births. Immigrants will inevitably have to be brought in to cover the deficit.
5 Until now, in all countries that have a demographic situation similar to ours and are trying to somehow correct it, measures of material support for families are mainly used with the help of various benefits and benefits. As history shows, the effectiveness of these measures is low. Deeper purposeful changes are needed in culture, in the whole way of life of society in order to increase the prestige of family life, the prestige of a family with several children, which is very low today. This requires a special family policy, large-scale programs of a cultural, and not just economic order.
Demographic science uses specific methods for analyzing statistical materials characterizing the development of population. This is what demographic analysis does. Consider the questions of the problem:
1. Essence, main milestones of demographic analysis.
2. Demographic aggregates.
3. Cohorts. Longitudinal analysis, cross section.
4. Demographic coefficients.
Demographic analysis is a central element in the study of demographic processes. In a broad interpretation, it covers the study of the relationship between demographic phenomena, their determination by social, economic, socio-psychological and other processes, patterns, causes and consequences of population reproduction in specific conditions, including the conclusions of empirical studies.
In a narrow sense, it acts as a link between the theoretical and empirical levels of knowledge of the population, analyzes demographic processes using specific research methods - coefficients, modeling, forecasts, tables, pyramids, etc.
The development of demographic analysis as an independent theoretical and methodological basis for studying the population by formal methods took place on the basis of an increase in research tools. There was a creation of its own "mathematized" concept of population reproduction.
The main milestones in the formation and development of demographic analysis:
1. XVIII - first half of the XX century. - from the construction of the first mathematical justifications for the tables of mortality - survival (L. Euler) to the formation of the principles of "cross-sectional analysis" - the "conditional generation method" with its inherent system of general and special coefficients, to the development of the "stable population" model and integral models of population reproduction ( A. Quetelet, R. Beck, M. Ptuhe).
2. 1930 - 1960: development of the principles of "longitudinal analysis" ("method of real generation") for assessing long-term trends, reconstruction of past dynamics, forecasts of demographic processes, the beginning of the use of selective sociological surveys (R. Sifman, B. Urlanis).
3. 1950 - 1970 - development of demographic forecasting of the population, the use of a rigorous mathematical theory of population stability, as well as special models for fertility, mortality, marriage (E. Cole, P. Demeny, etc.).
4. 1970 - 1980 – development of the principles of demographic tables, construction of a generalized model of the “open” population for migration.
5. 1980 - 1990 – development of methods and attempts at practical application of models for the purpose of “longitudinal-transverse analysis”.
Conclusion: a line has been drawn to the century-old search for solutions to one of the fundamental problems of demographic analysis - the construction of a generalized mathematical model population reproduction (S. Preston, E. Cole).
Demographic aggregates are used for the analysis. These are groups of people and the events taking place in their lives, identified in the analysis of demographic processes, the construction of tables and other calculations.
Mathematical demography uses three variables:
Time of observation of the demographic event "y",
Age "a"
Birth time "t".
The demographic populations that are the objects of observation include:
The totality of people of all ages living at a certain point in time (period) - contemporaries,
A set of people born in the same period - peers,
A set of people who have the same demographic events, but who have different years of birth - peers.
Peers are also defined as people of the same age (born at different times and live at different times).
They can be people of the same age or be in the age range (from 1 year to 5).
When disclosing the reproduction of the population, the term "generation" is used.
Generation is: 1. a set of people born in a certain period (most often a calendar year), i.e. cohort by year of birth, 2. offspring of a married couple or a set of married couples, 3. knee, step in the line of kinship between two relatives in a straight line (mother-daughter, father-son).
Generation length is the difference between the average age of parents and the average age of children, or the average interval of time separating the generation of parents and their children.
In addition to the real generation, demography uses the concept of a hypothetical, conditional generation: a set of people of different ages living in a given calendar time, in which demographic processes will continue (continue) in subsequent periods, taking into account age indicators.
Since demography deals with mass phenomena, it is necessary to group their participants. Such a grouping is the cohort method.
Cohort(from the Latin “cohors” - detachment) - a set of people who had a demographic event in the same period of time (marriage, childbirth, divorce, etc.) The term was introduced in 1947. P. Welpton for a specific study, but acquired a universal character. A distinction is made between real cohorts (object of longitudinal analysis) and hypothetical cohorts (object of cross-sectional analysis).
Demographic analysis uses longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis. Analysis demographic (from the Greek. analysis - decomposition, dismemberment) - the study of the process of changing generations of people and its factors. It is a section of demography. Uses special mathematical and demographic methods. Depending on the approach to population change over time, there are longitudinal analysis (finding out the frequency of demographic events in the life of a cohort, but in different periods) and transverse analysis (study of the same frequency in different cohorts, but in the same calendar period).
Longitudinal analysis (method of real generation) studies the sequence of events that have occurred and are occurring in a real cohort. The inconvenience of longitudinal analysis is that events need to be tracked for a long time. But it allows us to trace the demographic history, to establish the intensity of demographic events.
Cross-sectional analysis uses the concepts of conditional, hypothetical generation. The data of the population census and the previous year (2 years) obtained by the current population count are taken. Comparison of census and current records allows calculation of age-specific characteristics (eg mortality) of a hypothetical generation. Forming a conditional generation, the hypothesis is accepted: during the life of this generation, the age-specific mortality regime will be preserved, which was at a particular age in the year of calculation. The disadvantage of using this method is that it is impossible to take into account future abrupt changes, plus that it is easy to calculate, there is no need to track events for a long time.
Demography operates with massive, large statistics that are difficult to compare when dealing with a small and at the same time with a large population. Therefore, coefficients are introduced - the ratio of the number of demographic events to the population, or to its part (cohort). Depending on the population with which these events are correlated, the coefficients are divided into general (for example, total fertility rate - ), special (for example, sp. fertility rate - ), private (for example, age-specific fertility rate - ), where N - the number of births in a given _period - T children, P - the population in the middle of the period, W - the number of women of the reproductive period (15-49 years), X \ X + Y - the age of the woman. Multiplication by 1000 is caused by the need to calculate per 1 thousand people. population (promille - ).
The total fertility rate (F total) is used, which is equal to the sum of age-specific fertility rates in all age intervals. At one-year intervals, these are:
Total coefficient fertility characterizes the number of births per woman in a hypothetical generation. Total coefficient above 4.0 is considered high, less than 2.15 is considered low.
Demographic coefficients allow one to move on to probabilities that involve accepting hypotheses.
The number of cohorts, coefficients, probabilities are needed to compile demographic tables. This is a system of probabilistic characteristics of age-specific intensities of demographic processes. Demographic table are ordered series of interrelated values that characterize the course of one or more demographic processes in a cohort. Demographic tables as theoretical models describe the life of a cohort in the form of successive transitions between two or more clearly distinguishable states. The tables are numerical models that reflect the change in the intensity of the corresponding demographic process depending on the cohort's own time (for example, age, duration of marriage) and the change in the size of the cohort itself under the influence of the corresponding processes. Used in both real and hypothetical cohorts.
The tables have a single calculation scale - the root equal to 10,000 or 100,000 is the conditional initial size of the cohort. Depending on the step of the scale, the tables are divided into complete (in increments of 1 year) and short (in increments of 5 or 10 years). Tables are divided into general and special, differentiated and simple, combined, etc.
So, demographic analysis, taking shape historically, developing principles for the application of statistical, mathematical, sociological methods, has created its own language, its own methods for studying the processes taking place in the population.
Reproduction of the population - the process of generational change as a result of the natural movement of the population. To characterize the size and reproduction of the population, many demographic indicators are used, but the main ones are birth rates, mortality rates (the number of births or deaths in 1 year per 1 thousand inhabitants) and natural increase. Their value is expressed in% (ppm), i.e. in thousandths.
The demographic structure determines the ratio of the population at different ages. An analysis of population changes in different age groups makes it possible to describe the dynamics of changes in the age and sex group, that population growth in the next 45 years will actually take place entirely in less developed countries. economic terms regions. Despite higher death rates across all age groups, populations in poor countries are growing faster because they have significantly higher birth rates. Currently, the average woman in poor countries gives birth to almost twice as many children (2.9 children) as those in wealthy countries (1.6 children). Population size and the rate of its growth differed markedly by regions of the world.
According to UN experts, in 2000 the world population was 791 million people, of which 63.5% lived in Asia, 20.6% in Europe, 13.4% in Africa, 2.0% in Latin America, 0 .3% in North America and Oceania. By 2009, the world's population had more than doubled, with Africa (by 25%) and Asia (by 90%) the least. The fastest growing population in North America. Faster than the population of the world as a whole, the population of Latin America, Oceania and Europe increased. The proportion of the population of Europe has reached the highest value - almost 25% of the world's population. The share of the population of Africa and Asia, on the contrary, decreased (to 57.4% and 8.1%, respectively).
By 2010, the world population had increased by 4.2 times compared to 2005. Most of all, during this period, the population of Latin America (8.0 times), Africa (7.7 times) and Oceania (6.1 times) increased. Europe's population increased least of all (1.8 times), as a result of which its share in the world population decreased to 10.7%. The share of Asia increased to 60.4% (note that this is, nevertheless, lower than in 1750), Africa - up to 14.8%, Latin America - up to 8.6%, North America - up to 5.0 %, Oceania - up to 0.5% of the total world population. According to the average variant of the 2010 revision forecast, by the middle of this century the world's population will increase by 1.3 times. The population of Africa will grow the fastest, increasing by 2.1 times and in 2050 it will be almost 24% of the total population of the world. Population growth in other regions of the world will be more moderate, with only Europe having a smaller population in 2050 than in 2010. Population decline in Europe will begin in the 2020s, and in the middle of the century the value of the growth rate may drop to -0.2% per year. Already since the beginning of the 2000s, the value of the coefficient of natural increase has become negative, and the remaining overall growth is provided by migration growth. The population growth rate of Asia and Latin America will approach zero.
The population of Oceania and North America will grow more rapidly in the 2030s and 2040s, partly due to a rather high migration increase. The overall population growth rate of North America will decrease in 2045-2050 to 0.5% per year, and the rate of natural increase to 0.2%, in Oceania - to 0.7% and 0.6% per year, respectively. In addition, migration growth, in addition to a direct impact on the overall population growth, also has an indirect effect on it due to the rejuvenation of the age structure and the increase in the birth rate (if immigrants from countries with higher birth rates predominate among migrants). Africa's population growth, despite the decline, will remain very high. According to the average forecast option, the value of the coefficient of natural increase in this region will exceed 2% per year until 2025 and will not fall below 1.5% per year by the middle of the century. Half of the world's population growth will come from just nine countries. We list them in descending order of expected contributions: India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bangladesh, Uganda, USA, Ethiopia and China. The only wealthy state on the list is the US, where about a third of the population growth comes from high levels of immigration.
The population of fifty countries, mostly economically developed, on the contrary, will decrease by 2050. It is expected that the population of Germany will decrease from 83 to 79 million people, Italy - from 58 to 51 million, Japan - from 128 to 112 million, Russia - from 143 to 112 million.
Subsequently, projections that there will be billions more people in developing countries and an increase in the number of old people in all other countries, combined with hopes for the economic growth, especially for the world's poor, raise concerns in some quarters about our Earth's ability to bear the "human burden" now and in the future, Russia's population will be slightly smaller than Japan's. The countries of the world can be divided into 3 groups according to population density:
A very high population density for a single country can, obviously, be considered an indicator of over 200 people per 1 sq. km. For example - Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Israel, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Republic of Korea, Rwanda, El Salvador. medium density can be considered an indicator close to the world average (40 people per 1 km2). For example, Ireland, Iraq, Cambodia, Malaysia, Morocco, Tunisia, Mexico, Ecuador. And, finally, the indicator of the lowest density can be attributed to 2 people per 1 sq. km. This group includes Mongolia, Libya, Mauritania, Namibia, Guyana, Australia and Greenland (0.02 people/km2). There are different forecasts for the dynamics of the birth rate in Russia, both Russian and foreign, they are usually made in several versions, but even if we take only optimistic scenarios, they all assume a fairly moderate increase in the birth rate until 2025. And the most optimistic expectations do not imply the achievement modern level US fertility - the only developed country, where it is close to the level of simple replacement of generations.
This also applies to the goal set in the recently adopted Concept of Demographic Policy, where it is not supposed to achieve the American level. In order for natural growth to turn from negative to positive, or at least to zero, even the American level would not be enough now, given the peculiarities of the age structure of the Russian population.
But there is no full confidence that the most optimistic scenarios of birth rate growth will be realized. Some additional danger, understatement, is fraught with the official orientation towards reaching the population of Russia at 142 million people in 2015 and 145 million people in 2025. It brings reassurance where it would be better not to lose vigilance. It is possible to achieve the set goals, but only with large volumes of immigration. demographic population structural
Forecasts that are made even with the most optimistic assumptions about births and deaths show this clearly.
In order to stabilize the population, it is necessary to fully compensate for its natural decline: for this, say, in 2011-2015. almost 1 million immigrants a year will have to be received.
There are more moderate forecasts that also take into account the possibility of reducing mortality and increasing the birth rate, but still do not guarantee full compensation for the natural decline in the population, and hence its ongoing decline.
They proceed, in particular, from the fact that the labor shortage will be covered by about half through temporary migration, guest workers who are not immigrants in the strict sense of the word. But even partial compensation for the natural decline, which, after a period of reduction, will begin to grow again, implies fairly large volumes of stationary immigration.
An analysis of population changes in different age groups makes it possible to describe the dynamics of changes in the age and sex group, so that population growth in the next 45 years will actually take place entirely in economically less developed regions.
Despite higher death rates across all age groups, populations in poor countries are growing faster because they have significantly higher birth rates.
Introduction
As the largest city in Russia and all of Europe, Moscow faces the demographic problems typical of most megacities: high population density, low birth rate, population growth due to migration influx. According to Mosgorstat, as of January 1, 2014, the number of permanent residents of the Russian capital exceeded 12.1 million people, while the share rural population was only 1%.
Annual population growth due to migration from other regions of Russia and foreign countries remains high despite the decline in the crisis year of 2014. Nevertheless, it is not easy for the capital to cope with such a rate of influx of population, an increase in its density, and, consequently, a decrease in the quality of life. This is evidenced by the decrease in the proportion of the city's indigenous inhabitants, the aging of the population, the decline in the birth rate, the increase in the average age at which a child is born, and other adverse consequences.
The programs carried out by the Government of the Russian Federation aimed at increasing the population have also had a positive effect on the central region: since 2011, there has been an increase in natural population growth, an increase in life expectancy.
The purpose of this work is to study the demographic situation in Moscow. To achieve the goal, the author set himself the following tasks:
The work is structured as follows. The first chapter presents the main statistical data characterizing the current demographic situation in Moscow and identifying problematic aspects. The first paragraph of the first chapter describes natural demographic processes, namely: birth rate, death rate and life expectancy. The second paragraph is devoted to the characteristics of migration processes in the metropolis. The second chapter proposes possible measures to improve the described demographic situation and solve the identified problems. D In conclusion, conclusions are presented about the demographic processes taking place in the capital and the proposed actions of the Government of the Russian Federation to solve these problems.
Chapter 1. Current demographic situation in Moscow
1.1. natural processes
Fertility is one of the most significant demographic processes that determine demographic dynamics, namely, the rate of population reproduction.
For Moscow as a region Central Russia for many years, the birth rate has been low compared to the average Russian values (11.3 births per 1,000 population against 13.3 average Russian in 2012). However, after a significant decline in the birth rate in the 1990s and reaching a minimum in 1999, its rates began to grow steadily. Since 2011, the capital has been experiencing a positive natural population growth associated with a simultaneous increase in the birth rate and a decrease in mortality. The first fact is largely due to the implementation in 2006 and 2007 of the programs of the Government of the Russian Federation aimed at supporting the birth rate and strengthening the institution of the family; the second is an increase in life expectancy. Charts 1 and 2 show the dynamics of these indicators for Moscow and Russia (see Appendix 1).
It should be noted that despite the general increase in the birth rate in Moscow and other cities of the Russian Federation, in the capital after 2009 there was no slowdown in the birth rate, which is typical for other cities. Thus, we can talk about maintaining consistently high birth rates relative to other regions.
Another characteristic of the metropolitan area is the ambiguity in the estimation of the number of births. The fact is that the children of nonresident mothers who were born are taken into account, but the women in labor, in relation to whom this statistical indicator is calculated, are not. As a result, birth rates are inflated.
The values of the age-specific fertility rate for Moscow are also specific. It represents the number of births per woman in a certain age group (each group is equal to four years) and reflects the sex and age composition of women of reproductive age.
For Muscovites, as for most other residents of Russian cities in 2004-2010, a decrease in the number of children born to young women (15-24 years old) and an increase in the age-specific fertility rate for women aged 25-49 years are characteristic. Moreover, in this age group, a clear maximum of the coefficient is observed (see Chart 3, Appendix 2).
The peculiarity of Moscow is that, despite the lower average values of birth rates, for the age group of 35-44 years they are higher than the national average. That is, over the years, postponing births has become more and more typical for Moscow. According to V.N. Arkhangelsk , this phenomenon can lead to a reduction in the birth rate in general. There are several reasons for this:
At the same time, a certain (this time positive) contribution to the increase in the average age of women in childbirth was made by federal family assistance programs that provide additional subsidies for the birth of a second and subsequent children. Despite the fact that Moscow does not collect data on those born by birth order, the positive impact federal programs may indicate an increase in age-specific fertility rates in groups older than 25 years (which are characterized by the birth of more than the first child).
Positive trends are also manifested in mortality rates and life expectancy for Muscovites. Since 1994, life expectancy for residents of the capital has been on the rise. (See Table 1, Annex 3) In addition, this indicator remained unchanged for men and slightly increased for women, even with a significant reduction for the rest of Russians in the early 2000s.
At the same time, still low birth rates, a decrease in mortality and an increase in life expectancy lead to an increase in the average age of citizens, a reduction in the share of the working population (in 2010-2013, the share of the able-bodied population decreased by 1.5%) and, most importantly, his aging. The share of Muscovites aged 65 and over is higher than the national average (12.9%). Graph 5 (see Appendix 4) shows that the percentage of older people in the metropolis continues to grow.
Based on the data in the table, an unpleasant conclusion can be drawn: the burden on the working population from children is lower than in Russia, and for the elderly this figure is higher. Moreover, the burden on the part of the latter since 2003 tends to increase, which leads to such negative consequences as an increased burden on the budget, an increase in transfer payments and the provision of medical services, and a reduction in the labor force.
1.2. Migration processes
Economic interests have been and remain one of the main reasons for migration. With its high economic potential, Moscow is the largest center for the influx of migrants in Russia. Thanks to this fact, the population of Moscow is growing at a high rate, despite the low birth rate and negative natural growth until 2011. Thus, with zero and negative growth rates, the population of Moscow on average increases by 1 million people every ten years for a century.
It is obvious that such population growth is ensured by the influx of migrants. Moreover, the share of foreign immigrants accounts for 10% of all arrivals in the capital. Only a third of them are labor migrants. Therefore, a decrease in the influx of workers from abroad, due to an increase in the cost of a patent for work and a depreciation of the ruble, can hardly significantly affect the total migration growth of the population of Moscow.
Census data from 1989-2010 show that in 2010 every second resident of the capital (aged 25-30 years) did not live in it in 1989. high density and the high rate of increase in the number of inhabitants of the capital leads to the emergence of social problems and the growing discontent of the indigenous population. A significant role in the formation of a negative attitude is played by the multinationality of our country and the formation of the multi-ethnicity of the capital over the decades, as migrants from foreign countries and republics of our state have been influx. According to the 2002 census, after Russians, the majority of Moscow's population are Ukrainians, Tatars, or Armenians. In addition, representatives of 12 nationalities are present in the city in the amount of 10 to 100 thousand people. In total, representatives of 168 nationalities live in the capital.
An urgent problem for Russia is the statistical accounting of migrants. Thus, some unofficial sources say that the number of foreign migrants in Moscow reaches two million, while the FMS data for 2013 totals only one million. The bulk of illegal migrants are labor. In this regard, special attention will be paid to the labor migration of foreign citizens.
The flow of temporary, and with it, illegal labor migration is constantly increasing. It turns out that illegal workers take jobs, use the public and medical (childbirth, for example) benefits of the capital, but do not pay taxes to the state budget. In addition, migration is one of the three problems affecting the increase in crime. So, according to Moscow Prosecutor Sergei Kudeneev, in 2012 migrants committed every sixth crime in the metropolis, every third crime related to robbery and robbery.
The author is sure that government agencies and the media often deliberately focus on the crimes committed by migrants in order to divert attention from more important social problems. But there is some truth in these facts. Illegal migration is a potential environment for the growth of corruption, provoking interethnic conflicts, worsening the epidemiological and criminal situation in the metropolis. The fact is that a significant part of immigrants in Russia are uneducated people, the crime rate among which is higher. Ignorance of the laws of the host country and national peculiarities play their role (the kidnapping of underage brides, unacceptable in Russia, for example).
Uneducated migrants are of little economic benefit to Russia. If the migrant received at least one course higher education, not to mention the knowledge of the Russian language, its potential usefulness for the metropolis increases significantly. And uneducated illegal migrants can cause real harm to well-being. Dumping can also be added to the above problems. wages in the sector of unskilled workers, an increase in the burden on the social infrastructure of the city, not compensated from the funds federal budget(medical services, education, police control, fire services and much more), unhealthy competition in some market segments (illegal trade).
The main flow of migrants to Moscow comes from Uzbekistan (17.5% of all arrivals), Tajikistan (12.5%) and Kyrgyzstan (11.5%). Labor migration is becoming more distant culturally. Gradually formed enclaves - migratory areas. Mutual hostility arises between migrants and the population. Thus, a survey in the Demoscopeweekly magazine suggests that Muscovites are most afraid of bandits and migrants, and migrants are most afraid of the police, skinheads and Muscovites.
But despite the existing problems, it is impossible to stop the influx of both Russian and foreign migrants. Migrants are a labor force, including a skilled one. A survey in one of the articles in the Demoscom magazine shows that a third of Muscovites have used the services of foreign migrants in the past three years. household. The use of migrant labor in households allows qualified Muscovites not to leave the labor market, but to shift care of the elderly onto migrants, construction works, house cleaning and much more. One cannot deny the fact that due to the influx of foreign migrants, the costs of construction work and the improvement of the city's infrastructure have decreased.
Chapter 2. Possible measures to improve the demographic situation in Moscow
Despite the positive population growth in recent years and the decline in mortality, the birth rate still remains at a critically low level. Government programs to increase the birth rate cannot be carried out forever, especially in the current situation, when the state has to save budget funds. In addition, even the number of children desired by families (less than two for all age groups of women in labor) is not enough for a stable increase in the number of the indigenous population of the capital and a change in demographic dynamics. In this case, it is important to influence not only economic, but also psychological aspects. Competent agitation and promotion of the cult of the family and childbearing are needed to provoke among the population the desire to give birth more. It is necessary to change the values of society in such a way that a large number of children brought up by families become a source of pride.
It is also important to support low-income families with a large potential number of births, but little material resources for this. We are talking about visitors who have been living in Moscow for a long period of time (10 years, for example), but still have not had time to settle down. As mentioned above, visitors usually give birth to more children. Among the possible measures that could have a positive effect are loans for the purchase of housing with special repayment options subject to the birth of children, the extension of paid leave in the amount of the minimum subsistence level, or the opening of kindergartens with preferential terms payment.
The problem of increasing the average age of women in childbirth deserves special attention. Of course, this trend is understandable: Muscovites prefer to get an education, arrange their lives in the metropolis, and only then have children. But a further increase in the age of women in labor can lead to critical consequences. In this regard, it is important to pay attention at the public level to the importance of the state of health of a young mother, to cultivate the fashion of a strong family, to further protect the rights of women who have given birth (control over the preservation of the workplace after leaving maternity leave, enhanced supervision over the payment of alimony to a child in case of divorce of parents, etc.).
In the context of population aging, complexities and high costs in the way of population reproduction, migration seems to be simple and convenient way increasing the composition of the labor force and reducing the burden on the state budget. But to have a positive effect, migration must be strictly controlled by government agencies.
Only legal migration on a limited scale can have a favorable economic impact on the metropolis without exacerbating intercultural and interethnic problems. To do this, some experts suggest taking the following steps:
Conclusion
This article examined the main aspects of the demographic situation in the metropolitan metropolis: the birth rate, the age structure of the birth rate, mortality, natural increase, life expectancy, the demographic burden on the able-bodied population, migration rates, the main countries that “suppliers” of labor migrants to Moscow that exist in Moscow problems associated with population growth due to migration.
An analytical review of statistical data allows us to conclude that the birth rate in Moscow is characterized by an increase in its intensity, a positive natural increase and an increase in the average age of women in labor. Due to the high standard of living and quality medical care, the death rate in the capital is lower, and life expectancy is higher than similar indicators in other cities and the Russian average. In addition, Moscow is characterized by a high proportion of the elderly population, and it is increasing every year. The migration policy is characterized by significant problems in the statistical accounting of migrants, which leads to an increase in the flow of illegal migrants, mainly from the former Soviet republics.
The possible measures presented in the second chapter to improve the current demographic situation and solve the pressing problems in the metropolis are to some extent idealized. Of course, not all of these measures can be implemented in the short term. In order to see the real effect of the measures taken by the Government in the field of demography, a lot of time must pass. Therefore, for a real solution to the problem, you need to think globally, for the future. But one thing is clear: increased state intervention in solving demographic problems is necessary.
Attachment 1
Graph 1. Number of births (excluding stillbirths) per year, people, Moscow
Graph 2. Number of births (excluding stillbirths) per year, persons, Russian Federation
Annex 2
Graph 3. Age-specific fertility rates (number of births per year on average per 1000 women aged, years), ppm, Moscow, urban population
Chart 4. Age-specific fertility rates (number of births per year on average per 1000 women aged, years), ppm,
Russian Federation, urban population
Appendix 3
Table 1. Life expectancy at birth, years, year, Russian Federation, Moscow, men and women.
|
1990 |
1992 |
1994 |
1996 |
1998 |
2000 |
2002 |
2004 |
2006 |
2008 |
2010 |
2012 |
2013 |
|
| Men, RF |
63,7 |
61,9 |
57,4 |
59,6 |
61,2 |
58,7 |
58,9 |
60,4 |
61,9 |
63,1 |
64,56 |
65,13 |
|
| Men, MSC |
64,8 |
63,4 |
57,7 |
62,4 |
64,8 |
64,6 |
64,9 |
65,9 |
67,3 |
68,7 |
69,9 |
71,6 |
72,31 |
| Women, RF |
74,3 |
73,7 |
71,1 |
72,4 |
73,1 |
72,3 |
71,9 |
72,4 |
73,3 |
74,3 |
74,9 |
75,86 |
76,3 |
| Women, MSC |
73,9 |
71,5 |
73,8 |
74,6 |
74,8 |
75,8 |
76,9 |
77,8 |
Bibliographic list
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